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Background: Self-focused attention (S-FA), appearance-related comparisons (A-
RCs) and self-serving appearance-related biases are relevant to cognitive-behavioural 
models of, and therefore distress maintenance in, BDD despite them being under-
researched. To the author’s knowledge, there are no previous published 
investigations looking at the nature and specificity of A-RCs, beliefs held about the 
functions of A-RCs, or experiments investigating self-serving A-RCs biases in 
people with BDD relative to healthy controls. It was also felt that a more fine grained 
investigation of self-esteem looking at self-competence and self-liking in people with 
BDD was warranted. 
 
Hypotheses: Hypothesis 1 explored the nature (frequency, direction (attractiveness 
of A-RCs targets) and automaticity) of A-RCs. More frequent, generally more 
upwards (to more attractive others) and more automatic A-RCs were hypothesised in 
people with BDD relative to healthy controls. Hypothesis 2 explored the specificity 
of A-RCs in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. It was hypothesised that 
the more frequent A-RCs would not be attributable to more general constructs related 
to comparing. Beliefs about the functions of A-RCs in people with BDD relative to 
healthy controls were also explored. Hypothesis 3 investigated a self-serving A-RCs 
bias, hypothesising that healthy controls, but not people with BDD, would hold this 
sort of bias contingent on S-FA. Hypothesis 4 investigated self-esteem, 
hypothesising that self-liking would be disproportionately lower than self-
competence in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. 
 
Method: 23 people with BDD (10 females, 13 males) and 20 healthy controls (10 
females, 10 males) matched approximately on age and sex were recruited while using 
rigorous screening criteria. Hypotheses 1 and 2 used standardised and newly devised 
questionnaires to explore A-RCs in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. 
Hypothesis 3 was tested (BDD, n=22; healthy controls, n= 20) using a novel mixed 
experimental design to investigate the self-serving A-RCs bias, which included 
employing a manipulation of implicit S-FA as a repeated-measures variable. 
Hypothesis 4 used the well-established Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, divided into 
self-competence and self-liking, to look at the extent of between group differences. 
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Results: Hypothesis 1 was fully supported. A-RCs were significantly more frequent, 
generally more upwards, and more automatic in people with BDD relative to healthy 
controls. Hypothesis 2 was also fully supported. The significantly higher frequency 
of A-RCs in people with BDD, relative to healthy controls, could not be attributed to 
general social comparison orientation, upwards social comparison orientation, or 
self-esteem. People with BDD also held significantly stronger agreement with beliefs 
about A-RCs as serving functions of self-evaluation, self-loathing (a way to confirm 
beliefs about physical unattractiveness) and social threat management relative to 
healthy controls. Hypothesis 3 was not supported, with no A-RCs bias, contingent on 
S-FA, being found in healthy controls or people with BDD. Hypothesis 4 was also 
not supported with both self-competence and self-liking being found to be 
significantly and equally lower in people with BDD relative to healthy controls.  
 
Discussion: The author discusses results with particular reference to the theory of 
social comparison processes as well as literature on clinical anxiety and cognitive-
behavioural models of BDD. The discussed limitations of the present investigation 
include the absence of a clinical control group, not matching groups on objective 
attractiveness, and the study’s ecological validity. Clinical implications cover 
suggested guidance for addressing A-RCs in cognitive-behavioural therapy and with 
mindfulness. More comprehensive investigations of A-RCs biases in people with 
BDD are covered as future directions for research. 
 
Key words and abbreviations: Body Dysmorphic Disorder, BDD; Self-focused 
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1.1 Literature review 
 
1.1.1 Diagnosis of Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) 
 
Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) is defined in DSM-IV as a preoccupation with an 
imagined or slight defect in appearance, resulting in significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning 
(American Psychiatric Association, [APA] 2000). The preoccupation should not be 
better accounted for by another mental disorder such as the dissatisfaction with body 
shape and size found in anorexia nervosa (APA, 2000). The preoccupation in BDD 
should be for at least one hour per day (Phillips, 1996a). The content of this 
preoccupation however as defined as an imagined or slight defect in appearance can 
be problematic to diagnose and confusing or vexing for patients under assessment 
given that they tend to perceive the ‘defect’ as ugly, unsightly or disfigured for 
example. A suggested revision to the preoccupation criterion has therefore been 
proposed for the DSM-V as a ‘‘Preoccupation with a perceived defect(s) or flaw(s) in 
physical appearance that is not observable or appears slight to others.’’ (Phillips et 
al., 2010, p.578). This revision would more accurately reflect the phenomenology of 
BDD by focusing on a discrepancy between the concern of the person with BDD and 
the general views of others. The inclusion of the word flaw(s) in addition to defect(s) 
might also be more suitable to some patients if defect is considered a too harsh a 
term (Phillips et al., 2010). The proposed revision to the preoccupation criterion is 
therefore likely to be more helpful to therapeutic engagement. 
 
BDD is classified as a somatoform disorder in the DSM-IV and a hypochondrical 
disorder called “dysmorphophobia” in the ICD-10 (APA 2000; World Health 
Organisation, [WHO] 1992). The DSM-IV diagnosis of BDD however is preferred 
by experts in the field and is therefore focused on here (Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). 
 
The significant distress or impaired functioning criterion is what distinguishes more 
common presentations of body dissatisfaction expressed in therapy from a full 
diagnosis of BDD (Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1992). It has been shown that a larger 
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proportion of people with BDD meet the distress criterion (90%) as compared to that 
of impaired functioning (51%) (Koran, Abujaoude, Large, & Serpe, 2008). Beliefs 
about appearance in BDD that are held with poor insight are referred to as 
overvalued ideas in the DSM-IV. When such beliefs are of a delusional level of 
conviction an additional DSM-IV diagnosis of a delusional disorder can be given 
although the clinical utility of this is highly questionable (Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). 
BDD is commonly under- or mis-diagnosed for a multitude of reasons (Buhlmann, 
2011; Buhlmann, Greenberg, & Wilhelm, 2011). People with BDD might not voice 
their appearance concerns unless specifically asked by their physician owing to 
feelings of shame or embarrassment (Grant, Kim, & Crow, 2001; Conroy et al., 
2008). Clinicians might not assess for BDD if anorexia nervosa seems more relevant 
owing to the hierarchical approach to diagnosis in the DSM-IV (Grant & Phillips, 
2004). The disorder’s frequent presentation in less psychologically minded settings 
might also contribute to the inadequate diagnosis of BDD (e.g. Phillips, Grant, 
Siniscalchi, & Albertini, 2001; Crerand, Menard, & Phillips, 2010).  The age of onset 
for BDD is typically during early adolescence (Phillips & Diaz, 1997; Phillips, Didie, 
Menard, Pagano, Fay, & Weisberg, 2006), although the diagnosis of BDD is usually 
much later. 
 
1.1.2 BDD as an obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorder 
 
While having some commonalties with the affective spectrum, BDD has been 
proposed as belonging to the obsessive- compulsive spectrum (Phillips, McElroy, 
Hudson, & Pope, 1995; Phillips, 2002). The main preoccupation with appearance has 
indeed been deemed as obsessional and it can lead to both repetitive and avoidance 
behaviours as described below (Phillips, 2002; Greenberg & Wilhelm, 2011). 
 
1.1.3 The clinical features of BDD 
 
Appearance-related preoccupation in BDD 
People with BDD are frequently preoccupied with more than one area of their body 
(Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Pope, & Hudson, 1993). Parts of the face and head are the 
most commonly reported, such as the skin, hair, and nose, although any part of the 
body can be the focus of concern (Phillips & Diaz, 1997; Phillips et al., 1993; Veale, 
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et al., 1996). Indeed, in descending order, the skin (80%), head hair (57.7%), and 
nose (39%) were the most commonly reported lifetime body areas of excessive 
concern in a study of 200 people with BDD; the lifetime mean number of body areas 
of excessive concern was 5–7 (Phillips, Menard, Fay, & Weisberg, 2005). In addition 
to the presentation of intense preoccupation with specific body areas, 29% of people 
with BDD were recently shown to have more general weight concerns. This BDD 
group were more likely to be young, female, have a high number of body areas of 
concern and have greater body image disturbance, amongst other clinically pertinent 
variables (Kittler, Menard, & Phillips, 2007). 
 
Appearance-related processes in BDD 
People with BDD often engage in rumination about their appearance (Veale, 2004), 
and another behavioural process often found as a feature of BDD is appearance-
related comparing (Phillips, 2005; Cororve & Gleaves, 2001; Veale, 2004). People 
with BDD have reported spending a lot of time comparing their body areas of 
concern to the same area in others (Anson, 2008). Appearance-related comparing 
forms a key aspect of the present study and is returned to later. 
 
Appearance-related behaviours in BDD 
As in other anxiety disorders, people with BDD engage in both avoidance and 
“safety seeking behaviours” (SSBs) which are designed to reduce the likelihood of 
their feared outcomes occurring (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Salkovskis, 1999; Veale, 
2004). SSBs in BDD include camouflaging with clothing, or a particular hair style 
(Phillips et al., 1993). People with skin preoccupations are also likely to camouflage 
with make-up and to engage in pathological skin-picking (Grant, Menard, & Phillips, 
2006; Phillips, & Taub, 1995). SSBs in BDD also include changes in posture, not 
allowing others to see the body from certain angles and the use of clothing/jewellery 
as a distraction (Veale, De Haro, & Lambrou, 2003). 
 
People with BDD often experience marked anxiety in social situations owing to 
social-evaluative concerns (Pinto & Phillips, 2005; Coles et al., 2006). As a 
consequence, avoidance of both social and occupational situations is common in 
people with BDD, and this might well result in them becoming housebound (Phillips 
et al. 1993; Phillips, Didie, Menard, Pagano, Fay, & Weisberg, 2006).  
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A large majority of people with BDD report excessively checking their appearance in 
mirrors and other reflective surfaces for up to four hours per day with some periodic 
avoidance. Others have reported the avoidance of mirrors/ reflections, and of other 
potential appearance related triggers such as magazines and television (Phillips et al., 
1997; Phillips et al., 1993). In particular some people with BDD report that mirror-
gazing is too time-consuming or distressing (Veale & Riley, 2001). Some have also 
reported subtle tactile sensations such as facial tightness, preoccupation with 
concerns around the fragility of a facial feature, and excessive reassurance seeking 
(Phillips et al., 1993; Phillips et al., 1995). 
 
Other behaviours however can be long lasting, permanent, and dangerous owing to 
attempts to correct or enhance appearance. The use of tanning, appearance enhancing 
medical treatments (e.g. cosmetic surgery, dermatology and dental work) and “do it 
yourself” surgery have all been reported (Phillips et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 1993; 
Sarwer, & Crerand, 2008; Veale, 2000). Those who are treated medically rarely 
experience improvements and often endure an increase in their symptoms (Sarwer, & 
Crerand, 2008; Phillips et al., 1997; Phillips et al., 1993). Moreover, postoperative 
dissatisfaction has been found in 76% of 25 people with BDD who were currently 
presenting for psychiatric assessment and who reported having had a total of 46 
procedures between them. Most people in the study had multiple concerns with their 
appearance and it was reported that 50% of procedures resulted in a transfer of the 
main body area of preoccupation (Veale, 2000). Repeated operations and rhinoplasty 
led to the worst outcome whereas mammoplasty and pinnaplasty were associated 
with higher levels of satisfaction. 
 
Appearance-related insight in BDD 
Many people with BDD have also reported ideas or delusions of reference associated 
with their defect (Phillips et al., 1993). Furthermore, insight is usually poorer in BDD 
than in related disorders although a continuum ranging from insightful to delusional 
has still been observed (Eisen, Phillips, Coles, & Rasmussen, 2004; Phillips, 2004; 
Phillips, Menard, Pagano, Fay & Stout, 2006; Jakes & Hemsley, 1996). Research has 
highlighted that people with delusional and non-delusional BDD do not differ on a 
large range of variables (Phillips et al., 1994; Phillips et al., 2006). These variables 
have included demographic details, characteristics of the disorder, most measures of 
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functional impairment and quality of life, comorbidity (for both axis I and II 
disorders), family history, probability of remission over a one year follow-up and 
treatment response to Serotonin-Reuptake Inhibitors (Phillips et al., 2006; Phillips & 
McElroy, 1993). Phillips et al. (2006), however, found that a delusional BDD group 
had significantly lower educational achievement, a higher rate of attempted suicide, 
some evidence of poorer social functioning, a higher rate of lifetime drug abuse and 
dependency, more severe BDD symptoms, and were less likely to be receiving 
mental health treatment. BDD symptom severity however was found to account for 
these differences, with the exception of educational achievement, adding weight to 
the view that delusional and non-delusional groups are presentations of the same 
disorder at differing levels of severity (Phillips et al., 1994; Phillips & McElroy, 
1993; Phillips et al., 2006).  
 
Appearance-related standards and over-valued ideas in BDD 
People with BDD have been found to hold high aesthetic standards and overvalued 
ideas about the importance of attractiveness (Lambrou, Veale, & Wilson, 2011; 
Veale & Lambrou, 2002; Veale, 2002). Veale (2002) proposed that the self in BDD 
is defined by its aesthetic qualities/ as an aesthetic object. The idealised values 
associated with this processing of the self were unsurprisingly reported to be about 
appearance but in some people with BDD they were also reported as relating to 
social acceptance.  
 
1.1.4 Prevalence of BDD 
 
BDD has been found to have a lifetime prevalence of 1.1% in a community setting 
whereas its point prevalence has been shown to be 1.7% to 4.9% of the population 
(Bienvenu et al., 2000; Rief, Buhlmann, Wilhelm, Borkenhagen, & Brähler, 2006; 
Buhlmann et al., 2010; Koran, Abujaoude, Large, & Serpe, 2008; Boroughs, 
Krawczyk, 2010). In certain healthcare settings however, such as cosmetic surgery 
and dermatology, the prevalence is higher. It has been estimated that 5%-15% of 
patients presenting for appearance enhancing medical treatments suffer from BDD 
(Crerand, Franklin, & Sarwer, 2006; Sarwer & Crerand, 2008). In cosmetic surgery 
samples a rate of 7% was reported in an American study whereas rates from 3.2% to 
16.6% have been reported in recent international studies (Sarwer, Wadden, 
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Pertschuk, & Whitaker, 1998; Vulink et al., 2006; Aouizerate, et al., 2003; Bellino et 
al., 2006). In dermatological clinic settings prevalence rates of 8.5% to 11.9% have 
been identified (Vulink et al., 2006; Phillips, Dufresne, Wilkel, & Vittorio, 2000). 
The rate of BDD in adult inpatient settings is also high with reports ranging from 
13.1% to 16% (Grant, Kim, & Crow, 2001; Conroy et al., 2008). The prevalence of 
BDD has been found to decrease after the age of 44 years however (Koran et al., 
2008). The prevalence rate of BDD is clearly dependent on the healthcare setting 
studied (Crerand, Franklin, & Sarwer, 2006). The influence of the country and 
culture of study, and the assessment method used, is not well established. 
 
1.1.5 Quality of life in BDD 
 
Scores on all domains of mental health-related quality of life, as measured by a 
common quality of life measure, were found to be poorer in people with BDD as 
compared to norms from groups of patients with depression, diabetes mellitus, or a 
recent myocardial infarction. More severe BDD symptoms and greater delusionality 
were also associated with poorer mental health-related quality of life and social 
functioning after controlling for depression severity (Phillips, 2000). More recently, 
in a prospective study design, BDD symptom severity was shown to be a significant 
predictor of poorer psychosocial functioning (Phillips, Quinn, & Stout, 2008). More 
delusional BDD symptoms were not a significant predictor of such functioning once 
symptom severity had been controlled for however. This study also showed that 
psychosocial functioning was both poor and stable during a 3 year follow-up period. 
 
People with BDD have also been shown to score more poorly compared to people 
with eating disorders on a measure of the effects of body image disturbance on 
several areas of psychosocial functioning and well-being (Hrabosky et al., 2009). It 
has also been noted that people with BDD might have few friends and a restricted 
social life due to avoidance (Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). 
 
1.1.6 Suicidality in BDD 
 
A history of suicidal ideation owing primarily to BDD has been found to be 45%-
70% in cohorts studied in cross-sectional/retrospective studies (Perugi et al., 1997; 
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Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Hudson, Pope, 1997). The rates of past suicide attempts in 
people with BDD have been reported as 22%–24% (Veale et al., 1996; Phillips & 
Diaz, 1997). In addition, a 4 year prospective study found that 2.6% of a cohort of 
185 participants with BDD attempted suicide per year (Phillips & Meynard, 2006). 
The completed suicide rate for this BDD cohort was 0.3% which was documented as 
45 times higher than that of the general population. 
 
1.1.7 Demographics in BDD 
 
The current estimated prevalence rates of BDD have been slightly higher in women 
(1.9%-2.5%) than in men (1.4-2.2%) (Rief et al., 2006; Koran et al., 2008; Buhlmann 
et al., 2010). BDD has been found to have more similarities than differences between 
the sexes (Phillips & Diaz, 1997; Perugi et al., 1997; Phillips, Menard, & Fay, 2006). 
In this latter study by Phillips et al. (2006), which had the largest cohort and broadest 
inclusion and exclusion criteria, females were found to have a significantly greater 
number of current body areas of concern compared to males. More females were 
dissatisfied with their skin, stomach, weight, breast/chest, buttocks, thighs, legs, hips, 
toes, and body/facial hair. More males however were dissatisfied with their genitals, 
had concerns that their body build was too small/ poorly muscled, and that their head 
hair was thinning/balding.  
 
Furthermore more males were found to lift weights excessively, to have a substance 
use disorder, and to be more functionally impaired. More women however were 
found to have had repetitive and safety behaviours, an eating disorder, and an earlier 
onset of subclinical BDD. 
 
It has also been shown that people with BDD are likely to be unemployed and that a 
high proportion of this population are single, separated, or never married (Perugi et 
al., 1997; Phillips, McElory, Keck, Hudson, & Pope, 1994;; Koran, et al., 2008). 
Another study showed that a BDD group were of lower social class than a healthy 
control group and a rhinoplasty waiting-list group (Thomas & Goldberg, 1995). In 
this study less than half of the BDD group had this disorder as their primary 
diagnosis however. It has also been shown that dropping out of school is common 
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due to BDD amongst a cohort of younger people with this diagnosis (Albertini & 
Phillips, 1999). 
 
1.1.8 Comorbidity in BDD 
 
In BDD co-morbidity is very common, with a mean of more than two lifetime axis I 
comorbidities (Gunstad & Phillips, 2003). In terms of both current and lifetime co-
morbidity rates, major depressive disorder (MDD), social phobia (SP), and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), have been reported as the most common 
(Veale et al., 1996; Zimmerman & Mattia, 1998; Gunstad & Phillips, 2003; Phillips 
& Diaz, 1997).  
 
A large range of other current and lifetime co-morbidities have been reported 
including dysthymia, bipolar disorder, eating disorder, and substance use disorders 
including alcohol and non-alcohol substance dependency and abuse (Phillips & Diaz, 
1997; Zimmerman & Mattia, 1998; Gunstad & Phillips, 2003; Nierenberg et al., 
2002; Grant, Kim, & Crow, 2001; Grant, Menard, Pagano, Fay & Phillips, 2005). 
 
Gunstad & Phillips (2003), in the largest cohort study focusing on comorbidity in 
BDD, found the following prevalence rates: MDD: current, 58%, lifetime, 76%; SP: 
current, 32%, lifetime, 37%; and OCD: current, 25%, lifetime, 37%. The prevalence 
rate of current comorbid dysthmia in BDD has been reported to be 18% - 19% (Veale 
et al., 1996; Zimmerman & Mattia, 1998). Furthermore the larger cohort studies 
show the lifetime prevalence rate of dysthymia to be around 6-7% (Gunstad & 
Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Diaz, 1997). The prevalence rate of current comorbid 
bipolar disorder in BDD has been reported to be 5-6% although the reported lifetime 
prevalence rate of comorbidity has varied from 5%- 31% (Zimmerman & Mattia, 
1998; Gunstad & Phillips, 2003; Perugi et al., 1997).  
 
The prevalence rate of current comorbid eating disorder in BDD has been reported as 
4%- 19% (Gunstad & Phillips, 2003; Zimmerman & Mattia, 1998) whereas the 
lifetime prevalence rate has varied from as much as 4% in Gunstad & Phillips (2003) 
to 10%- 22% in both older and smaller cohort studies (Phillips & Diaz, 1997; Perugi 
et al., 1997; Nierenberg et al., 2002). 
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The prevalence rate of current comorbid substance use disorder (SUD) in BDD has 
been reported as 2%- 17% (Veale et al., 1996; Grant et al., 2005). The lifetime 
prevalence rate of SUD comorbidity however appears to be much higher with 
reported prevalence rates from 22%- 48.9% (Hollander et al., 1993; Grant et al., 
2005). The prevalence of both alcohol and at least some non-alcohol substance abuse 
disorders appears to be particularly high in the inpatient setting (Grant et al., 2001). 
 
1.1.9 Treatment of BDD 
 
In a large cohort followed up for 1 year BDD was shown to have a very low 
probability of remitting (0.09%) despite a large proportion (83.2%) of its participants 
receiving mental health treatment (Phillips, Menard, Pagano, Fay, & Stout, 2006). 
The course of BDD therefore appears to be chronic, highlighting a need for effective 
treatment. A recent review including 26 studies (including case reports, case series, 
open trials, controlled trials, and two meta-analyses) of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT) for BDD however showed that this mode of treatment is promising 
(Greenberg & Wilhelm, 2011). The review documented that CBT for BDD is 
associated with improvements in symptoms and associated features including 
functioning, depression, anxiety, and delusional beliefs. Furthermore, a meta-analysis 
showed that pharmacotherapy was not as effective as psychological therapies 
(Williams, Hadjistavropoulos, & Sharpe, 2006). A Cochrane collaboration meta-
analysis of RCT designed studies more recently highlighted that BDD symptom 
severity can be significantly reduced with either serotonin reuptake inhibitors or CBT 
(Ipser, Sander, Stein, 2009). CBT also had some evidence of a low relapse rate. The 
authors also concluded that there is a need for replication in results. The most 
substantive evidence for CBT for BDD comes from two studies employing the 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) design. Both studies have highlighted that CBT 
for BDD is more effective than wait-list control (WLC) conditions (Rosen, Reiter, & 
Orsan, 1995; Veale, et al., 1996). It is interesting however that CBT and BT have 
been shown to have a similar effectiveness in terms of BDD severity outcome in a 
meta-analysis (Williams et al., 2006). The models that CBT is currently being based 





1.1.10 Cognitive-behavioural models of BDD 
 
A number of cognitive behavioural models propose that, for a variety of reasons, 
people can develop preoccupations with negative views of their appearance (Cash, 
2002, 2008; Neziroglu, Khemlani-Patel, & Veale, 2008; Veale, 2004; Veale & 
Neziroglu, 2010; Wilhelm, 2006). For example one cognitive behavioural model has 
applied both operant and classical (or evaluative) conditioning, social learning, and 
relational frame theory to highlight how vulnerable people develop and maintain 
symptoms of BDD (Neziroglu, 2004; Neziroglu, Roberts, & Yaryura-Tobia, 2004). 
In particular, early life praise for physical attributes and built associations between 
related aspects of appearance and negative affect owing to teasing/bullying have 
been suggested as relevant (Neziroglu et al., 2004; Neziroglu et al., 2008; Osman, 
Cooper, Hackman, & Veale, 2004). 
 
Once negative views about appearance have developed Veale and Neziroglu’s (2010) 
model of BDD asserts that a trigger situation, such as an external representation of 
appearance (e.g. a relevant intrusive thought, somatic sensation, or in comparing with 
another person’s physical attractiveness) can lead to increased levels of self-focused 
attention. This increase in self-focused attention is said to heighten awareness of the 
“self as an aesthetic object”. This concept of the self as an aesthetic object, in 
addition to including self-focused attention, is said to constitute beliefs about the 
importance of self-focused attention, mental imagery, and the lack of a self-serving 
appearance-related bias (Neziroglu et al., 2008; Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). Self-
focused attention is viewed as being directed towards a distorted body image or 
“felt” impression of how one appears to others from an observer perspective (Veale, 
2004; Osman, Cooper, Hackmann, & Veale, 2004). This image is proposed to be 
appraised negatively leading to understandable but ultimately maladaptive cognitive 
processes and behaviours such as selective attention, rumination, appearance-related 
comparisons, mirror-checking/gazing, SSBs, and avoidance. These cognitive 
processes and behaviours maintain preoccupation with negative beliefs and certain 
features, increase self-consciousness and awareness of negative imagery, and prevent 
disconfirmation of feared outcomes. Furthermore negatively appraised imagery, and 
the other abovementioned cognitive processes and behaviours, are said to result in 
changes in mood such as increased shame, anger and depression. These changes in 
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mood are also asserted to increase self-consciousness and awareness of negative 
imagery. 
 
1.2 The present study 
 
1.2.1 Rationale I 
 
There is limited experimental research testing the models described above. In 
particular there is little research investigating self-focused attention and appearance-
related comparisons in people with BDD despite their relevance to cognitive-
behavioural models of the disorder. There is also a paucity of research on self-
serving appearance-related biases in body image research generally and in BDD in 
particular. There is a need to study this given that there is some indication that people 
with BDD lack such biases (Lambrou, Veale, & Wilson, 2011). A detailed review of 
self-focused attention, social and appearance-related comparisons and evidence on 
self-serving biases in body image research is now presented. The review of these 
constructs is broad-based reflecting the scarcity of research on BDD. The review 
later prepares the reader for a subsequent focus on the second part of the present 
research’s rationale along with its aims and hypotheses. 
 
1.2.2 Self-focused attention (S-FA) 
 
Definition of S-FA 
Self-focus increases the availability of one’s schematic representations of the self 
(Hull & Levy, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981). Self-focused attention (S-FA) has 
been defined as “an awareness of self-referent, internally generated information that 
stands in contrast to an awareness of externally generated information derived 
through sensory receptors” (Ingram, 1990b, p. 156). Research has demonstrated that 
S-FA increases the effects of schematic representations of the self on a wide variety 
of research tasks (Hull & Levy, 1979; Geller & Shaver, 1976). SFA is a “nonspecific 
process in psychopathology” found in many clinical disorders (Ingram, 1990b, p. 
173; Woodruff-Borden, Brothers, & Lister, 2001; Mansell, Harvey, Watkins, & 
Shafran, 2008; see Clark & Wells, 1995 for an example). Ingram (1990b) referred to 
the dysfunctional aspect of maladaptive S-FA as self-absorption. He explained self-
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absorption to be an excessive, sustained, and inflexible attention towards internal 
states even when an external focus would be more useful.  
 
Conceptualisation of S-FA 
It has recently been highlighted that S-FA1 is most adequately conceptualised as a 
multifaceted psychological construct or a dynamic information processing operation 
(Mor & Winquist, 2002). Indeed the relationship between S-FA and negative affect 
is dependent upon the form it takes, the context, and the content of focus (Moberly 
&Watkins, 2008; Mor & Winquist, 2002). There is also some literature highlighting 
the more beneficial correlates of S-FA including self-knowledge and insight, self-
regulation, and emotion regulation (McFarland, Buehler, von Ruti, Nguyen, & 
Alvaro, 2007). The notion of S-FA as multifaceted and contextually dependent 
therefore gives the concept greater construct validity for use in applied empirical 
testing (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Hamilton, & Nix, 1991; Mor & Winquist, 2002). 
 
Form of S-FA (rumination vs. reflection) 
There are different forms of S-FA, such as rumination and reflection, which are 
likely to serve different functions (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; 
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). A ruminative form of S-FA is related to greater distress 
and pathology when it is more abstract, general, and decontextualised (Watkins, 
2008). On the other hand, S-FA that is reflective, open-minded, and experiential 
including more concrete awareness of the present-moment is related with more 
adaptive outcomes (Watkins, 2008). There is also experimental work to show that 
                                                 
1
 Some literature conceptualises S-FA as trait-like and is therefore assessed by self-report in 
work that has often been correlational (e.g. Flory, Räikkönen, Matthews, & Owens, 2000; 
Mor & Winquist, 2002). The present research concentrates on S-FA as a state vulnerable to 
momentary experimental manipulation following Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton, 
(2006). Some literature on S-FA as a trait however is also referred to as this appears to be 
important when comparing clinical and non-clinical populations (Woodruff-Borden, 
Brothers & Lister, 2001; Mor & Winquist, 2002). The relationship between S-FA and 
negative affect tends to be often very similar for both trait and state S-FA assessed with 
correlational and experimental designs, respectively (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Neither the 
potential interaction between trait and state S-FA nor its possible relationship to other 
psychological variables has received much empirical research (Mor & Winquist, 2002). 
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this more experiential form of S-FA leads to reduced over-general memories but that 
more ruminative self-focus involving analytical thought about internal experiences 
does not (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). It has also been shown that rumination on the 
self counteracts the more adaptive influence of reflection on the self (Takano & 
Tanno, 2009).  
 
Potency of S-FA (less- more) 
The content of S-FA can also be experienced with differing potency. Indeed general 
measures of psychopathology and severity are correlated with S-FA, with these 
correlations becoming more pronounced when isolating negative S-FA (Woodruff-
Borden, Brothers & Lister, 2001). Woodruff-Borden et al. (2001) also found that a 
panic disorder group presented with more positive S-FA as compared to a depression 
group. This depression group however was found to have significantly less neutral S-
FA than both the panic disorder group and an “other anxiety” group. There is also 
evidence that depression positively correlates with S-FA (Smith, Ingram, & Roth, 
1985). The distorted internal body image that is proposed to exist in people with 
BDD has been found to be experienced more vividly, i.e. with a higher potency, as 
compared to in healthy controls (Veale, 2004; Osman, Cooper, Hackmann, & Veale, 
2004). 
 
Level of S-FA (Implicit vs. Explicit) 
There are different levels of awareness and these have been usefully applied to 
cognitive-behavioural models of an anxiety disorder and more recently to BDD 
(Baars, 1997, 2005; Brewin, Dagleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark 2000; 
Buhlmann, Teachman, Gerbershagen, Kikul, & Rief, 2008; Buhlmann, Teachman, 
Naumann, Fehlinger, & Rief, 2009; Buhlmann, Teachman, & Kathmann, 2011). S-
FA is a psychological concept which exists at both explicit and implicit levels of 
awareness (Silvia & Phillips, 2012; Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). Rumination is an 
explicit focus on the self usually in terms of one’s mood and the reasons for this 
(Watkins, 2008). It therefore tends to be inextricably and overtly linked to affect. S-
FA also appears to exist at a more implicit level of processing which appears to be 
less linked to affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). S-FA at the implicit level however still 
appears to impact the processing of incoming information and this is particularly 
important for the present study (Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton, 2006). 
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Context of S-FA (external & internal) 
There are a number of contextual factors that influence the facets of S-FA that are 
induced. For example, Greenberg & Pyszczynski (1986) showed that S-FA was 
persistently high after failure and low following success thus highlighting the 
moderating role of situational context. Furthermore it has been both asserted in 
theory and empirically shown that following negative events S-FA is positively 
correlated with negative affect but that this is not the case following positive events 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Mor & Winquist, 2002). Affective correlates of S-
FA are therefore also dependent on situational context. 
 
According to early models, S-FA is only unhelpful in the context of an unfavourable 
discrepancy between the perceived self and a relevant standard that the person is 
unable to minimise (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990). It has 
also been shown that the influence of experimentally manipulated ruminative S-FA 
on depressed mood interacts with negative self-beliefs (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007). 
Intrapersonal context can therefore also influence the affect that accompanies S-FA. 
  
Content of S-FA (private vs. public & positive vs. negative) 
In addition to the form, potency, and context of S-FA all being important it is clear 
that the content of what is focused on can differ (Ingram 1990a). Indeed the content 
of S-FA has been proposed to be disorder specific and evidence suggests that it 
influences its correlates (Ingram, 1990b; Mor & Winquist, 2002). For example, self-
focus in which the content involves private self-aspects, such as thoughts, feelings 
and attitudes, is more strongly associated with depression and generalised anxiety, 
whilst self-focus in which the content involves public self-aspects, such as thoughts 
about others’ reactions to what can be observed about the self (e.g. physical 
appearance), is more strongly associated with social anxiety (Mor & Winquist, 2002; 
for a review see Spurr & Stopa, 2002). In addition, as would be expected, focusing 
more on positive self-aspects is associated with lower negative affect although 
focusing more on negative self-aspects is associated with higher negative affect (Mor 
& Winquist, 2002; Sedikides, 1992a). The distorted internal body image that is 
proposed to exist in people with BDD, in addition to being experienced with a higher 
potency, has also been found to be appraised negatively, that is as a negative self-
aspect, as compared to in healthy controls (Veale, 2004; Osman et al., 2004). 
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The valence of the content of S-FA also appears to differentially influence the 
processing of incoming information according to whether the self-aspect focused on 
is positive, negative or neutral2, compared to no self-focus (Schwinghammer et al., 
2006). Self-focus has been associated with increased social comparison and indeed 
information which is often attended to by people in general pertains to appearance-
related comparisons (Duval, Duval, & Mulilis, 1992; Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & 
Tantleff-Dunn, 1999). People with BDD however, engage in appearance-related 
comparisons more often than healthy controls and they become a time consuming 
behaviour (Anson, 2008; Veale, 2004). Furthermore, comparisons have been related 
to higher levels of body dissatisfaction and so their role in the maintenance of BDD 
is worth inquiry (Myers & Crowther, 2009). 
 
1.2.3 Appearance-related comparisons (A-RCs) 
 
Festinger’s theory of social comparison processes 
Festinger (1954) proposed that there is a drive for people to engage in a process of 
both opinion- and ability-related social comparing in order to obtain personally 
relevant and important information for self-evaluation. Festinger’s theory of social 
comparison processes also states that, where possible, people will use objective, non-
social means (i.e. from the physical world) for such evaluations. The theory states 
that such information is often not accessible however and consequently it is asserted 
that evaluations of some self-relevant information rely on social comparisons with 
other people. More recent developments suggest that these subjective social 
comparisons are made even when objective information is available however (Marsh 
& Parker, 1984; Ruble, 1983). The following sections describe research on A-RCs in 
the context of some of the main tenets of Festinger’s theory. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Schwinghammer et al. (2006) refer to these as positive, negative and neutral self-activation. 
The author deems their positive and negative self-activations to be equivalent to what Mor & 
Winquist, (2002) refer to as focusing on positive and negative self-aspects.  The author 
deems their neutral self-activation to be the same as what is referred to as self-focused 
attention (S-FA) throughout the text. 
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Direction of A-RCs (upwards vs. downwards) 
A-RCs, like social comparisons more generally, can put the self in better or worse 
perceived standing relative to the target of comparison (Tiggemann & Polivy, 2010; 
Gibbons & Buunk, 2000). For abilities but not opinions Festinger (1954) asserted 
that there is a drive towards making comparisons more so to those who are perceived 
as slightly more able. This orientation towards “upwards comparisons” is said to be 
owing to a value-based desire to do better, despite the existence of strong limitations 
on what can be achieved in trying to improve in an ability3. There is indeed evidence 
that people tend to make more frequent upwards as compared to downwards A-RCs 
(Anson, 2008). Research has also shown that A-RCs to physically attractive others 
reduce self-evaluations (which were mainly but not entirely about physical 
attractiveness) more so than A-RCs to unattractive others (Trampe, Stapel, & Siero, 
2007). Furthermore, upwards A-RCs have been shown to predict lower appearance-
evaluations whereas downwards A-RCs have been shown to predict higher 
appearance-evaluations in the development of new A-RCs scales (O’Brien et al., 
2009). Upwards A-RCs have also been associated with increased negative affect and 
body dissatisfaction (Leahey, Crowther, & Mickelson, 2007; Engeln–Maddox, 2005; 
Bailey & Ricciardelli, 2010).  
 
Target of A-RCs (particularistic vs. universalistic) 
There is some assertion that targets of comparison are most frequently chosen for 
being relatively similar in their opinion, or in the ability, which is being evaluated for 
subjectively accurate self-evaluations (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Suls, Martin, & 
Wheeler, 2000; Festinger, 1954). Making social comparisons to others generally has 
been called universalistic comparisons. Making social comparisons to those who 
share a certain bond or identity however have been called particularistic comparisons 
(Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1988). This distinction has also been applied in the 
body comparison literature with particularistic comparisons leading to greater body 
image anxiety and distress (Heinberg & Thompson, 1992a; Heinberg & Thompson, 
1992b). Furthermore, Cash, Cash, & Butters (1983) found that women exposed to 
                                                 
3
 The physical restraints on what can be changed or altered in appearance can be said to 
mirror what Festinger (1954) wrote about their being strong limitations on what can be 
achieved in trying to improve in a certain ability. 
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photos of physically attractive women rated their own physical attractiveness lower 
compared to women who viewed the same photos with the added information that 
they were of professional models. This result was more recently replicated for self-
evaluations largely about physical attractiveness and appearance satisfaction again in 
women (Trampe, Stapel, & Siero, 2007). Frazoi & Klaiber (2007) used groups of 
Olympic athletes, professional models and college students to investigate who people 
target in A-RC. It was shown that members of each group reported most frequently 
comparing their bodies to people from their own group. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that people with BDD and healthy controls more often compare their 
appearance to same sex others relative to those of the opposite-sex (Anson, 2008). 
 
Frequency of A-RCs (low- high) 
In keeping with the above Festinger’s theory implies that in the general population 
when other people are judged as significantly discrepant from oneself, in terms of 
physical attractiveness, A-RCs will cease and hence reduce in frequency. When an 
ability or opinion is perceived as important, such as appearance in people with BDD, 
the pressure or drive towards reducing discrepancies in self-evaluation is also said to 
increase (Festinger, 1954). Festinger (1954) also wrote that the usual cessation of 
comparing to those who are largely discrepant is not seen when the desire to belong 
to a group is particularly marked. It therefore follows that one would continue to 
make unfavourable comparisons to those perceived as much more attractive when 
physical appearance is highly valued. This above pattern clearly fits with the 
phenomenology of BDD given time consuming A-RCs, including to those deemed 
more attractive, in the context of the over-valued ideation about physical appearance 
found in this disorder (Veale, 2004; Anson, 2008; Veale, 2002). 
 
Automaticity of A-RCs (low- high) 
Recent research has shown that social comparisons including A-RC are automatic 
processes that naturally occur (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004; Want, 2009; 
Leahey, Crowther, & Mickelson, 2007). It is interesting that body dissatisfaction has 
also been shown to increase access to self-related cognitions which in turn has been 
shown to increase social comparison tendencies (Trampe et al., 2009; Stapel & 
Tesser, 2001). Higher frequencies of more automatic A-RC might therefore be 
expected in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. 
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A-RCs and body dissatisfaction  
A-RCs appear to lead to dissatisfaction with one’s own physical appearance and 
mediate the relationship between exposure to appearance-related information and 
depressive symptoms (Myers & Crowther, 2009; Bessenoff, 2006). Despite research 
coming mainly from samples of women A-RCs have been found to predict body 
dissatisfaction in men (Karazsia & Crowther, 2009). Women with higher levels of 
body-dissatisfaction report engaging in a higher frequency of A-RCs relative to 
women who are satisfied with their bodies (Trampe et al., 2007). Furthermore 
Trampe et al. (2007) showed that self-evaluations in body-dissatisfied women were 
similarly low in body-dissatisfied women who were exposed to attractive models or 
attractive non-models. In body- satisfied women however the usual greater influence 
of particularistic targets of comparison (the attractive non-models) was seen. It is 
also of note that body-dissatisfied women have been found to engage in a greater 
proportion of upwards A-RCs relative to body-satisfied women (Leahey et al., 2007). 
It is also interesting that Trampe et al. (2007) showed that body dissatisfaction 
increased self-focus which has been suggested to increase engagement with social 
comparisons as well as strengthen the effect of A-RCs (Stapel & Tesser, 2001; 
Schwinghammer et al., 2006).     
 
A-RCs and body image disturbance 
Theories of body image disturbance propose that A-RCs are a core factor in the 
development and maintenance of distorted body image (e.g. Stormer and Thompson, 
1996; Cash, 1997). It has been shown in a sample of women that A-RCs are more 
distressing for people who have lower self-evaluated physical attractiveness (Patrick, 
Neighbors, & Knee, 2004). A-RCs in people with BDD are also likely to be self-
defeating. The selective attention to mental imagery and possible reliance on the 
processing of detail in faces and in memory recall in BDD might impede the 
attainment of an accurate view of the comparison target (Neziroglu et al., 2008; 
Feusner, Townsend, Bystritsky, & Bookheimer, 2007; Deckersbach, et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, the excessive S-FA towards a distorted perception of body image in 
BDD is likely to create a self-defeating point of reference (Veale, 2004; Rosen, 
1995). The result of these processes is likely to be a higher frequency of upwards A-




1.2.4 Self-serving body-image bias research 
 
It is interesting that research in disorders of body image disturbance has focused on 
finding evidence of distortions in body perception. Crisp & Kalucy (1974) studied 
Anorexia Nervosa (AN) with this aim and found overestimations of body widths 
although no control group was included in their first study. Their second study found 
that a control group of females exaggerated their body size almost as much as the AN 
group. This control group however were not screened for previous fluctuations in 
weight or size and this was later discovered in most. Other studies have been better 
designed by taking into account the role of actual body size in size estimation with 
matched group designs or with appropriate statistical techniques in meta-analysis; 
findings however have remained contradictory (Penner, Thompson, & Coovert, 
1991; Smeets, Smit, Panhuysen, & Ingleby, 1998). 
 
More recently, research has moved in the direction of looking for the presence or 
absence of self-serving biases in body image. Indeed it has emerged that healthy 
controls hold a self-serving body-image bias in their perceptions of how attractive 
their bodies are relative to more objective ratings from a panel of judges (Jansen, 
Smeets, Martijn, & Nederkoorn, 2006). This self-serving bias/ or “rose-tinted 
glasses4” perspective however was absent in what they referred to as eating-
symptomatic participants with this group’s views being more consensual with the 
more negative yet objective ratings of attractiveness from the panel (Jansen, et al., 
2006). There was also a significantly stronger consensus for which specific body 
parts were deemed unattractive between the panel from study two and the eating-
symptomatic participants, as compared to with the healthy controls.  
 
                                                 
4
 It is interesting that a qualitative account of BDD focusing on perceptions of self across the 
life course, which have been called “temporal-self comparisons” have shown a different 
angle on what might be called “rose tinted glasses” of a more unhelpful nature (Silver & 
Reavey, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2000). Silver & Reavey (2010) reported that participants with 
BDD appeared to perceive their past self as excessively attractive. This set of rose-tinted 
glasses is not necessarily self-serving for people with BDD and is more likely to be 
highlighting another maintenance factor of distress. 
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People with BDD have been found to display significantly larger discrepancies 
between how they perceive themselves to look and both how they would like to look 
in an ideal world and how they think they should look, compared to health controls 
(Veale, Kinderman, Riley, & Lambrou, 2003). The exact source of such differences 
in discrepancies however was not established. The source could have been a lower or 
more accurate self-evaluated physical attractiveness relative to the healthy control 
participants. A more accurate self-evaluated physical attractiveness in people with 
BDD, as found by Thomas & Goldenberg (1995), would have been evidence of a 
lack of a self-serving bias. The source could have also been an exaggerated ideal for 
their level of physical attractiveness relative to healthy controls in keeping with 
research on perfectionist standards in people with BDD (Buhlmann et al., 2008). This 
conundrum was later addressed by Lambrou, Veale, & Wilson (2011). These 
researchers showed that people with BDD were not disturbed in their perceptual 
processing of their own faces. Indeed, and crucially, it was demonstrated that people 
with BDD had a lack of a self-serving bias regarding their own facial attractiveness 
relative to the healthy controls (Lambrou et al., 2011). It is worth noting however 
that people with moderate BDD were the most accurate in perceptions of their own 
facial attractiveness whereas people with severe BDD showed the greatest negative 
distortion in such perceptions. 
 
A-RCs bias 
Along a similar theme of self-serving biases Schwinghammer et al. (2006) have 
emphasised the impact of self-focused attention (S-FA) on the way social 
(appearance-related) comparison information enters into a process of self-defence5: 
When participants were implicitly self-focused, “threatening” social comparison 
information (a photo of an attractive student) was processed in a self-serving 
manner. That is, favourable self-evaluations of attractiveness were made and the 
target of comparison was rated more negatively, as compared to in the absence of 
such self-focus. (See appendix 1 for the relevant figures from Schwinghammer et al., 
2006). Thus, their findings showed that S-FA promoted self-serving processing of 
appearance-related comparison information. In short, this study found that healthy 
participants (female students), when comparing, rated their own appearance more 
                                                 
5
 What the author calls a self-serving appearance-related comparing bias”  
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favourably and that of others less favourably under conditions of S-FA 
(Schwinghammer et al., 2006). This finding suggests the presence of a self-serving 
appearance-related comparing bias in healthy controls. 
 
1.2.5 Functions of A-RCs 
 
To the author’s knowledge there is currently no published research data on the 
function (i.e. why) people with BDD engage in A-RCs. One suggestion is that 
comparing serves to reassure people with BDD that their perceived defect is not as 
noticeable as what they think (Rosen, 1995). Reassurance seeking has been found to 
be counterproductive however in both anxiety disorders and depression (e.g. 
Salkovskis, 1999; Joiner, Metalsky, Katz, & Beach, (1999). Social comparing can 
also be driven by a need to enhance or improve ourselves (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
Moreover, comparing has been emphasised as a way to fulfil a need to maintain and 
protect self-esteem in a somewhat more defensive manner (Aspinwall & Taylor, 
1993). The Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study mentioned above interpreted their 
findings as illustrative of an apparent need to protect self-esteem which was 
heightened under the conditions of implicit S-FA as compared to in the control 
attention condition. Furthermore these researchers proposed that this need to protect 
self-esteem was particularly marked when social comparison conditions were 
asserted to be more threatening to the self with the use of an upwards appearance-
related comparison target. These findings suggest that A-RCs can have a self-serving 
function in addition to the self-evaluative function originally proposed by Festinger 
(1954). In keeping with social comparisons more generally, other possible functions 
of A-RCs are self-enhancement and self-improvement (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
More detail on the literature covering the functions of social comparisons and A-RCs 
can be found in section 2.7.13 of this thesis. Section 2.7.13 describes the 
development of subscales on beliefs about the functions of A-RCs in people with 
BDD and healthy controls.  
 
1.2.6 Specificity of A-RCs in BDD (specific?) 
 
To date it has not been shown if A-RCs are the only form of social comparison that 
people with BDD engage in to a greater extent relative to healthy controls. It is 
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possible that A-RCs are found more abundantly in people with BDD relative to 
healthy controls owing to a more general picture of higher social comparison 
orientation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). There is evidence for example that people 
with Anorexia Nervosa, another disorder characterised by body dissatisfaction, 
endorse significantly higher levels of negative social comparisons relative to student 
controls in domains other than physical attractiveness (Troop, et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that people with low self-esteem, who have self-
concepts which are characterised by less clarity or certainty, are particularly 
interested in social comparison, and more specifically upwards social comparison, as 
a form of self-evaluation (Campbell, 1990; Wayment, & Taylor, 1995). It is therefore 
also possible that A-RCs are found more abundantly in people with BDD relative to 
healthy control participants owing to a more general picture of a greater social 
comparison orientation or to a lower self-esteem. This area of investigation is 
important because cognitive-behavioural models need to be as disorder specific as 
possible in order for effective treatment to follow. 
 
1.2.7 Self-esteem in BDD 
 
One outcome of social comparing is lower self-esteem (Bessenoff, 2006). Self-
esteem has been defined as the degree to which the self is judged as competent in life 
domains that are perceived as important (James, 1890/1983). Both body image 
disturbance and indeed BDD in particular have been shown to be associated with low 
self-esteem (Biby, 1998; Bohne, Wilhelm, Keuthen, Florin, Baer, & Jenike, 2002; 
Phillips, Pinto & Jain, 2004). Low self-esteem at an implicit level of awareness has 
also been shown to exist in people with BDD relative to healthy controls (Buhlmann, 
Teachman, Gerbershagen, Kikul, & Rief, 2008). In this study low implicit self-
esteem was also associated with low explicit self-esteem. Low self-esteem in people 
with BDD is unsurprising given that reports have shown them to endorse equating 
unattractiveness or a defective appearance with being inadequate/ worthless and 
having a lonely/isolated future (Veale et al., 1996). Reports also show that people 
with BDD are often convinced that the only avenue to an improved self-esteem is to 
improve their appearance (Rosen, 1995). Recent research has also exposed the more 
latent beliefs that people with BDD have about physical attractiveness being more 
strongly associated with competence relative to healthy controls (Buhlmann, 
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Teachman, Naumann, Fehlinger, & Rief, 2009). This result corroborates the 
contingency of self-esteem on physical appearance that appears to exist in people 
with BDD. 
 
Recent research however has proposed that self-esteem, despite a strong literary 
consensus on its unidimensional nature, can be divided into the interdependent 
constructs of self-competence and self-liking (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995; Tafarodi & 
Milne, 2002; Sinclair, Blais, Gansler, Sandberg, Bistis, & LoCicero, 2010). Self-
competence has been defined as the valuation of the self as a causal agent of success 
and failure thus sitting closely with the definition of James (1890/1983) above 
(Tafarodi & Milne, 2002). These same authors defined self-liking as the valuation of 
the self as a moral and aesthetic social object. Such self-liking would seem to knit 
tightly with cognitive-behavioural models of BDD (Veale, 2004; Veale & Neziroglu, 
2010). Self-liking might therefore be disproportionately low in people with BDD 
relative to self-competence as compared to in healthy controls.  
 
1.2.8 Rationale II 
 
Aspects of A-RCs may contribute to distress maintenance in BDD. Cognitive-
behavioural models also need to be as disorder specific as possible in order for 
effective treatment to follow. As an initial part of the present investigation it was 
therefore considered important to study the nature (frequency, direction, and 
automaticity) as well as the specificity of A-RCs in people with BDD. Research has 
shown that people belonging to clinical populations can have beliefs about the 
processes they engage in which leads to a maintenance of feared outcomes and 
associated distress (Salkovskis, 1991). For example, it is reported that people with 
BDD use S-FA as a safety-seeking behaviour i.e. as a means through which they can 
check their appearance to prepare for future social threat (Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). 
To the best of the author’s knowledge however beliefs about A-RCs have not yet 
been the topic of empirical research. It is important that this gap in the literature is 
filled because A-RCs can be both time-consuming and a key distress maintenance 




A proposed lack of a self-serving appearance-related bias in BDD, possibly owing to 
persistent S-FA on a distorted or disturbed mental image strongly influenced the 
main hypothesis of the present research (Veale & Neziroglu, 2010; Neziroglu et al., 
2008). There is currently only one study on self-serving biases in people with BDD 
(Lambrou, Veale, & Wilson, 2011). More specifically however there are no studies 
testing for a self-serving appearance-related comparing bias in people with BDD. 
Furthermore there are only a small number of studies that have investigated implicit 
processes in people with BDD (Buhlmann et al., 2008; Buhlmann et al., 2009; 
Buhlmann et al., 2011). Exploring implicit processes is important because such 
processing is asserted to maintain anxiety pathology (Beck & Clark, 1997; McNally, 
1995). The above literature sets the scene for the present study’s aims and 
hypotheses which are stated below. 
 
1.2.9 Aims and hypotheses 
 
The present research’s first aim was to investigate the process of A-RCs in people 
with BDD and healthy controls. This aim was addressed with hypothesis 1 which 
explored the nature (frequency, direction (attractiveness of A-RCs targets) 
automaticity) of A-RCs and hypothesis 2 which explored the specificity of A-RCs in 
people with BDD relative to healthy controls. This aim was also addressed with 
exploratory work investigating the functions of A-RCs in people with BDD and 
healthy controls. The first aim was also addressed with hypothesis 3 which 
investigated a self-serving A-RCs bias proposed to exist in healthy controls but not 
people with BDD. The present research’s second aim was to investigate a construct 
well known to be influenced by, and therefore considered as an outcome of, social 
comparing. This construct was self-esteem and this second aim was addressed with 
hypothesis 4 which investigated different components of self-esteem in people with 
BDD relative to healthy controls. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Exploring the nature of A-RCs in BDD 
This hypothesis explored the nature (frequency, direction, and automaticity) of A-
RCs in people with BDD. There is indeed an emerging finding in the literature that 
people with BDD engage in A-RCs more often than healthy controls and so the 
author investigated this further for clinically useful information.  
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Research question 1: Does the nature of A-RCs differ in people with BDD relative 
to healthy controls? 
 
Hypothesis 1: In people with BDD A-RCs would be more frequent, generally more 
upwards and more automatic. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Exploring the specificity of A-RCs in BDD 
The possibility that a higher frequency of A-RCs in people with BDD relative to 
healthy controls can be attributed to less disorder specific factors has not yet been 
studied. Analyses were therefore planned comparing people with BDD and healthy 
controls on the frequency of A-RCs while covarying for the more general factors of 
social comparison orientation and self-esteem. 
 
Research question 2: Is the higher frequency of A-RCs in people with BDD relative 
to healthy controls attributable to more general constructs related to comparing? 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more frequent A-RCs in people with BDD would not be attributed 
to more general constructs related to comparing. 
 
Exploring beliefs about the functions of A-RCs 
The author also explored the phenomenology of A-RCs by investigating why people 
with BDD relative to healthy controls engage in this process. A brief but clinically 
relevant measure of theory and evidence based subscales on the possible functions of 
A-RCs was therefore generated. No hypothesis was made for this part of the present 
investigation because it is a newly explored area of research with no literature 
addressing this aim in people with BDD to the best of the author’s knowledge. 
 
Research question: Do beliefs about the functions of A-RCs differ between people 
with BDD and healthy controls?  
 
Hypothesis 3: Investigating the self-serving A-RCs bias 
This hypothesis investigated the self-serving A-RCs bias found in previous research 
with the use of a novel experimental design. The third aim was therefore to 
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investigate the hypothesis that people with BDD do not hold the self-serving 
appearance-related comparing bias that is seen in healthy controls. 
 
Research question 3: Do people with BDD show the same self-serving processing of 
appearance-related comparison information when self-focused, as that seen in 
healthy controls? 
 
Hypothesis 3: Healthy controls but not people with BDD would show a self-serving 
processing of appearance-related comparison information contingent on self-focused 
attention. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Exploratory analyses on self-esteem in BDD 
Analyses were planned to explore our theoretical but also clinically relevant 
reasoning behind the differences which may, or may not, exist between self-
competence and self-liking in BDD. That is, it is important to know what aspects of 
self-esteem are influenced by BDD to gauge what appearance-concerns mean to the 
self in BDD. Proposed divisions of self-esteem were therefore explored in BDD with 
supplementary analyses. 
 
Research question 4: Were the divisions of self-esteem influenced to a differing 
extent in people with BDD relative to healthy controls? 
 
Hypothesis 4: Self-liking would be disproportionately lower than self-competence in 








Participants comprised 23 people with BDD (10 females, 13 males) and 20 healthy 




2.1.1 People with BDD 
 
Two South London and Maudsley (SLAM) National Health Service (NHS) 
Foundation Trust sites were used to recruit people with BDD. Outpatients (n= 6) 
were recruited from the Centre for Anxiety Disorders and Trauma (CADAT) at the 
Maudlsey Hospital. These patients were either those that had been recently recruited 
for a BDD treatment trial or had been newly assessed for clinical treatment. 
Inpatients (n= 1) and patients who had been previously assessed and treated 
(recruited via postal adverts; n= 1) were recruited from the Anxiety Disorders 
Residential Unit (ADRU) at The Bethlem Royal Hospital. Participants (n= 9) were 
recruited from a BDD support group meeting monthly at The Priory Hospital in 
North London and this was also the source of recruitment of another inpatient (n= 1). 
Advertisements on the websites BDD Help, BDD Central, BDD Foundation, and 
OCD Action also acted as sources of recruitment (n= 5). In BDD patients recruited 
from CADAT and ADRU diagnosis had been established using DSM-IV criteria 
(APA, 2000). Exclusion criteria for BDD patients included the absence of a face, 
hair, or head-related concern (visible from anterior view), a BDD-YBOCS below 24 
on items 1- 12, or if BDD was reported as not their primary diagnosis/ most 
distressing current mental health concerns. Other exclusion criteria included any 
current co-morbidity with eating disorders, psychosis, substance abuse, or borderline 
personality disorder (BPD). 
 
There was an aim to recruit people with BDD who were reasonably naive to CBT for 
BDD to minimise treatment related changes to symptoms and clinical features, and 
appearance-related comparing in particular. N= 2 (4.7%) people with BDD were 
currently having CBT for BDD and had had some previous experience of this 
treatment in addition to their current course. N= 3 (7%) people with BDD were 
currently having CBT for BDD for the first time. Of those currently having CBT for 
BDD, 3 (2 outpatients; 1 inpatient) had only just started this treatment whereas 2 had 
had a substantial number of sessions (1 outpatient; 1 inpatient). N= 11 (25.6%) 
people with BDD had never had CBT for BDD. In total n= 23 people with BDD 
were recruited and these participants all completed testing. The distractor task used 
in the experimental procedure however was reported to elicit notable reflections by 
one person with BDD. This participant’s experimental data was therefore omitted 
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from the dataset. Experimental data was therefore available for n= 22 people with 
BDD. 
 
N= 19 (82.6%) people with BDD reported that their face, head hair, or head-related 
concern was also the area/feature of their body that they found the most disturbing. 
N= 4 (17.4%) had their face, head hair, or head-related concern as secondary to some 
other reported area/feature of concern. These areas/features of concerns were the skin 
(n= 2), the skin on the back of the neck (n= 1), and the knees (n= 1).  People with 
BDD reported the mean age of onset to be 15.30 yrs (S.D. = 4.92). N= 9 (39.1%) 
people with BDD reported being on current medication, n= 6 (26.1%) reported 
having been on medication in the past and n= 8 (34.8%) reported never having been 
on medication for mental health. 
 
2.1.2 Healthy controls 
 
Healthy controls (n= 5) were recruited from “Mindsearch” (a database associated 
with the IOP), a circular email to King’s College London staff (n= 11) (see appendix 
2) and some convenience sampling (n= 4) to gather a representative sample of the 
general population. Furthermore, such sampling was used to prevent the caveats of 
having an overly homogenous control group (e.g. undergraduates; see Wintre, North 
& Sugar, 2001). A rigorous screening process was used with healthy controls to 
exclude all axis 1 current mental health problems including BDD, eating disorders, 
substance abuse as well as BPD. A history of significant mental health problems was 
also screened for including psychosis, major depression, excessive body image 
concerns/ BDD, eating disorders, substance abuse, as well as BPD (by virtue of 
current diagnosis). Exclusion criteria for healthy controls also included those 
working as academics, researchers or clinical staff or studying in the fields of 
science, medicine, or psychology. In total n= 20 healthy controls were recruited and 
they all completed testing.  
 
Inclusion criteria for all participants was being at least 18 years of age and being able 
to understand the materials and instructions used in the study. The healthy controls 
were matched to the group of people with BDD, approximately, according to both 
age and sex to prevent a confound effect from these demographics (see section 3.2 
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for statistics). Indeed body image has been found to be perceived quite differently 
according to both age and sex and these characteristics are spontaneously encoded 
from faces with high levels of accuracy (Rusticus & Hubley, 2006; Santos & Young, 
2005; Bruce et al., 1993). Furthermore dimensions of appearance comparison have 





All participants had normal or corrected to normal eyesight with the exception of two 
people with BDD who reported that they were avoiding their possible need for 





The experimental design was adapted mainly from study one in Schwinghammer et 
al. (2006) who used a between-subjects design. The present investigation used a 
cross-sectional cross-over design. There were four conditions using a 2 (participant 
group as a between subject factor: BDD, healthy control) ×2 (attention as a within 
subject factor: S-FA, control attention condition (CAC)) mixed design. The use of 
attention as a within-subject factor allowed better statistical power given the 






The procedure below was run through with a colleague from the IOP who had a PhD 







2.4.2 Main piloting 
 
The procedure was briefly piloted with 2 people with BDD to find out if the 
procedure was easy to engage with in terms of its duration and complexity. The pilot 
participants were asked for their thoughts on the procedure. They were then asked if 
it made sense given the topic of study. Nothing was changed and so the data from 
these participants was included in all analyses. See figure 1 for a representation of 










A flow chart of recruitment, screening, and testing is provided (see appendix 3). 
After reading about the study and consenting to participation participants completed 
an initial battery of measures for screening purposes. They then completed the 
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experimental procedure. Following the experimental procedure a second battery of 
measures was completed. More detail on each stage of the procedure follows. 
 
2.6 Participant information and consent 
 
Information and consent forms written separately for each group were distributed to 
people who had shown an interest in participating (see appendix 4). These were read 
and signed before participation commenced. These forms did not include information 
regarding the topic of experimental manipulation (S-FA) or the physical 




The measures used are summarised below with a description of their content and 
reasons for their use. A summary of psychometric properties found in research as 
well as in the present sample (where possible and theoretically sensible) can also be 
found in appendix 5. 
 
2.7.1 Psychiatric Disorders Screening Questionnaire (PDSQ) 
 
Description: The PDSQ (Zimmerman & Mattia, 2001a; Zimmerman & Mattia 
2001b) is a self-administered questionnaire with 125 items which allows screening of 
thirteen DSM-IV axis 1 psychiatric disorders, from five areas most frequently found 
in outpatient mental health settings:  (1). Eating disorders (bulimia/binge-eating 
disorder); 2. Mood disorders (major depressive disorder); 3. Anxiety disorders (panic 
disorder, agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
generalized anxiety disorder, and social phobia); 4. Substance use disorders (alcohol 
abuse/dependence and drug abuse/dependence); and 5. Somatoform disorders 
(somatization disorder and hypochondriasis). There is also a 6-item psychosis screen. 
Items inquire about current and recent symptoms using time-frames that correspond 
to DSM-IV symptom-duration requirements for each disorder. Cut-off scores and 




Reason for use: Rush et al. (2005) reported that, despite being a screening 
questionnaire, the PDSQ uses a threshold with a 90% specificity for the presence of 
each disorder. These authors therefore documented the PDSQ as providing a 
reasonable estimate of the overall prevalence of frequently found comorbid 
conditions when studying depressed outpatients. The PDSQ was therefore deemed to 
be a reasonably accurate method of ascertaining if BDD was the primary disorder in 
the clinical group. It was also used to screen healthy controls for axis 1 disorders in 
keeping with exclusion criteria. 
 
2.7.2 Body Dysmorphic Disorder Questionnaire (BDDQ) 
 
Description: The BDDQ is a brief self-report screening questionnaire for BDD 
(Phillips, 1996b). The BDDQ asks participants for a yes/no response to the question 
“are you worried about how you look?” If the answer to this question is yes then a 
second yes/no response question is asked. This second question asks about 
preoccupation with the reported appearance concerns, including whether the 
participant wishes that they could think about them less. Those participants 
indicating a preoccupation with their appearance are then asked to report their body 
area(s) of concern. Participants who answered yes to the above two questions are 
then asked for a yes/no response to a question asking if their main appearance 
concern is related to being too thin or too fat. A four part question then asks for 
yes/no responses to how the problem has affected the participant’s life in terms of 
distress, impairment in social and occupational functioning and avoidance. The final 
question asks the participant about the amount of time that is spent thinking about 
how they look (<1 hour a day, 1-3 hours a day, >3 hours a day). To screen positive 
for BDD a participant must fulfil all of the disorder’s DSM-IV criteria by reporting a 
preoccupation with a perceived appearance flaw that is thought about for more than 
one hour a day. They must also be experiencing significant distress or impairment in 
functioning as a result. 
 
Reason for use: The BDDQ was used to ensure that the healthy controls did not have 
BDD. Such exclusion was highly important given that proposed differences between 




2.7.3 Structured clinical interview for DSM-IV axis II personality disorders 
(SCID II; version 2.0) (Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) section only) 
 
Description: The SCID-II 2.0 was designed by First, Spitzer, Gibbon, Williams, & 
Benjamin (1994). It is a semi-structured diagnostic interview which can be used for 
the assessment of a comprehensive list of DSM-IV (APA, 1994) axis II personality 
disorders with its various sections. In the present research the BPD brief self-report 
screening questionnaire (14 statements requiring yes/no responses) as well as the 
SCID-II 2.0 BPD section (completed where participants screened positive; i.e. 5≥ yes 
responses) was used. The BPD section provides the interviewer with the DSM-IV 
criteria as well as with questions that are efficient in eliciting the information 
necessary in judging each criterion’s presence or absence. 
 
Reason for use: This clinical interview was used to screen all participants for BPD 
as per our exclusion criteria because the results of Marfei et al. (1997) suggested that 
it can be suitably used in studies of a cross-sectional design involving both inpatients 
and outpatients. It was unlikely that our healthy controls would meet such a 
diagnosis due to our request for volunteers with no known psychiatric history. 
However, the assessment was carried out for rigour. The clinical interview was 
important in ascertaining that the concerns of people with BDD were not part of or 
confounded by the broader picture of complexities, such as a disturbed self-identity, 
found in BPD. Indeed, one study found BDD to be extremely common in participants 
with BPD as their main problem (Semiz, et al., 2008). SCID-II structured interview 
schedules have been used to diagnose BPD in people with BDD by others Neziroglu, 
McKay, Todaro, & Yaryura-Tobias (1996). 
 
2.7.4 General Details Forms 
 
Description: The general details forms for both people with BDD and healthy 
controls included questions to collect preferred contact details and information 
regarding demographic variables. A question to assist with the exclusion of 
participants with a current episode of Anorexia Nervosa (AN) was also included. The 
form for healthy controls also included questions to assist with the exclusion of 
participants with previous episodes of psychosis, MDD, bulimia/binge-eating 
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disorder, AN, BDD symptoms, and drug or alcohol abuse. The wording of these 
questions was based on those used in the PDSQ. See appendix 6.   
 
Reason for use: Information to describe our groups’ demographic variables was 
deemed useful in understanding more general differences between people with BDD 
and healthy controls. Such potential group differences might have informed our 
experimental findings and may have been needed for co-variate purposes. In 
addition, because the PDSQ does not cover Anorexia Nervosa it was also useful to 
use this form to assist with the exclusion of people with current restricted eating. 
 
2.7.5 Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale for Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
(BDD-YBOCS)  
 
Description: The BDD-YBOCS is a 12-item semi-structured, clinician-administered 
measure which is based on the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Phillips, 
Hollander, Rasmussen, Aronowitz, DeCaria, Goodman, 1997; Y-BOCS; Goodman et 
al., 1989a; Goodman et al., 1989b). It assesses the severity of BDD symptoms over 
the past week covering preoccupations (items 1-5), compulsive behaviours (items 6-
10), insight (item 11), and avoidance behaviours (item 12). Each item uses a scale 
from 0-4. Higher scores are indicative of a greater extent of BDD symptomatology. 
Scores range from 0-48.  
 
Reason for use: This measure was included to assess the severity of BDD keeping in 
mind that exclusion criteria included less than a moderate level of symptoms (<24 on 
items 1-12; Phillips et al., 1997). 
 
2.7.6 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)  
 
Description: The HADS (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) is a widely used 14-item self-
report measure assessing the severity of current symptoms of anxiety and depression 
over the past week. Each item uses a 4 point scale. Higher scores are indicative of a 
greater extent of anxiety and depression. The internal consistencies for anxiety and 




Reason for use: This scale was used to measure the extent of clinical anxiety and 
depression symptoms in group comparisons between people with BDD and healthy 
controls 
 
2.7.7 Multidimensional Body-Self Relations Questionnaire – Appearance Scales 
(MBSRQ-AS) 
 
Description: The MBSRQ-AS (Cash, 2000) is a 34 item standardised self-report 
questionnaire measuring the cognitive, affective, and behavioural components of an 
individual’s body image. The MBSRQ-AS has 5 subscales. The Appearance 
Evaluation (AE) subscale (7 items) assesses positive and negative appraisals of an 
individual’s own body image with higher scores indicative of more positive body 
image evaluations. The Appearance Orientation (AO) subscale assesses investment 
in and importance of appearance, with higher scores indicating greater orientation. 
The Body Areas Satisfaction Scale (BASS) assesses degree of satisfaction with 
specific body areas and attributes, with lower scores indicating greater body 
dissatisfaction. The Overweight Preoccupation (OP) subscale (4 items) assesses fat 
anxiety, weight vigilance, dieting, and eating restraint, with higher scores indicating 
greater preoccupation. The Self-Classified Weight (SCW) subscale assesses 
perceptions of weight (under-over weight), with higher scores indicating a body 
image of being more overweight. Participants respond to item statements using a 5 
point scale from 1= definitely disagree/ very dissatisfied to 5= definitely agree/ very 
satisfied depending on the item. 
 
Reason for use: These subscales were used to assess body image attitudes in both 
people with BDD and the healthy controls. The MBSRQ-AS has commonly been 
used to assess body image in the psychological literature. There is research using the 
MBSRQ-AS in people with BDD and in healthy controls assessing differences in 
body image (Hrabosky et al., 2009; O’Brien et al., 2009). The MBSRQ-AS has also 
been used in research on A-RCs amongst groups of people differing in their degrees 






2.7.8 Body Comparison Scale (BCS) 
 
Description: The BCS (Fisher and Thompson, 1998) is a 36-item self-report 
questionnaire assessing the frequency of A-RCs to same-sex individuals. The first 25 
items require responses for comparisons of specific body sites to the same body sites 
of same-sex individuals. The last 10 items require responses regarding general 
tendencies to engage in some specified A-RCs. The total score ranges from 36-180. 
 
Reason for use: The BCS was used to look at differences in the frequencies of A-
RCs between people with BDD and healthy controls. The BCS was also deemed the 
most adequate dependent variable for such group comparisons while including 
certain co-variates in analyses due to its established psychometrics and wide usage. 
The BCS was therefore used to explore hypothesis 1 and 2. It was also used to 
measure the concurrent validity of some items of the PA-RCS. 
 
2.7.9 Physical Appearance-Related Comparisons Scale (PA-RCS) 
 
Description: The PA-RCS is a brief version of the Physical Appearance Comparison 
and Evaluation Scale (PACES) questionnaire designed in the first supervisor’s PhD 
(Anson, 2008). The PA-RCS has 9 items which are divided across 4 sections. Each 
section starts with the same introductory passage as follows: “In situations when you 
see others of the same sex, i.e. when you are: out in public, in social 
situations/interacting with people, or when you are reading/looking at magazines, 
watching television/films, looking on the internet etc.” Section one includes two 
questions asking about the frequency of A-RCs to same sex others in terms of overall 
physical appearance (question (qu.) 1) and the specific facial or body features of 
most concern (question 2). 
 
Section two includes three questions asking about the frequency of A-RCs to same 
sex others of differing physical attractiveness (attractive, (qu. 3)  average (qu. 4), and 
unattractive (qu. 5) others) to cover both upwards and downwards comparisons 
(O’Brien et al., 2009). Section three includes a question asking how participants 
generally rate/judge the physical attractiveness of same sex others in comparison to 
their own physical attractiveness (qu. 6). The second question in section three then 
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asks how satisfied participants generally are with their own physical appearance after 
comparing to the physical appearance of others of the same sex (qu. 7). 
 
Section four included two questions asking about the frequency of automatic 
comparing (i.e. without at first realising (qu. 8) and without a clear aim (qu. 9) to 
same sex others (Want, 2009).  All nine items use scales ranging from 0% (none of 
the time/ much less attractive than me/ much less satisfied) to 100% (all of the time/ 
much more attractive than me/ much more satisfied) to gauge participant responses. 
This questionnaire is shown in appendix 7. 
 
Reason for use: The PA-RCS was used to collect data on the nature of A-RCs 
(frequency, direction, and automaticity) in the sample for group comparisons 
between people with BDD and healthy controls and to provide a more meaningful 
context to the data on the functions of A-RCs. The PA-RCS was therefore 
predominantly used to explore hypothesis 1. 
 
2.7.10 Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM) 
 
Description: The INCOM (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) is an 11-item measure of 
individual differences in social comparison orientation capturing core aspects of the 
self, the other, and the psychological interaction between the two. Two items are 
reverse coded, functioning as a control for acquiescence biases (Oskamp and Schultz 
2004). The items use statements about comparisons between the self and others on a 
variety of topics that include both opinions and abilities (Festinger, 1954). The 
INCOM also includes two separate 6-item subscales looking at individual differences 
in the tendency to make upwards and downwards comparisons (The UCS and DCS, 
respectively). Participants answer all items using a five point likert scale ranging 
from A, strongly disagree (1 point), to E, strongly agree (5 points). Scores therefore 
range from 11-55 on the INCOM and 6-30 on the UCS and DCS with higher scores 
indicating greater social comparison orientations. 
 
Reason for use: The INCOM was used to highlight if the extent of A-RCs in people 
with BDD relative to healthy controls could be attributed to a more general tendency 
towards making social comparisons (i.e. from outside the domain of appearance). 
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This data was deemed particularly important in the absence of a clinical control 
group because there might be variation in a psychological predisposition towards 
making social comparisons (Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001). The INCOM was therefore 
used to co-vary for social comparison orientation in group comparisons of A-RCs in 
an exploration of hypothesis 2.  
  
2.7.11 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) 
 
Description: The RSES is a well known and widely used 10-item measure of global 
self-esteem with each item using a 4-point (0-3) likert scale ranging from strongly 
agree to strongly disagree (Rosenberg, 1965). The RSES items were designed for 
fast and easy administration and scoring of a unidimensional construct (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1991, p. 121). Total scores can range from 0 to 30 with higher scores 
indicating higher self-esteem. Tafarodi and Milne (2002) also showed that there is 
validity in dividing the scale into measures of self-competence and self-liking. 
Indeed this division was shown to follow the item selection used to create factors of 
assessment and acceptance, respectively (Tafarodi & Milne, 2002). The self-
competence and self-liking subscales therefore have 5 items each with each of these 
subscales having total scores ranging from 0-15. 
 
Reason for use: The RSES was used to explore the difference in self-esteem 
between people with BDD and the healthy controls. In a previous study the RSES 
score was lower by approximately 1.5 standard deviations in people with BDD 
compared to nonclinical samples (Phillips et al., 2004). The RSES was also used to 
allow an exploration of self-competence and self-liking in people with BDD relative 
to healthy controls. Sinclair et al. (2010) made the same division using the RSES in a 
large cohort of adults. The RSES was therefore predominantly used to explore 
hypothesis 4. 
 
2.7.12 Beliefs about Appearance-Related Comparisons Subscales (BA-RCS) 
 
Description: The BA-RCS was developed in order to cover the beliefs about the 
functions of A-RCs that drive their use in people with BDD and healthy controls. 
The measure was developed from psychological literature on comparing, as well as 
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by adapting items from the Mirror Questionnaire and from clinical experiences of 
people with BDD (Veale & Riley, 2001). The scale has 20 items that use scales from 
0% (no agreement) to 100% (complete agreement). These items are organised into 5 
subscales: comparing to check/verify for self-evaluation; comparing to put something 
right through self-enhancement; comparing to put something right through self-
improvement; comparing as self-loathing; and comparing as threat management. 
Each subscale has 4 items and is scored using a mean of the four item total (i.e. with 
a maximum of 100). Higher scores indicate a greater extent of agreement with the 
corresponding belief about the function of A-RCs. A more in depth explanation of 
how this measure was developed can be found following the description of its reason 
for use below. See appendix 8.  
 
Reason for use: The BA-RCS was developed and used because there is no research, 
to the author’s knowledge, looking at the beliefs that people with BDD have about 
why they engage with A-RCs. The BA-RCS was therefore not used in any 
exploration of a hypothesis although addressed one of the authors research questions. 
 
2.7.13 Development of the BA-RCS 
 
Classifying A-RCs as a compulsive behaviour 
 
Briefly reviewed earlier was the emerging view of many researchers that BDD is an 
obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorder in that the cognitions and behaviours have a 
strong resemblance to those found in OCD.  Like the other compulsive behaviours 
found in people with BDD (such as mirror-gazing) A-RCs become time-consuming 
and difficult to resist despite the distress they induce. Furthermore, people with BDD 
have been found to hold a whole range of appearance-related beliefs about 
behaviours such as mirror-gazing with stronger conviction than healthy controls 
(Veale & Riley, 2001). In the same study, Veale & Riley (2001) showed that people 
with BDD were significantly more likely than healthy controls to endorse mirror-
gazing as something that distorted their judgement about how attractive they were. It 
was therefore further reasoned that there might be additional functions of A-RCs that 
were more specific to the psychopathology of BDD which drive continue to drive 
this behaviour irrespective of the distress it seemingly induces. In keeping with the 
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consideration of A-RCs as a compulsive behaviour Veale proposed that they can be 
deemed as a process designed to either: 1.) Check / verify something about 
appearance 2.) Put something right about appearance.  
 
Drawing from comparison motives in social comparison research 
 
Given that A-RCs were assumed to have one of these two above mentioned a priori 
aims, it was suggested by an expert in the field of BDD (D.V.) that the items 
generated should describe the desired end-goal of comparing before comparing 
occurs. Moreover beliefs about the functions that A-RCs might serve were deemed to 
be synonymous with the comparer’s motives for comparing in the first place. It 
therefore seemed logical to look towards the wider social comparison literature for 
comparison motives. In their work in developing a measure of social comparison 
orientation Gibbon & Buunk (1999) neatly reviewed comparison motives as falling 





As reviewed earlier Festinger’s theory of social comparison processes (1954) stated 
that comparing occurs with similar others in order to gather subjectively accurate 
self-evaluations. This motive for social comparing therefore resides in attempting to 
find out where one stands in relation to another indeed through a process of social 
checking or verification. 
 
Subscale 1: The BA-RCS subscale 1 thus highlighted A-RCs as a process with a 
primarily cognitive function: Comparing to check/verify for self-evaluation. For 




Festinger (1954) also stated that in the process of social comparing, a drive upward 
exists whereby individuals orientate comparisons of themselves to those who are 
thought to be similar yet superior. Despite not explicitly stated in his theory, this is 
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consistent with a method of learning to try and improve the self or one’s abilities. 
The use of upwards social comparisons in attempts at self-improvement has gained 
some evidence (Collins, 1996). In addition, at least in healthy female participants, it 
has been shown that A-RCs focused on self-evaluation were associated with 
increased body-focused anxiety relative to a no A-RCs control condition (Halliwell 
& Dittmar, 2005). Importantly however these authors also showed that such 
increases in anxiety were not seen relative to the no A-RCs control condition when 
A-RCs were focused on self-improvement. It was therefore reasoned that self-
improvement was an important function of A-RCs to cover in the BA-RCS following 
the understanding that A-RCs induce high levels of distress in people with BDD. 
 
Furthermore however, self-improvement also seemed relevant for the BA-RCS 
because it was not known if people with BDD were using A-RCs to work out what 
they might change about their appearance given their frequent and sometimes 
extreme efforts to do so. Moreover it was reasoned that A-RCs might be one method 
through which people with BDD gather information about what to target for medical 
or home treatment/ “do it yourself” surgery (Phillips et al., 1993; Sarwer, & Crerand, 
2008; Veale, 2000). Interestingly people with BDD have reported standing in front of 
mirrors “pulling my features or squashing my nose to see how I’d look if I had 
plastic surgery” (Veale & Riley, 2001). This report is in keeping with the above 
reasoning for a possible use of A-RCs in people with BDD. Such a use would make 
sense given that Festinger (1954) stated that the drive towards reducing discrepancies 
in self-evaluations found in social comparing is increased if the ability or opinion is 
perceived with importance. It is noteworthy that some of the items on this subscale 
might also have touched upon the use of safety seeking behaviours in people with 
BDD although this was focused on more so in a later subscale.  
 
Subscale 2: Subscale 2 of the BA-RCS thus highlighted A-RCs as a process with a 
cognitive-behavioural function: Comparing to put something right through self-
improvement. For example: “I compare in order to help me work out how I can 








Brickman & Bulman (1977) asserted that comparisons with others who are thought 
to be superior in some way might be informative yet also threatening. These authors 
therefore proposed that such upwards A-RCs might be avoided in some people 
perhaps in favour of downwards comparing. Indeed Wills (1981) later argued that 
people sometimes compare themselves to those who are worse off when in situations 
characterised by threat that produce a decrease in well-being. Such downwards 
comparisons have been asserted as a means of helping oneself cope and therefore 
feel better. Downwards A-RCs have been reported in the domain of appearance 
(O’Brien et al., 2009). Self-enhancing downwards comparisons have however also 
been found in non-threatening situations to enhance feelings of satisfaction (Buunk 
& van Yperen, 1989; Buunk, Oldersma, & de Dreu, 2001). More specific to body 
comparisons some literature now supports the use of A-RCs in strategies that are 
likely to be self-enhancing (Franzoi, et al., 2012).  
 
Subscale 3: Subscale 3 of the BA-RCS thus highlighted A-RCs as a process with a 
cognitive-affective function: Comparing to put something right through self-
enhancement. For example: “I compare to try and reduce the negative feelings I 
have about my looks”. 
 
Confirming beliefs about physical unattractiveness 
 
Cash (1991, 2008) described a cognitive bias for A-RCs with people who are deemed 
more attractive and he coined this “unfair to compare”. Recent research has 
confirmed that this cognitive bias is found in people with BDD who also make more 
A-RCs than healthy controls more generally (Anson, 2008). Interestingly however 
recent evidence also suggests that people with BDD have a selective attentional bias 
for looking at the facial area that they perceive to be defective in themselves during 
observations of unfamiliar faces (Grocholewski, Kliem, & Heinrichs, 2012). The 
above research suggested an additional self-defeating aspect to A-RCs in people with 
BDD which might fit closely with the aspects of inductive reasoning found more so 
in people with OCD relative to healthy controls (Simpson, Cove, Fineberg, Msetfi, & 
Ball, 2007). These aspects included a need for more information which might be 
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reflected in the higher frequency of A-RCs in people with BDD (Anson, 2008) and 
less attempts to prove their own beliefs about physical appearance wrong, which 
might be reflected in the selective attention to disliked features in others 
(Grocholewski et al., 2012). Similarly, beliefs about A-RCs in people with BDD 
might reflect a data-gathering reasoning bias as found in people who are prone to 
delusion formation and maintenance (Colbert, & Peters, 2002). People with BDD 
indeed frequently hold inflexible and overvalued beliefs about self-evaluated 
physical attractiveness which are often of a delusional intensity (Veale, 2002; 
Phillips et al., 2006). 
 
It was therefore proposed that people with BDD might report using A-RCs as a 
means of proving their own beliefs about their flawed appearance correct. A subscale 
reflecting beliefs about A-RCs as part of a confirmation bias about physical 
unattractiveness in people with BDD was therefore created. In keeping with this 
possibility people with BDD have reported standing in front of mirrors to “pull ugly 
faces to prove how disgusting I am” (Veale & Riley, 2001). Confirmation biases 
have been reported in other areas of psychopathology and in non-clinical samples 
prone to delusion formation (Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006; 
Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007). 
 
Subscale 4: Subscale 4 of the BA-RCS thus highlighted A-RCs as a process with a 
primarily cognitive function: Comparing as self-loathing. For example: “I compare 
in order to help me prove to myself that I am really ugly”. 
 
Safety seeking and avoidance 
 
A final subscale was produced to tap into the possibility that people with BDD might 
use A-RCs to manage the associated threats, such as social-evaluative concerns, that 
often come with this disorder (Pinto & Phillips, 2005; Coles et al., 2006). Such 
potential methods of management were thought to include safety seeking behaviours, 
checking, and avoidance as seen in the other anxiety disorders (e.g. Salkovskis, 
1999; Clark, & Wells, 1995). Veale & Riley (2001) found that people with BDD 
were driven to mirror-gaze by a desire to camouflage themselves for example. In 
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keeping with this it was reasoned that A-RCs might be one way that people with 
BDD inform and regulate their camouflaging, checking and avoidance behaviours.  
 
Subscale 5: Subscale 5 of the BA-RCS thus highlighted A-RCs as a process with a 
cognitive-behavioural function: Comparing as threat management. For example: “I 
compare in order to know if I should go and check my appearance”. 
 
2.7.14 Finalised presentation of the BA-RCS 
 
After subscale items had been viewed and confirmed by both M.A. and D.V. they 
were put into questionnaire format. Items were not presented clustered into subscales 
to minimise the chance of a response bias/ order effect of presentation. Each item 
used a scale from 0% (no agreement) to 100% (complete agreement). This scale was 
used to maximise the chance of picking up response variance especially since ceiling 
effects have been found in self-reports of BDD phenomenology. 
 
2.8 Testing procedure 
 
2.8.1 Testing environment 
 
N = 39 (90.7%) participants were seen in the same room for testing with the chief 
investigator seated opposite them for administration of questionnaires and seated 
behind a screen during the experimental procedure. Both BDD inpatients and two of 
the BDD outpatient participants (n = 4, 9.3%) who preferred to participate at the 
Priory Hospital in North London however had different testing environments. 
Statistical power was a priority over higher control of the testing environment. 
 
2.8.2 Administration of battery 1 measures 
 
The following measures were administered in person before the experimental 
procedure: BDD History (people with BDD only), General Details Form, PDSQ, 
SCID-II (Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) section only) and, the BDD-




2.8.3 Description of experimental procedure 
 
All participants viewed a booklet which said “this booklet has simple instructions to 
take you through some short tasks. When you arrive at the section with faces please 
form an impression of these people as some questions about them will follow”. There 
was then an instruction page illustrating how to respond to the scales used to index 
the dependent variables. One of the following attention conditions then followed: 
 
S-FA: S-FA was induced with the completion of a vignette task used in Stapel & 
Koomen (2001) and Schwinghammer et al. (2006) (modelled after Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996). Findings from Schwinghammer et al. (2006) also provide construct 
validation/ research reliability for the use of this manipulation- see their table 1 in 
their discussion). Participants were asked to read a vignette (describing a trip to the 
city; see appendix 9) carefully and circle all the pronouns within it which may be 
singular (e.g. I, me, my, myself, or mine). 
 
CAC: The control attention condition involved written instructions asking the 
participants to describe three qualities of a chair (as per Schwinghammer et al., 
2006). These conditions were counterbalanced to minimise order effects. 
 
Photographic portraits: In total 12 photos (6 males and 6 females) were used. These 
were organised into two sets of 3 for each sex. These photos were taken from a 
database of 1000 photographs of faces that had been used in psychological research 
prior to the present investigation (Santos & Young, 2005). These authors had mean 
ratings for the photos gathered from a representative cohort who had used likert 
scales ranging from 1-7 to rate several characteristics of which physical 
attractiveness was one. 
 
The photos were selected for their level of high physical attractiveness (>5 out of 7). 
This selection was justified by an attempt to replicate findings from the healthy 
student sample used in Schwinghammer et al. (2006). These researchers showed that 
upwards A-RCs information (an attractive portrait), in the context of implicit S-FA, 
was processed in a self-serving manner (for both the participants’ self-evaluated level 
of attractiveness and that of the person viewed in a portrait) relative to their control 
48 
 
attention condition with a large effect. The use of an unattractive portrait however 
led to a smaller effect. In addition to the use of a repeated-measures variable the 
choice of stimuli therefore made the design more sensitive to adequately test the 
main hypothesis in people with BDD- a challenging to recruit clinical population. 
Furthermore people with BDD have been found to perceive physically attractive (but 
not average or unattractive) faces as significantly more attractive as compared to 
those without BDD (Buhlmann, Etcoff, & Wilhelm, 2008). The choice of stimuli 
therefore also maximised sensitivity to group differences in perceived attractiveness. 
The photos were grouped into sets A and B for each sex and were matched for mean 
level of physical attractiveness (see appendix 10). Indeed the author wanted to keep 
this variable controlled especially given that there is partial evidence to show that 
physical attractiveness is spontaneously processed in faces (Santos & Young, 2005). 
The photo sets were the A-RCs information. 
 
A-RCs information: Following each attention condition, participants were exposed 
to A-RCs information made up of the sets of 3 photographic portraits described 
above. There were sets of portraits for each sex. Each participant viewed sets 
matched to their sex because both healthy controls and people with BDD tend to 
target their own sex for A-RCs (Anson, 2008). Futhermore, sex is also spontaneously 
encoded from faces with high levels of accuracy (Santos & Young, 2005; Bruce et 
al., 1993). A different set of portraits followed each attention condition. The photo 
sets (set A, set B) were counterbalanced between the attention conditions for 
experimental rigour.  
 
Immediately following each photographic portrait participants were exposed to 
written instructions asking for ratings which were used to index the dependent 
variables (as per section 2.8.5). Participants therefore completed these ratings three 
times for the CAC and three times for the S-FA condition. 
 
Distracter task: Half way through the experimental procedure, following the 
attention condition participants had been exposed to first, all participants were asked 
to play a non-verbal computer game. The game involved colour and concurrently 
played background music and was called Tetris®. During the game participants 
concentrated on creating lines using the moving shapes that they controlled on the 
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screen. The resulting number of lines did not differ statistically between people with 
BDD and healthy controls, giving an indication of approximately equal levels of task 
engagement (U = 189.00, p =.44, exact, 2-sided; r= -.12). The task was used to 
reduce tedium with the main task and to minimise the possibility of contaminating 
the experimental manipulation of attention.  
 
Counterbalancing: The sets of photographic portraits and attention conditions were 
counterbalanced separately for both male and female people with BDD and male and 
female healthy controls. This was deemed necessary given that there is research 
suggesting that BDD symptoms may vary somewhat according to sex (Phillips & 
Diaz, 1997; Perugi et al. 1997; Phillips et al. 2003). Furthermore, there is evidence to 
show that appearance comparing is a process engaged in more often in people with 
BDD than in healthy controls and also more often in females than in males (Anson, 
2008). Counterbalancing was therefore as rigorous as possible in order to diffuse any 
potential confounding group influence. See appendix 11. 
 
2.8.4 Manipulation check 
 
The experimental manipulation aimed to contrast the presence of S-FA with its 
absence/ more outward attention. Schwinghammer et al. (2006) did not use a 
manipulation check. These authors asserted that a manipulation check would 
interrupt the processes being studied which were claimed to be both volatile and 
implicit. They therefore referred to evidence that had illustrated the effectiveness of 
the experimental task instead. In the present study the same manipulation of S-FA 
was used albeit with a new participant population in a novel experimental design. 
Manipulation checks were therefore included following the last presentation of the 
questions used to measure the dependent variables for each attention condition. 
These checks were conducted using open ended questions. Following the S-FA the 
question asked “what were you doing and thinking about while reading the short 
vignette?” Following the CAC the question asked “what were you doing and 
thinking about while describing three qualities of a chair?” These questions allowed 
us to look for evidence of engagement with the attention tasks as well as any 




2.8.5 Dependent variables 
 
Participants were exposed to written instructions asking for two ratings following the 
presentation of each photographic portrait. The first rating was as follows: “rate the 
physical attractiveness of the person you have just seen”. A scale ranging from 0 
(“very unattractive”) to 100 (“very attractive”) was used to do this. Mean scores of 
the ratings given to the photos in each attention condition were taken to index this 
first dependent variable called the general attractiveness of others. 
 
The second rating was as follows: “rate the physical attractiveness of the person you 
have just seen in comparison to your own physical attractiveness”. A scale ranging 
from -50 (“much less attractive than me”) to +50 (much more attractive than me”) 
was used to do this. Mean scores of the ratings given to the photos in each attention 
condition were also taken to index this second dependent variable called self-
evaluated attractiveness compared to others. 
 
These scales were used because research experience shows that floor and ceiling 
effects are often seen on smaller range scales when enquiring about physical 
attractiveness in people with BDD (M.A. personal communication). In addition to 
the DVs based on the mean ratings from the photos in each attention condition 
analyses were planned to look at if the effects of the manipulation were present (or 
possibly stronger) for the ratings given to the first photographic portraits directly 
following the attention conditions. This was planned because the manipulation of S-
FA might have only induced a very transient effect and indeed this method of DV 
measurement more closely followed the procedure of Schwinghammer et al. (2006). 
 
2.8.6 Administration of battery 2 measures 
 
A second battery of measures was then administered, again in person, following the 
experimental procedure including the: HADS, MBSRQ-AS, BCS, PA-RCS, BA-
RCS, INCOM, and the RSES. These are all described hereafter. All participants were 
compensated for their participation in the study with £10-20, irrespective of if they 








Statistical methods were used to describe the sample on the above measures and 
experimental data including simple frequencies, percentages, means and standard 
deviations (and medians where median statistical tests were employed) for 
participants with BDD and healthy controls. Some inferential statistics were also 
used to test for statistically significant differences in demographic details between 
the people with BDD and healthy controls. 
 
The analysis for the main experimental design is now focused on because it was for 





It was hypothesised (hypothesis 3) that healthy controls but not people with BDD 
would show a self-serving processing of appearance-related comparison information 
contingent on self-focused attention. This experimental hypothesis was addressed 
using two-way (2 (participant group: BDD, healthy control) × 2 (attention condition: 
S-FA, CAC)) mixed-analyses of variance (ANOVA) for each dependent variable. 
 
Despite it not being the main hypotheses, main effects of participant group were 
expected for both dependent variables, as close replications of Buhlmann et al. 
(2008). The main hypothesis however was addressed with the tests of interaction 
effects from the mixed ANOVAs.  
 
The main hypothesis was explored by investigating whether there were significant 
interactions between participant group and attention condition for both the 
attractiveness of the evaluated others and self-evaluated attractiveness compared to 
others. Importantly the effects would need to be driven by these dependent variables, 
showing statistically significant self-serving ratings in the S-FA condition compared 
to the CAC in healthy controls but not in people with BDD. Planned pairwise 
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comparisons would then follow as post-hoc assessments of any differences between 
attention conditions for each participant group. Estimates of effect size using partial 
eta (ηp2) or r were made throughout. All analyses were conducted using SPSS for 
WindowsTM (version 17.0). 
 
2.9.3 Power analysis 
 
As stated above our main experimental hypothesis was tested by the interaction 
effects between participant group and attention condition for each dependent 
variable. The dependent variables and design of the present investigation were not 
identical to those used in Schwinghammer et al. (2006). Data from this study 
however was deemed the most appropriate for the basis of a power analysis. 
 
For the first dependent variable, the general attractiveness of others, it was assumed 
that the change between attention conditions in healthy controls would be 
approximately 1.17. This figure was taken from the difference in dependent variable 
means between the neutral self-activation and no self-activation conditions in the 
student sample of the “attractive comparison other” condition in study 1 from 
Schwinghammer et al. (2006) (see appendix 1). Based on theoretical reasoning and 
clinical experience we made a conservative estimate of no change in our dependent 
variables between attention conditions for people with BDD. The difference in 
difference scores was therefore 1.17-0 = 1.17. A standard deviation of the difference 
score of 1.06 was assumed (based on the more conservative SD from the 
abovementioned conditions in study 1 from Schwinghammer et al., 2006). It was also 
assumed that the correlation between the repeated measures variable (attention 
condition) was one of 0.5. We therefore expected an effect size of the interaction of 
1.17/1.06 = 1.10. Given that this was a large but estimated effect size due to changes 
in method (including both the experimental procedure and the participant group; i.e. 
BDD), a more conservative effect size of 0.8 was used. To have 80% power to detect 
such an effect we required 26 participants per group at an alpha level of .05 (2 
tailed). 
 
For the second dependent variable, self-evaluated attractiveness compared to others, 
we followed the same procedure as above using data from Schwinghammer et al. 
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(2006) (see appendix 1) and found an estimated effect size of the interaction of 1.13. 
Given again that this was a large but estimated effect size, we used the more 
conservative effect size of 0.8 which gave the same number of participants as above. 




All materials were computer printed on paper and the photographic portraits were 
available from the first supervisor. The first supervisor had been sent the database of 
portraits from the original research group who had them rated objectively (Santos & 
Young, 2005).  
 
2.11 Costs and budget 
 
The main cost of recruitment (£20 per person with BDD, £10-15 per healthy control 
dependent on the stage of the study) was covered by the DClinPsy research budget. 
 
2.12 Ethical considerations 
 
The experimental manipulation and materials used in this study did not include 
content over and above that which people with BDD expose themselves to on a day 
to day basis independently. Furthermore, the experimental manipulation was not 
appearance-related and therefore did not directly target core BDD symptoms. 
Participants who wished to know were debriefed with regards to the true aims of the 
research following their participation. 
 
National Research Ethics Committee (NRES; London – Camberwell St Giles) 
approval of this research (research ethics committee reference 11/LO/0287) was 
received on 24/05/11. Research and Development at the IOP in association with 









3.1 Distribution of data 
 
The distribution of data was assessed for each analysis to test whether or not the 
assumptions of normality inherent to parametric statistical analyses were met. 
Observations of boxplots and Q-Q plots were first made to form an initial impression 
of the data. The data’s deviation from normality (using the Shapiro-Wilk test) and 
homogeneity of variance (standard deviations not >2:1 between groups; Howell, 
2002) in addition to assessing for case outliers, all for each analysis. Indeed outliers 
have been reported as potentially misleading in data analyses (Osborne & Overbay, 
2004). Outliers were defined as scores above and below 2 and -2 on de-trended 
normal Q-Q plots, respectively. 
 
3.1.1 Questionnaire data 
 
For comparative analyses where all the above assumptions were not met non-
parametric analyses were used as a means of stringency. Data was not transformed as 
this is not considered a useful approach by all (Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972).  
 
The above assumptions were also deemed to be appropriately met for the use of a 
mixed (2 × 3) ANOVA and post hoc one-way repeated measures ANOVAs. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant and also the Greenhouse-Geisser 
epsilon score was above .7 suggesting that the sphericity assumptions of the repeated 
measurement ANOVA were fulfilled (Howell 2002). Sphericity assumptions were 
also not violated for the one-way repeated measures ANOVA for people with BDD 
but not for healthy controls and so in this latter analysis the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used. 
 
For the three 2-level factorial ANCOVA analyses which were used the homogeneity 
of regression slopes was also tested as this is an additional assumption of the 
ANCOVA (Field, 2005). The dependent variable for these analyses was the BCS. 
The interaction effects between participant group and each covariate (INCOM, UCS, 
RSES) were not significant (F(1, 39)= .06, p = .804, ηp2= .00, F(1, 39)= .00, p = 
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.959, ηp2= .00, and F(1, 39)= 1.24, p = .272, ηp2= .03, respectively). These non-
significant test results further justified the use of the ANCOVA. It is noted that the 
Shapiro-Wilk test was significant (p=.02) for the distribution of the UCS in people 
with BDD. Given that all other assumptions were met for both groups the three 2-
level factorial ANCOVA was considered robust enough for usage.  
 
Observations of scatterplots were made before Person’s r correlations were 
considered suitable for use. 
 
In testing for associations between the categorical variables of demographic details 
and participant group (people with BDD, healthy controls) the minimum expected 
cell frequency of >5 assumption of the Pearson chi-square (χ2) test was not violated. 




In keeping with the use of mixed (2 × 2) ANOVAs for the main analyses, the 
distribution of change scores (defined by the difference in each dependent variable 
between the levels of the within subject factor of attention condition) were assessed 
for each group. All assumptions (i.e. as per section 3.3) were met for these change 
scores on the first dependent variable for both mean scores of the photo ratings and 
also for when the change scores were isolated to the first photos following each 
attention condition. The same procedure was followed for the second dependent 
variable. It is noted that the Shapiro-Wilk test was significant for the change scores 
for mean scores of the photo ratings in people with BDD and for both groups when 
the change scores were isolated to the first photos following each attention condition. 
In the context of all other assumptions being met however mixed ANOVAS were 
deemed robust enough for usage and preferable to transformations (Glass et al., 
1972).  
 
In testing for associations between the categorical variables of participant group 
(people with BDD, healthy controls) and those used in the manipulation checks the 
minimum expected cell frequency of >5 assumption of the Pearson chi-square (χ2) 





See table 1 for the demographic details of the people with BDD and healthy controls. 
The group of people with BDD consisted of just over half males (56.5%) and the 
healthy control group was 50% male. There was no significant association between 
participant group (people with BDD, healthy controls) and gender (χ2 (1) = .18, p = 
.764, exact, 2 sided, Cramer’s V= .07). In terms of marital status the majority of 
people with BDD were single (65.2%) as were the majority of healthy controls 
(55%). There was no significant association between participant group (people with 
BDD, healthy controls) and marital status (single vs. relationship) (χ2 (1) = 1.69, p = 
.219, exact, 2 sided, Cramer’s V= .20). In terms of ethnicity the majority of people 
with BDD were white (European / Anglo-American) (65.2%) as were the majority of 
healthy controls (75%). There was no significant association between participant 
group (people with BDD, healthy controls) and ethnicity (white, non-white) (χ2 (1) = 
.49, p = .53, exact, 2 sided, Cramer’s V= .11). 
 
The group of people with BDD was mainly unemployed (52.2%) whereas the healthy 
control group was mainly employed (90%). There was a significant association 
between occupation (employed vs. unemployed) and participant group (people with 
BDD, healthy controls) (χ2 (1) = 8.67, p = .004, exact, 2 sided, Cramer’s V= .45). The 
group of people with BDD was mainly educated to at least degree level (34.8%) as 
was the majority of the healthy control group (80%). There was a trend towards 
significance for an association between participant group (people with BDD, healthy 
controls) and education (non degree, degree) (χ2 (1) = 4.74, p = .056, exact, 2 sided, 
Cramer’s V= .33). In addition, age was not statistically significant between people 
with BDD and the healthy control group (U = 214.50, p = .713, exact, 2-sided). This 










Table 1. Demographic details as a function of participant group. 
      People with BDD          Healthy controls 
     n %   n  %     
 
Gender   
Male     13 56.5  10 50.0 
Female    10 43.5  10 50.0 
 
Marital status 
Single     17 73.9  11 55.0 
Single (never married) 15 65.2  11 55.0 
Separated/Divorced  2 8.7  0 0.0 
Relationship    6 26.1  9 45.0 
Married   1 4.3  4 20.0 
Cohabiting/Living together 2 8.7  4 20.0 
Other    3 13.0  1 5.0 
 
Ethnicity   
White (European/ Anglo-American) 15 65.2  15 75.0 
Non-white (see below)  8 34.8  5 25.0 
Black – Caribbean  1  4.3  0 0.0 
Black - African   0 0.0  1 5.0 
South Asian   3 13.0  0 0.0 
East Asian   0 0.0  0 0.0 
Hispanic   0 0.0  1 5.0 
Other    4 17.4  3 15.0 
 
Occupation  
Employed    11 47.8  18 90.0 
Job    9 39.1  15 75.0 
Student   2 8.7  3 15.0  
Unemployed    12 52.2  2 10.0 
 
Education 
Non degree    12 52.2  4 20.0 
Primary   1 4.3  1 5.0 
Secondary   1 4.3  0 0.0 
O-levels / GCSE’s  1 4.3  0 0.0 
A-levels (or equivalents) 7 30.4  2 10.0 
Tertiary (non-degree)  2 8.7  0 0.0 
Other    0 0.0  1 5.0 
Degree     11 47.8  16 80.0 
Tertiary (degree level) 8 34.8  10 50.0 
Postgraduate   3 13.0  6 30.0 
M S.D.  M S.D.      
 
Age  
Years     32.11 8.28  30.98 7.33   




3.3 Standardised measures 
 
3.3.1 Body image questionnaires 
 




Appearance evaluation: As expected, people with BDD had significantly lower 
appearance-evaluations relative to healthy controls (t(41) =-9.63, p < .001, 2-sided). 
This result had a large effect size (r = -.83). 
 
Appearance orientation: People with BDD (Mdn= 4.33) also had a significantly 
greater investment in their appearance relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 3.08) (U = 
80.00, p <.001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (r = -.56). 
 
Body areas satisfaction: People with BDD (Mdn= 2.33) also had significantly lower 
satisfaction with discrete aspects of appearance relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 
3.67) (U = 49.00, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (r = -
.67). 
 
Overweight preoccupation: There was no significant difference in preoccupation 
with becoming overweight between people with BDD (Mdn= 2.00) and healthy 
controls (Mdn= 1.75) however (U = 187.00, p =.298, exact, 2-sided). This result had 
a small effect size (r = -.16). 
 
Self-classified weight: There was also no significant difference in perceptions of 
weight between people with BDD (Mdn= 3.00) and healthy controls (Mdn= 3.00) (U 
= 198.00, p =.421, exact, 2-sided). This result had a small effect size (r = -.12). The 








Body comparisons: In keeping with hypothesis 1 people with BDD reported a 
significantly higher frequency of body comparisons with other individuals of the 
same sex relative to healthy controls (t(41) =3.18, p = .003, 2-sided). This result was 
close to a large effect size (r = .44).  
 
BDD-YBOCS 
BDD symptomatology: The mean level of BDD symptoms reported by people with 
BDD was in keeping with a moderate level of severity (Phillips et al., 1997). 
 
3.3.2 Social comparison orientation 
 
INCOM 
Social comparison orientation: There was no significant difference in social 
comparison orientation between people with BDD and healthy controls (t(41) =.91, p 
= .370, 2-sided). This result had a small effect size (r = .14). 
 
Upwards social comparison orientation: There was a significantly greater 
orientation towards upwards social comparisons in people with BDD (Mdn= 25.00) 
relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 20.50) (U = 123.50, p = .009, exact, 2-sided). This 
result had a medium effect size (r = -.40).  
 
Downwards social comparison orientation: There was no significant difference in 
orientation towards downwards social comparisons between people with BDD and 
healthy controls (t(41) = -.45, p = .657, 2-sided). This result was below a small effect 











Table 2. Body image and comparing data as a function of participant group. 
        People with BDD       Healthy controls 
      M S.D.  M S.D.      
 
MBSRQ-AS 
Appearance evaluation   2.02 .68  3.79 .49 
Appearance orientation*   4.04 .73  3.17 .56  
Body areas satisfaction*   2.62 1.06  3.84 1.07 
Overweight preoccupation*   2.18 .91  1.93 .78 
Self-classified weight*   3.09 .62  3.98 3.35 
 
BCS 
Total      93.39 23.50  72.65 18.47 
 
INCOM 
Main scale     39.22 6.08  37.50 6.32 
INCOM UCS*    23.65 4.93  19.35 6.29 
INCOM DCS     16.04 5.09  16.70 4.43 
 
BDD-YBOCS 
Total items 1-12    33.74 5.01  - - 
 
Note. BDD, Body Dysmorphic Disorder; M, mean; S.D., standard deviation; 
MBSRQ-AS, Multidimensional Body-Self Relations Questionnaire – Appearance 
Subscales, range, 1-5; BCS, Body Comparison Scale, range, 36-180; INCOM, Iowa-
Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure, range, 11-55; UCS, Upwards 
Comparisons Scale, range, 6-30; Downwards Comparisons Scale, range, 6-30;  
BDD-YBOCS, Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale for Body Dysmorphic 




3.3.3 Mental health and self-esteem 
 




Anxiety: People with BDD (Mdn= 12.00) had significantly higher levels of anxiety 
relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 2.00) (U = 7.00, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This 
result had a large effect size (r = -.83). 
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Depression: People with BDD (Mdn= 10.00) had significantly higher levels of 
depression relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 1.00) (U = 6.00, p < .001, exact, 2-
sided). This result had a large effect size (r = -.84).  
 
Global self-esteem: People with BDD had significantly lower global self-esteem 
relative to healthy controls (t(41) = -13.17, p < .001, 2-sided). This result had a large 
effect size (r = -.90). Please see section 5.3.6 (Part 4 of the present investigation) for 
further investigation of self-esteem. 
 
Table 3. Mental health and self-esteem data as a function of participant group. 
     People with BDD         Healthy controls 
     M S.D.   M S.D.      
 
HADS 
Anxiety*    11.57 4.01  2.50 2.16 
Depression*    9.91 3.79  1.75 1.97 
 
RSES 
Global self-esteem   9.04 4.23  25.25 3.78 
Self-competence*   6.04 2.88  13.30 1.49  
Self-liking*    3.00 2.02  11.95 3.00 
 
Note. BDD, Body Dysmorphic Disorder; M, mean; S.D., standard deviation; HADS, 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, anxiety range, 0-21, depression range, 0-21; 
RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, range, 0-30. (Ranges for self-liking and self-
competence are 0-15). * = Medians reported in text due to use of nonparametric tests. 
 
 
3.3.4 Hypothesis 1: Exploring the nature of A-RCs in BDD 
 
See table 4 for data on the nature of appearance-related comparisons (A-RCs) in 
people with BDD and healthy controls gathered from the newly devised measure 
called the Physical Appearance-Related Comparisons Scale (PA-RCS). The PA-RCS 
was used to explore hypothesis 1. 
 
PA-RCS 
Comparisons of overall appearance and specific features 
Comparison of overall appearance: In keeping with hypothesis 1 people with BDD 
(Mdn= 80) reported a significantly higher frequency of A-RCs of overall appearance 
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to others of the same sex relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 37.25) (U= 49.50, p < 
.001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (r = -.67). 
 
Comparison of specific features: In keeping with hypothesis 1 people with BDD 
(Mdn= 92.50) reported a significantly higher frequency of A-RCs of specific facial or 
body features that they are most concerned about to that in others of the same sex 
relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 22.50) (U= 30.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This 
result had a large effect size (r = -.74). 
 
Physical attractiveness rating of other compared to own physical attractiveness:  
People with BDD (Mdn= 90.50) generally rated/judged the physical attractiveness of 
others of the same sex (in general) with a significantly higher level of physical 
attractiveness compared to their own physical attractiveness relative to healthy 
controls (Mdn= 47.00) (U= 33.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large 
effect size (r = -.73). This result is in keeping with the results above showing that 
people with BDD tend to rate same sex targets of A-RCs as more physically 
attractive (i.e. in an upwards direction) relative to healthy controls. 
 
Body satisfaction after A-RCs 
Satisfaction after comparing: People with BDD (Mdn= 12.50) reported being 
significantly less satisfied with their physical appearance after comparing to the 
physical appearance of others of the same sex relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 
50.00) (U= 31.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (r = -
.75). 
 
Automaticity of A-RCs 
Comparing without at first realising: People with BDD (Mdn= 75.00) reported 
significantly more frequently finding themselves comparing their physical 
appearance to someone of the same sex for a while without at first realising relative 
to healthy controls (Mdn=  19.25) (U= 75.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result 
had a large effect size (r = -.57). This result supports hypothesis 1. 
 
Automatic comparing without clear aim: People with BDD (Mdn= 70.00) reported 
significantly more often finding themselves comparing their physical appearance to 
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someone of the same sex automatically without a clear aim relative to healthy 
controls (Mdn= 19.75) (U= 79.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large 
effect size (r = -.56). This result supports hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 4. Data on the nature of A-RCs as a function of participant group. 
        People with BDD       Healthy controls 
      M S.D.  M S.D.      
 
PA-RCS 
Comparison of overall appearance*  75.35 25.03  33.15 21.65 
Comparison of specific features*  85.63 19.83  32.40 23.99  
Physical attractiveness rating of other 
compared to own physical attractiveness* 83.09 19.69  41.00 15.36 
Satisfaction after comparing*   18.20 15.61  50.23 7.27 
Comparing without at first realising*  68.98 31.94  27.58 25.04 
Automatic comparing without clear aim* 65.50 32.16  25.75 25.13 
 
Note. A-RCs, Appearance-Related Comparisons; BDD, Body Dysmorphic Disorder; 
M, mean; S.D., standard deviation; PA-RCS, Physical Appearance-Related 
Comparisons Scale, item range, 0-100. * = Medians reported in text due to use of 
nonparametric tests.  
 
The attractiveness of comparison targets (Direction of A-RCs) 
See figure 2 for a graph illustrating the results of the attractiveness of comparison 
targets (direction of A-RCs) in people with BDD and healthy controls. 
 
A two-way participant group (people with BDD, healthy controls) × attractiveness of 
comparison target (unattractive, average, attractive) mixed ANOVA showed that 
there was a significant main effect of participant group (F(1, 41)= 23.25, p < .0001, 
ηp
2
= .36). This replicated the earlier finding of a significantly higher frequency of 
body comparisons in people with BDD relative to healthy controls on the BCS. 
There was also a significant main effect of attractiveness of comparison target (F(2, 
82)= 10.04, p < .0001, ηp2= .20). There was also a significant interaction effect 
between participant group and attractiveness of comparison target (F(2, 82)= 3.08, p 
= .051, ηp2= .07).  
 
The interaction was investigated further with one-way (attractiveness of comparison 
target (unattractive, average, attractive) repeated measures ANOVA post hoc 
64 
 
analyses for each participant group. For people with BDD there was a significant 
main effect of attractiveness of comparison target (F(2, 44)= 8.35, p = .001, ηp2= 
.28). Pairwise comparison contrasts showed that this significant effect was driven by 
a significantly lower frequency of body comparisons to unattractive targets of 
comparison relative to both average and attractive targets of comparison in people 
with BDD (p = .01; p = .002, respectively). Frequencies of body comparisons to 
average and attractive targets of comparison were not significantly different in 
people with BDD however (p = .249). For healthy controls there was a non-
significant main effect of attractiveness of comparison target (F(1.37, 26.01)= .2.82, 




Figure 2. The attractiveness of comparison targets (direction of A-RCs) in people 
with BDD and healthy controls. 
 
3.3.5 Hypothesis 2: Exploring the specificity of A-RCs in BDD 
 
Hypothesis 2 was explored using data from the Body Comparisons Scale (BCS), 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM), and the Rosenberg 




Covarying for social comparison orientation: The significantly higher frequency of 
body comparisons in people with BDD relative to healthy controls withstood 
covariance for social comparison orientation in a 2-level factorial ANCOVA, (F(1, 
40) = 8.92 , p = .005, η2= .18). The significantly higher frequency of body 
comparisons in people with BDD relative to healthy controls was therefore not 
driven by a more general difference in social comparison orientation. This result 
supports hypothesis 2. 
 
Covarying for upwards social comparison orientation: Earlier results suggested that 
A-RCs in both healthy controls and people with BDD in particular are mainly 
directed upwards. An analysis was therefore used to test if the higher frequency of 
body comparisons in people with BDD relative to healthy controls withstood 
covariance for upwards social comparison orientation. The significantly higher 
frequency of body comparisons in people with BDD relative to healthy controls 
withstood covariance for upwards social comparison orientation in a 2-level factorial 
ANCOVA, (F(1, 40) = 6.31, p = .016, ηp2= .14). The difference showing that people 
with BDD more often engage in body comparisons relative to healthy controls was 
therefore not driven by a more general difference in upward social comparison 
orientation. This result supports hypothesis 2. 
 
Covarying for global self-esteem: Research has shown that people with low self-
esteem are more interested in social comparisons. An analysis was therefore used to 
test if the higher frequency of body comparisons in people with BDD relative to 
healthy controls withstood covariance for global self-esteem. The significantly 
higher frequency of body comparisons in people with BDD relative to healthy 
controls withstood covariance for global self-esteem in a 2-level factorial ANCOVA, 
(F(1, 40) = 4.39, p = .042, ηp2= .10). The difference showing that people with BDD 
more often engage in body comparisons relative to healthy controls was therefore not 








3.3.6 Exploring beliefs about the functions of A-RCs 
 
See table 5 for the data on the beliefs about the functions of appearance-related 
comparisons (A-RCs) in people with BDD and healthy controls. This data was 
gathered from the newly devised measure called the Beliefs about Appearance-
Related Comparisons Subscales (BA-RCS). 
 
Comparing to check/verify for self-evaluation: People with BDD (Mdn= 73.63) 
reported significantly stronger agreement with A-RCs as a means of checking or 
verifying for self-evaluative purposes relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 33.31) 
(U = 47.00, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (r =-.68). 
 
Comparing to put something right through self-enhancement: There was no 
significant difference in agreement between people with BDD and healthy controls 
regarding A-RCs as a means of putting something right through self-enhancement 
(t(41)= 1.61, p = .114, 2-sided). This result was close to a medium effect size (r = 
.24). 
 
Comparing to put something right through self-improvement: There was no 
significant difference in agreement between people with BDD and healthy controls 
regarding A-RCs as a means of put something right through self-improvement 
(t(41)= 1.61, p = .114, 2-sided). This result was close to a medium effect size (r= 
.24). 
 
Comparing as self-loathing: People with BDD (Mdn= 74.00) reported significantly 
stronger agreement with A-RCs as a means of self-loathing relative to healthy 
controls (Mdn= 8.88) (U = 18.00, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a large 
effect size (r = -.79). 
 
Comparing as threat management: People with BDD (Mdn= 59.88) reported 
significantly stronger agreement with A-RCs as a means of threat management 
relative to healthy controls (Mdn= 10.00) (U = 36.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This 




Effect sizes showed that the biggest differences between groups were for people with 
BDD to report stronger agreement with beliefs about A-RCs as means of self-
evaluation, self-loathing, and threat management relative to healthy controls. 
 
Table 5. Data on beliefs about the functions of A-RCs as a function of participant 
group. 
        People with BDD       Healthy controls 
      M S.D.  M S.D.      
 
BA-RCS 
Comparing to check/verify for 
self-evaluation*    70.23 20.38  34.63 17.94 
Comparing to put something right 
through self-enhancement   46.84 24.09  35.51 21.60 
Comparing to put something right 
through self-improvement   54.46 26.00  43.14 18.70 
Comparing as self-loathing*   66.57 26.01  13.27 16.36  
Comparing as threat management*  57.83 29.19  11.13 11.97 
 
Note. A-RCs, Appearance-Related Comparisons; BDD, Body Dysmorphic Disorder; 
M, mean; S.D., standard deviation; BA-RCS; Beliefs about Appearance-Related 
Comparisons Subscales, range 0-100. * = Medians reported in text due to use of 
nonparametric tests.  
 
3.3.7 Hypothesis 3: Investigating the self-serving A-RCs bias 
 
See table 6 for the experimental data on the investigation of the self-serving A-RCs 
bias in people with BDD and healthy controls. This data was gathered from the 
author’s novel experimental design based on Schwinghammer et al. (2006). 
 
The general attractiveness of others 
Mean photo ratings: A two-way (participant group × attention condition) mixed 
ANOVA showed that there was a non-significant main effect of participant group 
(F(1, 40)= 3.35, p = .075, ηp2= .08). This result however showed a trend towards 
significance for people with BDD to rate the general attractiveness of others as more 
physically attractive relative to healthy controls, in keeping with Buhlmann et al. 
(2008). There was also no significant main effect of attention condition (F(1, 40)= 
1.92, p = .174, ηp2= .05). There was also a no significant interaction effect between 
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participant group and attention condition (F(1, 40)= .13, p = .725, ηp2= .00). This 
result indicated that there was no difference between people with BDD and healthy 
controls in the processing of information about the physical attractiveness of others 
contingent on self-focused attention (S-FA). The result therefore indicated an 
acceptance of the null hypothesis 3. 
 
First photo ratings: A two-way (participant group × attention condition) mixed 
ANOVA showed that there was no significant main effect of participant group (F(1, 
40)= .42, p = .522, ηp2=.01). There was also no significant main effect of attention 
condition (F(1, 40)= 2.39, p = .130, ηp2= .06). There was also no significant 
interaction effect between participant group and attention condition (F(1, 40)= .28, p 
= .599, ηp2=  .01). This result further indicated that there was no difference between 
people with BDD and healthy controls in the processing of information about the 
physical attractiveness of others contingent on S-FA. The result therefore indicated 
an acceptance of the null hypothesis 3. 
 
Self-evaluated attractiveness compared to others 
Mean photo ratings: A two-way (participant group × attention condition) mixed 
ANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect of participant group 
showing that people with BDD had lower ratings of self-evaluated attractiveness 
compared to others relative to healthy controls (F(1, 40)= 55.21, p < .001, ηp2= .58). 
There was however no significant main effect of attention condition (F(1, 40)= 1.78, 
p = .190, ηp2= .04). There was also no significant interaction effect between 
participant group and attention condition (F(1, 40)= .13, p = .720, ηp2= .00). This 
result indicated that there was no difference between people with BDD and healthy 
controls in the processing of appearance-related comparison information contingent 
on S-FA. The result therefore indicated an acceptance of the null hypothesis 3. 
 
First photo ratings: A two-way (participant group × attention condition) mixed 
ANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect of participant group 
showing that people with BDD had lower ratings of self-evaluated attractiveness 
compared to others relative to healthy controls (F(1, 40)= 41.79, p < .001, ηp2= .51). 
There was however no significant main effect of attention condition (F(1, 40)= 3.12, 
p = .085, ηp2= .07). There was also no significant interaction effect between 
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participant group and attention condition (F(1, 40)= 2.09, p = .156, ηp2= .05). This 
result further indicated that there was no difference between people with BDD and 
healthy controls in the processing of appearance-related comparison information 




Control attention condition: In the control attention condition manipulation check 
there was “evidence of engaging with the task only” in n= 20 (100%) of the healthy 
controls and n= 21 (95.5%) of the people with BDD. There was however a “possible 
contamination of explicit S-FA (e.g. mention of appearance concern)” in n= 1 (4.5%) 
person with BDD. This differential influence was not statistically significant 
however (FET: p = 1.00, 2-sided, Cramer’s V = .15). 
 
Self-focused attention: In the S-FA condition there was “evidence of engaging with 
the task only” in n= 20 (100%) of the healthy controls and n= 14 (63.6%) people 
with BDD. There was however a “possible contamination of explicit S-FA (e.g. 
mention of face/ appearance concern/ or reflection)” in n= 8 (36.4%) people with 
BDD suggesting a substantial differential influence of the vignette in people with 
BDD relative to that seen in the healthy controls. This differential influence was 
statistically significant (FET: p = .004, 2-sided, Cramer’s V = .46). 
 
3.3.7 Hypothesis 4: Exploratory analyses on self-esteem in BDD 
 
Hypothesis 4 was explored using data from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES). See table 3 for the data on the divisions of self-esteem in people with BDD 
and healthy controls. 
 
Self-competence 
People with BDD (Mdn= 6.00) reported significantly lower self-competence relative 
to healthy controls (Mdn= 13.00) (U =1.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had 






People with BDD (Mdn= 3.00) reported significantly lower self-liking relative to 
healthy controls (Mdn= 13.00) (U = 1.50, p < .001, exact, 2-sided). This result had a 
large effect size (r = -.85). Effect sizes showed that differences between groups were 




Table 6. Experimental data as a function of participant group and attention condition. 
People with BDD  Healthy controls  Combined groups 
        M  S.D.    M S.D.       M S.D.     
DV 1: 
The general attractiveness of others 
 
CAC mean photo ratings     73.92 14.06   68.20 8.95   71.19 12.11   
SFA mean photo ratings     72.50 12.52   65.81 10.90   69.31 12.11 
Combined attention mean photo ratings   73.21 12.78   67.00 8.54   70.25 11.29 
 
CAC first photo ratings     67.73 14.85   66.65 12.85   67.21 13.77   
SFA first photo ratings     65.34 13.97   61.78 13.77   63.64 13.82 
Combined attention first photo ratings   66.53 12.35   64.21 10.79   65.43 11.55 
 
DV 2: 
Self-evaluated attractiveness compared to others 
 
CAC mean photo ratings     35.42 14.65   6.86 9.30   21.82 18.93   
SFA mean photo ratings     34.18 16.05   4.71 11.63   20.15 20.41 
Combined attention mean photo ratings   34.80 14.73   5.78 9.82   20.98 19.26 
 
CAC first photo ratings     32.84 16.55   6.70 15.83   20.39 20.76 
SFA first photo ratings     32.14 18.11   -.35 14.27   16.67 23.07 
Combined attention first photo ratings   32.49 16.23   3.18 12.73   18.53 20.73  
 
Note. DV, dependent variable; CAC, control attention condition; SFA, self-focused attention;  BDD, Body Dysmorphic Disorder; M, mean; S.D., 






The present investigation studied self-focused attention (S-FA) and appearance-
related comparisons (A-RCs) in people with body dysmorphic disorder (BDD). The 
overarching rationale for this investigation was that both S-FA and A-RCs are 
purported to be key distress maintenance factors in BDD according to the 
information processing cognitive-behavioural model proposed by Veale (2004) and 
Veale and Neziroglu (2010). The author therefore addressed the limited research on 
these constructs in people with BDD. Hypotheses 1 and 2 of the present investigation 
used a questionnaire based design to explore both the nature (frequency, direction, 
and automaticity) and specificity of A-RCs in people with BDD relative to healthy 
controls. The exploration of these hypotheses was deemed important because aspects 
of A-RCs may contribute to distress maintenance and cognitive-behavioural models 
should be as specific as possible for effective treatment to follow. The present 
investigation then used a newly devised questionnaire to investigate the beliefs held 
about the functions of A-RCs in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. 
Beliefs about engaging in behavioural processes, for example in anxiety disorders, 
can often lead to further engagement with them resulting in a maintenance of feared 
outcomes and associated distress (Salkovskis, 1991). Addressing beliefs about A-
RCs was therefore considered to be another aspect of the present investigation which 
would be informative for cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
 
In order to explore hypothesis 3 the author used a novel experimental design to 
hypothesis test for the possible lack of a self-serving appearance-related bias in 
people with BDD relative to healthy controls (Lambrou et al., 2011). This 
experiment was considered important because it was designed to investigate a 
hypothesised interaction between key aspects of BDD phenomenology namely- S-FA 
and A-RCs. To the best of the author’s knowledge the present investigation is the 
first study of self-serving A-RCs biases in people with BDD relative to healthy 
controls. The author tested the main hypothesis with a manipulation of implicit S-
FA. The inclusion of this manipulation was important given the paucity of research 
on implicit processing in people with BDD, despite an assertion that such processing 
maintains anxiety pathology and more BDD specific symptoms (Beck & Clark, 
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1997; McNally, 1995; Buhlmann, et al., 2009). Hypothesis 4 of the present 
investigation focused on self-esteem in people with BDD because it has been found 
to be particularly low in this disorder (Phillips et al., 2004). Self-esteem is also 
recognised as a key psychological construct influenced by comparing. In particular, 
the divisions of self-esteem namely- self-competence and self-liking in people with 
BDD relative to healthy controls were investigated (Tafarodi & Milne, 2002). 
 
4.2 Summary of findings 
 
In summary the present investigation’s questionnaire results supported its hypotheses 
1 and 2 regarding the nature (frequency, direction, and automaticity) and specificity 
of A-RCs in people with BDD, respectively. A-RCs were more frequent, generally 
more upwards, and more automatic in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. 
The higher frequency of A-RCs in people with BDD could also not be attributed to 
more general constructs related to comparing. In using a newly developed measure 
results also uncovered some beliefs about A-RCs in people with BDD. These results 
suggested that people with BDD, more so than healthy controls, believe that A-RCs 
are a means of self-evaluation, self-loathing (a way to confirm beliefs about physical 
unattractiveness) and a means through which they can manage current social threats. 
The present investigation however did not find evidence to suggest that either 
healthy controls or people with BDD show a self-serving A-RCs bias contingent on 
S-FA contrary to its main experimental hypothesis. In addition the present 
investigation did not find evidence that the divisions of self-esteem, self-liking and 
self-competence, were disproportionately effected in BDD relative to healthy 
controls, contrary to its final hypothesis. 
 
Each part of the present investigation led by its research questions and hypotheses 
will now be discussed in turn before addressing limitations of the research. The 
discussion will then address the present investigation’s clinical implications and 







4.3 Hypothesis 1: Exploring the nature of A-RCs in BDD 
 
In keeping with hypothesis 1 A-RCs were found to be more frequent in people with 
BDD relative to healthy controls. This result offers some support for the notion that 
A-RCs are another one of the compulsive behaviours engaged in by people with 
BDD. It is more interesting however that an interaction emerged between participant 
group and the frequency of A-RCs when this was reported on as per the perceived 
attractiveness of the target of comparison. When this interaction was investigated 
further it was found that people with BDD reported engaging in A-RCs significantly 
more with both attractive and average others relative to unattractive others. This 
finding is in keeping with Festinger’s (1954) original theory which proposed a 
“unidirectional drive upwards” in the social comparison processes of abilities (p. 
124). There were no significant differences in the frequencies of different directions 
of A-RCs in healthy controls however. These more substantial findings relating to 
the direction of A-RCs were also in keeping with the result showing that people with 
BDD reported rating targets of A-RCs as more physically attractive than themselves 
relative to healthy controls. The data therefore supported hypothesis 1 which stated 
that A-RCs would be generally more upwards in people with BDD relative to healthy 
controls. 
 
The above findings therefore suggest that Cash’s (1991, 2008) “unfair to compare” 
cognitive bias is found in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. It is 
interesting to consider what these findings mean when applying Festinger’s (1954) 
theory of social comparison processes. Festinger (1954) proposed that people tend to 
make social comparisons only with those that allow subjectively accurate self-
evaluations. Indeed Festinger stated that when social comparisons are not deemed to 
give accurate feedback for the self the comparing ceases. In this context the present 
findings suggest that people with BDD continue to perceive their A-RCs as offering 
useful self-evaluations despite them being generally more upwards relative to healthy 
controls. Moreover the present findings imply that healthy controls refrain from A-
RCs at a lower ceiling of perceived physical attractiveness relative to people with 
BDD. Indeed it has been stated that social comparison activity is sometimes refrained 
from or curtailed when people become aware that they are not faring well (Buunk, 
Schaufeli, & Ybenma, 1994; Gibbons, Benbow, & Gerrard, 1994). 
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For people with BDD however such curtailment in A-RCs, at least relative to healthy 
controls, does not appear to occur to a similar extent. It therefore makes sense that 
people with BDD reported being generally much less satisfied with their appearance 
after comparing as again it appears that they continue to engage with more upwards 
A-RCs beyond the norm. Theories of body image disturbance propose that A-RCs 
are a core factor in the development and maintenance of distorted body image (e.g. 
Stormer & Thompson, 1996; Cash, 1997). The present investigation’s results on the 
nature of A-RCs in BDD appear to be in keeping with such theories. The question 
then becomes why does the same curtailment in A-RCs not occur in people with 
BDD relative to controls? It might be that through the very nature of the disorder, as 
defined by perceived flaws, most targets of A-RCs are expected to be of a more 
upwards direction. People with BDD might therefore continue to see the information 
these A-RCs offer as relevant to subjectively accurate self-evaluations. This 
interpretation fits well with the present investigation’s finding that people with BDD 
believe that they can use A-RCs as a means of a confirmation bias of their perceived 
flaws- this finding will be returned to later. It is also known that people with BDD 
can have highly perfectionistic thinking (Buhlmann et al., 2008). Such perfectionism 
might also be relevant to the targets of A-RCs chosen in people with BDD. The 
present findings however did not find significant differences in the frequency of A-
RCs between average and attractive targets of comparison in people with BDD.  
 
In keeping with hypothesis 1 the present investigation also found that people with 
BDD engage in A-RCs relating to both their overall appearance and the specific 
facial or body features that they are most concerned about with a significantly higher 
frequency relative to healthy controls. The effect sizes however show that the 
difference between groups was larger for A-RCs of the specific facial or body 
features of concern. This finding is in keeping with the current diagnostic thinking 
for BDD and indeed that which has been proposed for the DSM-V (APA, 2000; 
Phillips et al., 2010). The finding is also supported by evidence of an attentional bias 
in people with BDD for selecting the area of perceived defect in observations of 
unfamiliar faces (Grocholewski et al., 2012). In summary of this section it would 
seem that more frequent, generally more upwards A-RCs, and A-RCs of specific 
perceived flaws are particularly pertinent to appearance comparing in BDD. These 
findings are unlikely to be in reference to mutually exclusive instances of A-RCs in 
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this disorder. That is, focusing on specific facial features of concern in the observed 
other is likely to be followed by an appraisal of them as being more attractive hence 
creating an abundance of more upwards A-RCs. The proposed link between focusing 
on specific facial features of concern and subsequent appraisals of more upwards A-
RCs is built on in section 4.5. 
  
In keeping with hypothesis 1 A-RCs were also found to be more automatic in people 
with BDD relative to healthy controls. This finding is important because research has 
shown that the habitual (i.e. automatic) component of negative body image thinking 
about appearance predicts body dissatisfaction over and above the negative content 
of such thinking (Verplanken & Tangelder, 2011). This research also found that the 
habitual component of negative thinking about appearance also accounted for low 
self-esteem over and above thought content when controlling for body 
dissatisfaction. The highly automatic nature of A-RCs in people with BDD is 
therefore likely to be adding to the maintenance of their body image disturbance and 
associated negative affective states.  
 
4.4 Hypothesis 2: Exploring the specificity of A-RCs in BDD 
 
The present investigation endeavoured to build on the result showing that A-RCs are 
more frequent in people with BDD relative to healthy controls (e.g. Anson, 2008). In 
addition to replicating this finding it was explored further for its specificity. Analyses 
were therefore aimed at showing whether or not the higher rates of A-RCs in people 
with BDD relative to healthy controls could be attributed to less disorder specific 
constructs. Social comparison orientation was firstly chosen as a covariate because 
some research suggests that there is variation in a psychological predisposition 
towards social comparing- a phenomenon commonly found in the general population 
(Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
 
In keeping with hypothesis 2 the significantly higher frequency of A-RCs in people 
with BDD relative to healthy controls withstood covariance for the more general 
construct of social comparison orientation. This therefore suggests that people with 
BDD are not driven to make A-RCs more often than healthy controls merely as part 
of a broader picture of being more generally orientated towards making social 
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comparisons. A subsequent analysis found that people with BDD had a greater 
orientation towards upwards social comparisons relative to healthy controls. A post-
hoc analysis was therefore also performed using upwards social comparisons as a 
covariate. Indeed it made sense to run this analysis especially when considering that 
results had also shown that the higher frequencies of ARCs in people with BDD 
relative to healthy controls were most pronounced in more upwards A-RCs. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to show that significantly higher levels of upwards 
social comparisons are endorsed in another disorder characterised by body 
dissatisfaction (Anorexia Nervosa) relative to student controls in domains other than 
physical attractiveness (Troop, et al., 2003). The significantly higher frequency of A-
RCs in people with BDD relative to healthy controls however again withstood 
covariance. It would therefore seem that the higher frequencies of A-RCs found in 
people with BDD relative to healthy controls is not subsumed by their more general 
difference in orientation towards making more upwards social comparisons. This 
finding further supported hypothesis 2 regarding the specificity of A-RCs in people 
with BDD. 
 
Previous research has shown that people with BDD have substantially lower self-
esteem relative to healthy controls (Bohne et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2004). People 
with low self-esteem have also been shown to be interested in social comparison, and 
specifically upwards social comparison, as a form of self-evaluative information 
(Wayment, & Taylor, 1995). It therefore followed that the final construct to be used 
as a covariate in a comparative analysis of A-RCs between people with BDD and 
healthy controls would be self-esteem. This difference again withstood covariance 
but this time for self-esteem. In a series of analyses the present investigation 
therefore found evidence suggesting that high frequencies of A-RCs are a specific 
aspect of BDD phenomenology. These results are new in the literature and support 
the validity of including A-RCs in the information-processing cognitive-behavioural 
models of BDD (Veale, 2004; Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). 
 
4.5 Exploring beliefs about the functions of A-RCs 
 
The present investigation also explored the phenomenology of why people with BDD 
engage in A-RCs relative to healthy controls. A brief but clinically relevant measure 
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of theory and evidence based subscales on the possible beliefs about the functions of 
A-RCs was generated for this purpose. 
 
People with BDD had significantly stronger agreement with A-RCs as a means of 
checking/verifying for self-evaluation relative to healthy controls. The function of 
social comparisons originally purported by Festinger et al. (1954) therefore appears 
to be particularly applicable to A-RCs in the phenomenology of BDD. This finding 
makes sense in the context of the higher overall rates of A-RCs in people with BDD, 
relative to healthy controls, when the anxiety disorders literature is consulted. That 
is, it is known throughout the anxiety disorders literature that when behaviours such 
as checking or reassurance-seeking are excessively repeated ambiguity and reduced 
confidence in their feedback ensues (e.g. Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey, & 
Rachman, 2010). People with BDD engage in several compulsive behaviours that are 
likely to have this effect on their appearance concerns such as mirror checking and 
gazing and questioning others about their appearance (Phillips et al., 1993). The 
present investigation offers some suggestion that A-RCs can be added to this list; the 
repeated A-RCs themselves might become the source of an increased uncertainty or 
ambiguity about appearance which then drives a further need/ higher motivation to 
use A-RCs as a means of self-evaluation. Corroborating this perspective is research 
highlighting that interest in social comparison is associated with uncertainty 
(Festinger, 1954; Taylor, Buunk, & Aspinall, 1990; Wills & Suls, 1991). This 
vicious cycle is illustrated in figure 3. 
 
It is also interesting to consider that occasional more favourable A-RCs would 
intermittently reinforce A-RCs in a similar way to what has been proposed in mirror 
use in people with BDD (Veale & Riley, 2001). There would appear to be some 
contradiction however between this and the main belief about A-RCs serving a 
function of confirmation bias which is described more fully hereafter. 
Notwithstanding, it is possible for the same behaviour to serve multiple functions. 
The next two potential areas of beliefs about/ functions of A-RCs were comparing to 
put something right through self-enhancement and to put something right through 
self-improvement. Self-enhancement referred to a cognitive-affective construct (i.e. 
A-RCs as a means of feeling better about the self) whereas self-improvement 
referred to a cognitive-behavioural construct (i.e. A-RCs as a means of learning what 
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to do/ not do to with one’s appearance). People with BDD did not have a 













Figure 3. A vicious cycle of A-RCs as a means of self-evaluation in people with 
BDD. 
 
This is interesting because these two functions of A-RCs are relatively more adaptive 
than the others studied. The notion that A-RCs for a function of self-improvement 
are relatively adaptive has some support from the literature given that they do not 
significantly increase body-focused anxiety relative to a no A-RCs control condition 
(Halliwell & Dittmar, 2005). Halliwell & Dittmar (2005) did find however that such 
increases in anxiety when A-RCs were focused on a function of self-evaluation. It 
would appear that despite the significantly higher rates of A-RCs in people with 
BDD relative to healthy controls, they are not used any more so for more adaptive 
reasons. Rather, significant differences between these groups arise only when asking 
about the more unhelpful functions of A-RCs.  
 
The present investigation also found that people with BDD had significantly stronger 
agreement in the beliefs that A-RCs are a means of self-loathing relative to healthy 
controls. Moreover, this finding suggests that people with BDD believe that A-RCs 
are a means through which they can confirm their own beliefs about being physically 
unattractive. Indeed of all the beliefs about the functions of A-RCs that were 
investigated the largest effect size (r = -.79) between people with BDD and healthy 
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controls was for the function of self-loathing. People with BDD therefore appear to 
firmly believe that A-RCs are a means of confirming that their physical appearance is 
unattractive/ugly or flawed. Indeed, it therefore makes sense that a disproportionately 
higher frequency of more upwards A-RCs (Cash’s (1991, 2008) “unfair to compare”) 
were found in people with BDD relative to healthy controls compared to the other 
directions of such comparing. That is, people are most likely to use a behaviour for a 
function in which they most firmly believe it to serve for them. People with BDD 
might therefore drive their preponderance of generally more upwards A-RCs owing 
to their belief that A-RCs serve a function of self-loathing. 
 
The tendency for more upwards A-RCs in people with BDD might also occur 
because their beliefs about the function of self-loathing feed into a tendency for 
selecting the area of perceived defect in observations of unfamiliar faces 
(Grocholewski et al., 2012). The resultant appraisal of more upwards A-RCs is likely 
to result in lower appearance self-evaluations, increased body dissatisfaction, and 
negative affect (O’Brien et al., 2009; Leahey et al., 2007; Engeln–Maddox, 2005; 
Bailey & Ricciardelli, 2010). The author proposes that increased body dissatisfaction 
and negative affect are subsequent to a secondary appraisal of lower self-evaluated 
physical attractiveness. The present investigation’s results are in keeping with the 
cognitive-behavioural sequence described in this paragraph. A diagrammatic 
illustration of this sequence is therefore included to promote an understanding of 
how the results of the present investigation might fit together (see figure 4).   
 
The present investigation’s results also found that people with BDD were 
significantly less satisfied with their appearance after comparing relative to healthy 
controls and this is also in keeping with the diagrammatic illustration found in figure 
4. The diagrammatic illustration also proposes a larger feedback loop where beliefs 
about the function of A-RCs as one of self-loathing are confirmed by the smaller 
feedback loop. In this smaller feedback loop the persistent pairing of what become 
perceived as more upwards A-RCs with lower self-evaluated physical attractiveness 
and negative affective outcomes, potentially through mechanisms of classical or 
evaluative conditioning, might lead to conditioned negative emotional responding to 
A-RCs more generally (Neziroglu et al., 2008). The negative affective outcomes of 
perceived upwards A-RCs in people with BDD might also feed back into an 
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interpretation of more upwards A-RCs. This is illustrated in the role of affective 
outcomes feeding back into the primary appraisal shown in figure 4. This process is 
proposed to be in keeping with evidence of a depression-linked negative 
interpretation bias which is substantial (e.g., Norman, Miller, & Klee, 1983; Nunn, 
Mathews, & Trower, 1997). More specifically, there is evidence to show that 
induced low mood can lead to more unfavourable body perception at least in female 
samples (Baker, Williamson, & Sylve, 1995; Taylor, & Cooper, 1992).  
 
The present investigation also found that people with BDD had significantly stronger 
agreement in the beliefs that A-RCs are a means of threat management, through their 
use to initiate safety seeking behaviours/ checking or avoidance, relative to healthy 
controls. Such behaviours are known to maintain anxiety through the prevention of 
disconfirming feared outcomes (Salkovskis, 1991). The present findings therefore 
suggest that beliefs about A-RCs in people with BDD feed into the maintenance of 
the social-evaluative concerns that often come with this disorder (Pinto & Phillips, 
2005; Coles et al., 2006; Anson, 2008). 
 
4.6 Hypothesis 3: Investigating the self-serving A-RCs bias 
 
4.6.1 Self-serving A-RCs 
The experimental hypothesis (hypothesis 3) of the present investigation was not 
supported. The present results indicated that neither healthy controls nor people with 
BDD become significantly more self-serving in their evaluations of physical 
appearance when self-focused. Indeed this null result was found for both ratings of 
the general attractiveness of others and self-evaluated attractiveness compared to 
others. It is possible that this null interaction effect is owing to insufficient statistical 
power. Results hold implications for the information-processing cognitive 
behavioural models of BDD proposed by Veale (2004) and Veale & Nezirolgu 
(2010). These models assert that an appearance-related trigger can lead to S-FA on 
negatively appraised imagery which in turn leads to other maladaptive cognitive and 
behavioural processes. The models therefore give a central role to S-FA in linking 


























Figure 4. Reinforcement of self-loathing more upwards A-RCs in BDD. 
The results of the present investigation suggest that S-FA at the implicit level of 
awareness might not be sufficient for driving differences in evaluations of A-RCs in 
people with BDD relative to healthy controls. That is, there was no difference in the 
processing of appearance-related comparison information between people with BDD 
and healthy controls contingent on implicit S-FA. A self-serving A-RCs bias 
contingent on S-FA was therefore not found. 
 
A self-serving A-RCs bias contingent on S-FA was however found in 
Schwinghammer et al. (2006) - the study on which the present investigation’s main 
hypothesis was partly based. The author proposes that the most adequate 
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and samples used in these respective investigations. The designs, for example, were 
different in the 2 studies. The Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study used a between 
subjects design whereas the present investigation used a mixed design with attention 
condition as a repeated measures variable. A mixed design was decided upon owing 
to time constraints and the difficulty in recruiting large enough numbers of people 
with BDD for a between subjects design.  
 
The present investigation and the Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study differed in 
terms of a number of aspects of the experimental procedure. In the present 
investigation the main dependent variables were mean ratings taken from 3 photos in 
each attention condition. In Schwinghammer et al. (2006) dependent variables were 
from ratings taken from 1 photo. The present investigation however also carried out 
analyses of ratings that followed the first photos only, although again the null effect 
was still found. It might have been that the photos used in the present investigation 
were not sufficiently attractive in order to induce the self-serving A-RCs bias found 
in Schwinghammer et al. (2006) despite a purposeful selection of faces with high 
physical attractiveness (>5 out of 7). It is also worth noting that the interaction 
effects found in Schwinghammer et al. (2006) were between independent variables 
of SFA (S-FA vs. a control attention condition) and the attractiveness of the target of 
comparison (attractive vs. unattractive). It might be asserted that the use of portraits 
of differing levels of attractiveness is required for a self-serving A-RCs bias to be 
found. According to the Schwinghammer et al. (2006) data however, the use of 
attractive portraits alone should give a salient A-RCs bias contingent on implicit S-
FA, hence their selection in the present investigation.    
 
Another source of difference is the content of the dependent variables used. The first 
dependent variable (the general attractiveness of others) in the present investigation 
was ratings from: “rate the physical attractiveness of the person you have just seen”. 
This variable bares most resemblance to the Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study 
dependent variable (called: Attractiveness comparison other) which was ratings 
from: “In general, to what extent do you think this person is seen as attractive?” 
These variables are considered very similar. The second dependent variable (self-
evaluated attractiveness compared to others) in the present investigation was ratings 
from: “rate the physical attractiveness of the person you have just seen in comparison 
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to your own physical attractiveness”. This variable bares most resemblance to the 
Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study dependent variable (called: Self-evaluation) 
which was combined ratings from: “To what extent do you think you are attractive?” 
and “To what extent are you satisfied with your looks?” This dependent variable is 
therefore not explicitly about A-RCs, in addition to having an affective loading (i.e. a 
rating of body satisfaction), which was not an aspect of the present investigation’s 
dependent variable. Indeed it might be that the self-serving A-RCs bias found in the 
latter of the Schwinghammer et al. (2006) variables was contingent on its apparent 
focus on self-evaluated attractiveness (i.e. without the mention of an explicit 
appearance comparison) and/or its sensitivity to an induced affective state. 
 
It is interesting that the manipulation check of the S-FA condition showed that there 
was a differential influence of the vignette task between people with BDD and 
healthy controls. Indeed there were a significant proportion of people with BDD with 
evidence suggesting that the manipulation of S-FA induced a more explicit focus of 
attention on the self, relative to healthy controls. One explanation of this differential 
influence is the content of the vignette used to induce S-FA which states 
“everywhere I go I see my reflection looking back at me in the glass of a hundred 
windows”. Indeed some people with BDD wrote in the manipulation check for the S-
FA condition that they had had thoughts about their face/ an appearance concern, or 
their reflection. These reports are very understandable given that mirror checking and 
gazing are key clinical features of BDD that are also associated with increased S-FA 
(Phillips et al., 1993; Windheim et al., 2011). 
 
A more theoretical explanation however which might account for the people with 
BDD who reported thoughts about their appearance (and hence evidence of explicit 
S-FA) without clear reference to reflections is related to more general differences 
between clinical populations and healthy controls in terms of S-FA. Woodruff et al. 
(2001) for example found that general measures of psychopathology and severity are 
correlated with S-FA, with these correlations becoming more pronounced when 
isolating negative S-FA. The vignette task might therefore have elicited more explicit 
S-FA in people with BDD relative to the healthy controls due to a more enduring 
trait vulnerability. The vignette task might also have resulted in S-FA at a higher 
level of awareness in people with BDD owing to a trait vulnerability independent of 
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the vignette’s content. It would follow that these higher levels of S-FA would have a 
particularly self-relevant content. According to a cognitive-behavioural model of 
BDD the content brought to mind would likely be the distorted internal body image 
that it proposes exists in people with BDD hence their self-reports about physical 
appearance (Veale, 2004; Osman, et al., 2004). 
 
The differential influence of the vignette (with the S-FA manipulation check reports 
of appearance occurring only in people with BDD) was not strong enough to drive a 
significant difference in the dependent variables however. This is interesting given 
that there is a suggestion that the more available or easily brought to mind 
information is the greater its impact on subsequent inferences is said to be (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). Furthermore it has been consistently demonstrated that self-
focus increases the influence of self-relevant and internal sources of information on 
subsequent judgments and behaviours (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Pryor, Gibbons, 
Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977). If there is a self-serving A-RCs bias in healthy 
controls contingent on S-FA that is not found in people with BDD then it would 
seem that a different manipulation of S-FA and/or more statistical power to that used 
in the present investigation is required.  
 
The author’s intentions however were to test for a replication of the self-serving A-
RCs bias found in healthy controls (found in Schwinghammer et al., 2006) and also 
to hypothesise a relative absence of this bias in people with BDD. It was therefore 
deemed experimentally sound to utilise the same manipulation of S-FA as in 
Schwinghammer et al. (2006) despite this being one at the implicit level of 
processing. Indeed more explicit inductions of S-FA might not give rise to a self-
serving A-RCs bias perhaps due to its tendency to induce more negative affect (Mor 
& Winquist, 2002). Furthermore, the author wished to investigate an implicit process 
in BDD due to their being little research on this topic despite it being asserted that 
such processing can maintain anxiety pathology (Buhlmann et al., 2008; Buhlmann 
et al., 2009; Buhlmann et al., 2011; Beck & Clark, 1997; McNally, 1995). 
 
The Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study used a sample of female students and 
although not explicitly stated in the study’s methodology, it must be presumed that 
these students were of a fairly average undergraduate age i.e. approximately late 
86 
 
teens to early twenties. Healthy controls in the present investigation were matched 
approximately according to both age and sex to the group of people with BDD. In 
consequence their mean age was approximately 31 years and there were 50% males 
in the group. Differences in the results between the present investigation and the 
Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study might therefore be owing to an effect of age 
and/or sex both of which have been found to influence body image perception 
(Rusticus & Hubley, 2006). Furthermore S-FA has been found to have a stronger 
effect in females (Mor & Winquist, 2002). It is acknowledged however that Mor & 
Winquist (2002) were referring to the association between S-FA and negative affect 
whilst the dependent variables used in the present investigation were related to 
perceptions of attractiveness and therefore not directly affect laden. 
 
Furthermore there might have been other characteristics inherent to the highly 
homogenous student sample of the Schwinghammer et al. (2006) study which drove 
their effect of an A-RCs bias contingent on S-FA (see Wintre, North & Sugar, 2001). 
In contrast to their student sample the healthy controls of the present investigation 
were varied in a range of demographic variables including employment status, 
marital status and level of education. The influence of demographic variables might 
have been responsible for why a replication of Schwinghammer et al. (2006) was not 
found. More statistical power may be needed to drive a replication of the 
Schwinghammer et al. (2006) findings in a more heterogeneous sample. 
 
4.6.2 Experimental main effect of A-RCs 
It is noteworthy that people with BDD rated their self-evaluated attractiveness 
compared to others (dependent variable 2) as significantly lower than healthy 
controls. There was no significant difference between groups for ratings of the 
general attractiveness of others (dependent variable 1) however. The juxtaposition of 
these findings is in keeping with the notion that body image problems in BDD are 
related to negative self-evaluations as opposed to excessively high physical 
appearance evaluations of others. Dependent variable 2 was therefore more sensitive 
to the psychopathology of BDD because it asked for A-RCs which explicitly 
incorporated self-evaluations. Dependent variable 1 however was focused on the 
evaluation of others’ physical attractiveness. There is some evidence however that 
people with BDD form significantly higher evaluations of physical attractiveness in 
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attractive others relative to healthy controls (Buhlmann et al., 2008). The present 
findings are nonetheless in keeping with theories of body image disturbance 
proposing that appearance comparison is a core factor in the development and 
maintenance of distorted body image (e.g. Stormer and Thompson, 1996). The 
present findings are also in keeping with current diagnostic accounts of BDD as a 
disorder of perceived appearance flaws in the self (APA, 2000; Phillips et al., 2010). 
The above findings therefore contribute to the knowledge of BDD. Such 
contributions to empirical literature are still important because there is still limited 
knowledge of BDD amongst health professionals. Perhaps not mutually exclusive 
from this issue is that people with BDD can be very self-critical and experience their 
appearance concerns as “vain, superficial, narcissistic, or self-indulgent” leading to 
feelings of shame. Indeed research has shown that owing to such feelings people 
with BDD are unlikely to voice their appearance concerns unless specifically asked 
by their physician (Grant et al., 2001). Research contributing to the knowledge of 
BDD should contribute to mitigating feelings of shame by virtue of its application 
into the healthcare setting and wider public dissemination.  
 
4.7 Hypothesis 4: Exploratory analyses on self-esteem in BDD 
The present investigation found that people with BDD had significantly lower levels 
of self-esteem relative to healthy controls in keeping with other research (Bohne et 
al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2004). The present investigation also wished to explore a 
division in this construct, highlighting self-competence and self-liking, in people 
with BDD (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995; Tafarodi & Milne, 2002; Sinclair et al., 2010). 
It was hypothesised that self-liking would be disproportionately lower than self-
competence in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. Contrary to hypothesis 
4 however self-competence and self-liking were both significantly lower in people 
with BDD relative to healthy controls to a similar extent based on an observation of 
effect sizes. 
 
It is interesting to consider however that self-competence and self-liking may or may 
not be adversely affected in people with BDD for different reasons. Self-liking for 
instance has been defined partly as the valuation of the self as an aesthetic social 
object (Tafarodi & Milne, 2002) which is a construct deemed relevant to BDD and 
hence further elaborated on in cognitive-behavioural models of this disorder (Veale, 
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2004; Neziroglu & Veale, 2010). Self-liking might therefore be affected mainly by a 
direct effect of BDD symptomatology. Furthermore self-liking has been found to be 
relatively low in single individuals and indeed as much as 75% of people with BDD 
have been found to be single (Sinclair et al., 2010; Phillips, McElory, Keck, Hudson, 
& Pope, 1994). Notwithstanding, the low levels of self-liking and self-competence 
found in people with BDD relative to healthy controls might well be a more general 
reflection of poor quality of life and poor psychosocial functioning (Phillips, 2000; 




4.8.1 Absence of a clinical control group 
The present investigation had no clinical control group as part of its design. It is 
therefore difficult to ascertain the extent to which group differences were driven by 
an effect of BDD symptomatology as opposed to discrepancies in levels of 
psychopathology per se. A stronger experimental design would therefore have 
included another group from a different clinical population to assist with ruling out 
such possibilities. Indeed it has been shown in experimental studies that clinical 
samples respond with higher levels of negative affect to S-FA manipulations as 
compared to in non-clinical samples (Mor & Winquist, 2002). More specifically, 
depression is an example of a disorder in which S-FA can have maladaptive 
consequences (Rimes & Watkins, 2005) as is purported to be the case in BDD 
(Veale, 2004). A group of clinically depressed participants might therefore have been 
a sound choice for a clinical control group. Furthermore, in keeping with the 
literature on co-morbidity in BDD a large proportion of the people with this disorder 
in the present investigation were clinically depressed (Gunstad & Phillips, 2003). 
The present investigation found that both healthy controls and people with BDD 
were characterised by the absence of a significant self-serving A-RCs in the context 
of using a manipulation of S-FA. The notion of an absent self-serving bias of any 
kind however, whether centred on appearance-comparisons or not, is in keeping with 
the notion of depressive realism (Ally & Abramson, 1979). It cannot be ascertained 
from the present investigation that the lack of a self-serving A-RCs bias in people 
with BDD was more generally a product of high levels of depression in the sample as 
opposed to it being due to distorted and negatively appraised imagery (Osman et al., 
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2004). This conclusion stands irrespective of the lack of a self-serving A-RCs bias in 
the healthy controls. Statistical control for the influence of depression might have 
been one option in the present investigation. Researchers studying another disorder 
characterised by body dissatisfaction (Anorexia Nervosa) however have asserted that 
such statistical methods are not a valid option when depression is so inextricably 
linked to the disorder of main interest (Jansen et al., 2006). This point is therefore 
also applicable to hypothesis 2 of the present investigation in which a series of 
ANCOVAS were used to explore the specificity of A-RCs in people with BDD. The 
use of the ANCOVA to control for group differences in psychopathology is common 
yet a point of controversy in the field (Miller & Chapman, 2001). 
 
Evidence has also suggested that people with depression are a clinical group 
particularly interested in making social comparisons, and negative social comparison 
and depression have been shown to be associated in a number of populations 
(Swallow & Kuiper, 1992; Gilbert, 2000; Gilbert et al., 2002; Troop et al. 2003). The 
link between depression and low self-esteem has also been well established (e.g. 
Battle, 1978). These findings again suggest that the present investigation would have 
benefited from a clinical control group of people with depression to explore the 
specificity of A-RCs in BDD. The findings were nonetheless suggestive of such 
specificity which could be built on with the suggested more comprehensive design. 
 
4.8.2 Objective attractiveness 
The present investigation matched people with BDD approximately on both age and 
sex to minimise any potential confound from these variables with those that the 
author was more interested in measuring. An interesting point to consider however is 
that the author made no attempt to match groups by objective ratings of physical 
attractiveness. Matching on such a variable would indeed be akin to accounting for 
more objective variables in studies of other disorders such as life events in 
depression or nature of trauma event in post-traumatic stress-disorder (e.g. Michael, 
Ehlers, & Halligan, 2005). 
 
One study has shown that the physical appearance of healthy controls, people with 
BDD, and people on a waiting list for rhinoplasty was not significantly different in 
terms of attractiveness (Thomas & Goldberg, 1995). The BDD participants in the 
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Thomas & Goldberg (1995) study however were also found to have a variety of 
abnormal features as identified by a technique called morphanalysis which was 
deemed to be an objective measure of physical attractiveness. This study however 
used a small number of BDD participants (n = 11) of whom some had this as a 
secondary diagnosis. Some studies of body image disturbance focusing on BDD in 
particular are now starting to control for more objective physical appearance 
variables such as genital size in samples where this is also the body area of 
preoccupation and distress (Veale, personal communication). The present 
investigation’s main hypothesis however was nonetheless focused on an interaction 
effect looking at a change in perception of physical attractiveness as a repeated-
measures variable meaning that there was a within-group control for objective 
attractiveness. The limitation however does apply to the present investigation’s main 
effects.  
 
4.8.3 Ecological validity  
The present investigation had a strong reliance on self-report data and its 
experimental design used 2-dimensional photographic portraits as appearance-related 
comparison information. Its methods could therefore be more ecologically valid. 
Indeed some research has used daily momentary assessments of A-RCs and 
associated affective reactions in both body satisfied and dissatisfied women (Leahey 
et al., 2007; Leahey & Crowther, 2008). Other research has also related S-FA 
measurements to real life negative social interactions (Flory et al., 2000). Compared 
to these pieces of research it can be asserted that the results of the present 
investigation cannot be as easily generalised to daily S-FA and A-RCs. Nonetheless 
people are exposed to images found in magazines/ on television regularly and this 
information can contribute to lower self-evaluated physical attractiveness and body 
dissatisfaction (Cash et al., 1983; Heinberg & Thompson, 1995; Grabe, Ward, & 
Hyde, 2008). The present investigation’s use of 2-dimensional photographic portraits 








4.9 Clinical implications 
 
4.9.1 Facilitating change in A-RCs in CBT for BDD 
The present investigation found that the nature of A-RCs were significantly different 
in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. People with BDD also reported 
significantly less favourable self-evaluations of physical attractiveness during A-RCs 
and reported being significantly less satisfied with their appearance after comparing 
relative to healthy controls. It follows that A-RCs are likely to at least partly maintain 
these aspects of body image disturbance in BDD. Clinical intervention should 
therefore encourage a reduction in this behaviour. In therapeutic discussion people 
with BDD might therefore be encouraged to reduce A-RCs with the rationale that 
this will reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity which is likely to be reinforcing a 
need to self-evaluate their physical attractiveness. Figure 2 of this discussion could 
be used to formulate this vicious cycle to illustrate the proposed rationale for 
reducing A-RCs. A discussion on the role of intermittent reinforcement in 
maintaining A-RCs as a form of self-evaluation (or self-loathing) might also assist in 
therapy. 
 
In figure 4 of this discussion it was illustrated how beliefs about A-RCs as a means 
of self-loathing might feed into attention and interpretation biases. These biases then 
in turn lead to a cognitive-affective cycle reinforcing both perceived more upwards 
A-RCs and beliefs about A-RCs as serving a function of confirming physical 
unattractiveness/ self-loathing. The author proposes that this figure could also be 
useful in promoting a formulaic understanding of this vicious cycle. The author also 
proposes that Padesky’s prejudice model would be useful in socialising people with 
BDD to the notion that their beliefs about A-RCs as a way to confirm physical 
unattractiveness (and perhaps their wider beliefs about self-evaluated 
unattractiveness) could be both self-fulfilling and indeed maintained through 
cognitive distortion (Padesky, 1993). The present findings also suggested that, in 
people with BDD, A-RCs can function to manage threat. The clinical implication 
here is that cognitive-behavioural therapists should ask about situations in which A-
RCs are most often engaged with. Such questioning might then elicit further 
information on situations in which the safety seeking behaviours and avoidance 
strategies that are maintaining feared outcomes are being used (Salkovskis, 1991).  
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Evidence in the manipulation check of the S-FA condition of distressing appearance-
related thoughts and imagery in people with BDD further corroborates a need for 
imagery work in CBT (Osman et al., 2004). Such imagery work should facilitate 
both an awareness and alteration of the vividly experienced distorted or disturbed 
content of S-FA in people with BDD to reduce the self-defeating point of reference 
in A-RCs. Furthermore, for people with BDD who often create A-RCs with media 
information, an effort to show how untrue to real life many such targets of 
comparison are should be made. 
 
4.9.2 Mindfulness for A-RCs and S-FA in BDD 
The present findings also hold implications for the use of therapeutic approaches that 
might more directly address the highly automatic process of engagement with A-RCs 
that was reported in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. Indeed this would 
seem important based on evidence that the habitual component of negative body 
image thinking about appearance predicts body dissatisfaction over and above the 
negative content of such thinking (Verplanken & Tangelder, 2011). Mindfulness 
meditation has been defined as “paying attention in a particular way, on purpose, in 
the present moment, and non-judgementally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). The nonreactive 
attention that it promotes might help people with BDD to notice urges for A-RCs 
without subsequent behavioural engagement with them (or rumination about/self-
criticism for having such urges). Such intervention would bare relation to the use of 
mindfulness in other populations (Bowen & Marlatt, 2009). Mindfulness practice 
might therefore facilitate the ‘breaking’ of habitual responding through A-RCs in 
people with BDD. Promoting this way of being might alleviate the significantly 
lower self-evaluations of physical attractiveness and body dissatisfaction that A-RCs 
were found to be associated with relative to healthy controls. Indeed this would seem 
an important clinical implication when considering that the present findings also 
showed people with BDD engage in a higher frequency of A-RCs relative to healthy 
controls. 
 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg (1987) proposed that when people become caught in 
attempting to reduce an irreducible discrepancy that they perceive between 
themselves and a particular standard, a depressive self-focusing style occurs where 
negative self-aspects are focused on resulting in depression. Based on the findings of 
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the present investigation it would therefore seem logical that A-RCs (as well as self-
discrepancies between the perceived self and ideal self) could well constitute such 
irreducible discrepancies in people with BDD perhaps contributing to their 
vulnerability to depression (Veale et al., 2003; Lambrou et al., 2011; Gunstad & 
Phillips, 2003). This hypothesis is also corroborated by evidence that the relationship 
between social comparison and depression is moderated by the perceived importance 
of the topic of comparison when considering that people with BDD hold over-valued 
ideas about appearance (Thwaites & Dagnan, 2004; Veale, 2002). 
 
Mindfulness meditation is said to promote changing a person’s relationship with their 
experiences as they arise (Teasdale, 2002) and might therefore address the unhelpful 
impact that A-RCs (and other forms of appearance-related discrepancy-based 
processing) can have in people with BDD (Veale et al., 2003; Lambrou et al., 2011). 
Mindfulness meditation might also assist people with BDD to form a more adaptive 
form of S-FA to reduce appearance-related rumination as part of the more flexible 
attentional system which is advocated in BDD intervention work (Baer, 2009; Veale 
& Neziroglu, 2010). 
 
4.10 Future directions for research 
 
In terms of forming further directions for research, it is interesting to consider further 
why the manipulation of S-FA did not drive an interaction effect between people 
with BDD and healthy controls. The author asserts that the main experimental 
research question of the present investigation is worth more comprehensive empirical 
research in the context of both the possible presence or absence of both self-serving 
and self-loathing/self-defeating A-RCs biases in people with BDD. To form such 
future directions for research the author critically appraises the present investigation 
with reference to the cognitive-behavioural information-processing model of BDD 
and a recent multi-component model of aesthetic sensitivity (Veale, 2004; Veale & 
Neziroglu, 2010; Lambrou et al., 2011).  
 
The manipulation used in the present investigation was designed to induce implicit 
S-FA. Irrespective of not finding an A-RCs bias in healthy controls it is proposed 
that the manipulation was not explicit enough to drive a significant reduction in 
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perceptions of physical attractiveness in the S-FA condition relative to the control 
attention condition in people with BDD. Moreover, Veale’s (2004) cognitive-
behavioural model proposes that, when triggered, S-FA is directed to a distorted and 
negatively appraised image of the self. A more explicit manipulation of S-FA might 
therefore be needed to trigger sufficient awareness of this imagery in order to drive 
the significant interaction effect which was hypothesised in the present investigation 
albeit characterised by a self-loathing/self-defeating A-RCs bias in people with BDD. 
It is again noted however that in a subset of people with BDD the manipulation of S-
FA did have an effect at a more explicit level of awareness as indicated in the S-FA 
manipulation check. A more powerful manipulation of explicit S-FA nonetheless, 
which would also be highly related to BDD phenomenology, would be the use of 
mirror-gazing (Windheim et al., 2011). Other non-rumination studies of S-FA have 
used the presentation of a mirror (Mor & Winquist, 2002). A manipulation of 
appearance-related rumination which would influence both the content and form of 
S-FA might also be informative for future research on A-RCs biases in people with 
BDD given that rumination is also a key aspect of BDD phenomenology (Veale, 
2004). 
 
A more comprehensive investigation of A-RCs biases in people with BDD should 
also take into account the several components of aesthetic sensitivity when choosing 
its method of S-FA manipulation and when designing its dependent variables 
(Lambrou et al., 2011). Again a more explicit manipulation of S-FA might be needed 
in order to drive differences in perceptual sensitivity, emotional sensitivity or 
evaluative components of aesthetic sensitivity during A-RCs (Lambrou et al., 2011). 
The dependent variables chosen would need to be sensitive to the components of 
aesthetic sensitivity pertinent to such comparisons. For example, the present 
investigation’s dependent variables were not of an affective content and so the 
experiment might not have tapped into an aspect of aesthetic sensitivity that would 
have otherwise driven an interaction effect between groups. A self-defeating A-RCs 
bias in people with BDD relative to healthy controls might be expected when 
manipulating S-FA or rumination while measuring aesthetic emotional sensitivity. 
Indeed rumination studies of S-FA tend to have a stronger influence on negative 
affect than non-rumination studies (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Other manipulations of 
S-FA that appear relatively more implicit as compared to ruminative ones, that still 
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yield strong effects in terms of their relationship with negative affect have included 
giving a speech, and listening to one’s voice (Mor & Winquist, 2002). One of these 
manipulations might have given a more adequate test of the present investigation’s 
main hypothesis testing for a self-serving A-RCs bias in healthy controls but not 
people with BDD contingent on S-FA. 
 
In addition to looking for more adept ways of testing the main experimental research 
question of the present investigation there are other meaningful research questions 
that could be explored. In figure 4 the author presented a diagrammatic 
understanding of how the present investigation’s findings might link together 
sequentially. In either people with BDD or analogue samples it would be clinically 
useful to know whether or not beliefs about the functions of A-RCs relate to the main 
area of appearance selected for A-RCs. Indeed, as proposed in figure 4, it might be 
that people who use A-RCs to serve a more unhelpful function of self-loathing (to 
confirm beliefs about physical unattractiveness) focus more on the area of their own 
appearance that they find the most disturbing when viewing targets of A-RCs. 
Furthermore, in an experimental design in which the area of focus in A-RCs is 
manipulated, either to include or exclude participants’ most disturbing feature, it 
might be that this significantly influences the appraisal of the direction of appearance 
comparison, self-evaluated physical attractiveness, and resulting affective outcomes. 
Finally, those who focus more on A-RCs as serving a function of self-enhancement 
might focus their attention on the facial feature which they are most comfortable or 
happy with in their own appearance when viewing targets of A-RCs. This research 
would again start to approach the topic of self-serving biases in A-RCs similar to in 




In conclusion, the present investigation studied self-focused attention (S-FA) and 
appearance-related comparisons (A-RCs) in people with BDD. Questionnaire results 
supported hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the nature and specificity of A-RCs in 
people with BDD, respectively. Indeed A-RCs were found to be significantly more 
frequent (for both specific features of concern and overall appearance), generally 
more upwards, and more automatic, relative to healthy controls. In keeping with 
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hypothesis 2 the more frequent A-RCs in people with BDD could not be attributed to 
the more general constructs relating to comparing that were controlled for. The 
author therefore found evidence for the specificity of A-RCs in BDD hence 
supporting their inclusion in cognitive-behavioural models of this disorder (Veale, 
2004; Veale & Neziroglu, 2010).  
 
Using a newly developed questionnaire, some beliefs about A-RCs were also 
explored in people with BDD. Results suggested that people with BDD, relative to 
healthy controls, held significantly stronger agreement with beliefs about A-RCs as a 
means of self-evaluation, self-loathing (a way to confirm beliefs about physical 
unattractiveness) and as a means of threat management. 
 
The present investigation however did not find evidence to suggest that healthy 
controls but not people with BDD hold a self-serving A-RCs bias contingent on S-
FA. Hypothesis 3 was therefore not supported. Results nonetheless informed Veale’s 
(2004) and Veale and Neziroglu’s (2010) information-processing cognitive-
behavioural models of BDD. The models outline S-FA as key to linking appearance-
related triggers with negatively appraised imagery and subsequent maladaptive 
cognitive and behavioural processes. Results suggest that S-FA at the implicit level 
of awareness might not be sufficient for driving differences in evaluations of 
physical appearance in people with BDD relative to healthy controls. 
 
Hypothesis 4 of the present investigation was tested using exploratory analyses on 
self-esteem in BDD. Hypothesis 4 was based on research proposing divisions of self-
esteem with self-liking appearing to bare more relation to cognitive-behavioural 
models of this disorder relative to self-competence (Tafarodi & Milne, 2002, Veale, 
2004; Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). Contrary to hypothesis 4 however self-competence 
and self-liking were both significantly lower in people with BDD relative to healthy 
controls to a similar extent. 
 
The discussion of limitations of the present investigation was focused on the absence 
of a clinical control group, the measurement of objective attractiveness, and the 
research’s ecological validity. Clinical implications about how to guide cognitive-
behavioural therapy were made by integrating present findings with other empirical 
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evidence in the development of two brief models of A-RCs in BDD. Results showing 
that people with BDD, relative to healthy controls, hold beliefs about A-RCs as a 
means of threat management hold implications for eliciting information on SSBs and 
avoidance in therapy. The application of mindfulness to both A-RCs and S-FA in 
people with BDD was also suggested. 
 
The future directions for research section covered further methods of testing the main 
experimental hypothesis in a more comprehensive investigation of S-FA and self-
serving as well as self-loathing/self-defeating A-RCs biases in BDD. These future 
directions were informed by the cognitive-behavioural information-processing model 
of BDD and a recent multi-component model of aesthetic sensitivity (Veale, 2004; 
Veale & Neziroglu, 2010; Lambrou et al., 2011). In this context both different 
manipulations of S-FA and dependent variables were considered.  
 
Cognitive-behavioural models of BDD and therapy for this disorder should 
incorporate the present investigation’s findings relating to S-FA and A-RCs. The 
author has offered guidance on how this might best be advanced. The author also 
asserts that the suggested future research would be fruitful for further understanding 
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6.2 Appendix 2: Healthy controls circular e-mail to KCL Staff 
 
Email subject line: Body Image Study: Request for Non-Academic/Non-
Research/Non-Clinical Staff to take part as healthy volunteers – Circular 
 
Circular email for use for the recruitment of volunteers for study 11/LO/0287 
approved by the National Research Ethics Service Committee London – Camberwell 
St Giles. This project contributes to the College’s role in conducting research, and 
teaching research methods.  You are under no obligation to reply to this e-mail.  
However, if you choose to reply, participation in this research is voluntary and you 
may withdraw at any time.   
 
We would like to invite you to take part in the above-named research study for. We 
are looking for male and female volunteers between 35 and 50 years old who do not 
have a current mental health problem, personality disorder or difficulties with 
substance abuse and who do not have any past history of a severe mental health 
condition or substance abuse. Volunteers should not have significant worries or 
anxieties about their physical appearance. We are also hoping to exclude academic, 
research and clinical staff. 
 
The purpose of the study is to learn more about the thoughts and behaviours related 
to comparing appearances in people with and without Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
(BDD). People with BDD are preoccupied with and distressed by one or more 
aspects of their physical appearance. More information can be provided if you decide 
to ring the Chief Investigator. We hope this research will inform treatments for BDD.  
The study is a student project being undertaken as part of a Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology.   
 
Taking part involves one phone interview of 15 minutes and one 45 minute meeting 
(max) with the study Chief Investigator, Mr Mark Turner, at the Addiction Sciences 
Building, 4 Windsor Walk, London SE5 8AF.  If you decide to take part, you will be 
asked to complete some questionnaires and to look at some pictures of faces and 
answer questions about them. There will be questions about your current and past 
mental health and how you think and feel about your appearance and that of others. 
All information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential, and you will not be identifiable in any publications derived from 
the study. Should you decide to participate in this study you will receive £15 
compensation for your time 
 
If you are interested in participating, or would like further information, please 
contact the study Chief Investigator, Mr. Mark Turner, by replying by e mail to 

































































- Information and consent 
People with BDD – Recruitment 
Clinics: CADAT; Anxiety 
Residential Unit 
Websites: BDD Help, BDD Central, 
BDD Foundation, and OCD action 
BDD Support Group 
Healthy controls – Recruitment 
Mindseaarch (a database source 
associated with the Institute of 
Psychiatry was used. Those with 
no known psychiatric history were 
asked for. 
- Experimental procedure as 
per figure 1 in main text 
Debrief 
All patients– Further measures 
 
HADS to measure current anxiety and depression. 
MBSRQ-AS to measure components of body image. 
BCS, PA-RCS, INCOM & BA-RCS to collect information on comparing. 
RSES to measure self-esteem 
(Check that all measures are fully completed) 
-  Screening 
BDD History to check for face &/or 
hair concern. 
General details form for 
demographics and to screen for 
current Anorexia Nervosa (AN)  
PDSQ to screen for co-morbidity. 
Exclude: Primary diagnosis not 
BDD, Bulimia, Psychosis and 
substance abuse. 
SCID II to screen BPD only 
BDD-YBOCS below 24 on items 1-
12. 
(To screen out low severity BDD) 
- Screening 
General details form to screen 
out hx of significant mental health 
problems and current AN. 
Exclude: past hx of Psychosis, 
major depression, body image 
concerns, Bulimia and substance 
abuse. 
PDSQ to screen those with current 
mental health problems including 
BDD/ appearance related concerns 
(inc. weight and shape), Eating 
Disorders and substance abuse. 
SCID II to screen BPD only 
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6.4 Appendix 4: Participant information sheets and consent forms 
 
 
Institute of Psychiatry 
Department of Psychology 






Participant Information Sheet 
for people with Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
 
 
Faces and comparing your appearance to other people 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research project that 
forms part of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology qualification. 
This document is designed to give you some information about 
the study, detailing what we hope to achieve, why we believe the 
research is important, and what your involvement, should you 
wish to take part, would entail. You are welcome to take your 
time in coming to a decision, and please do not hesitate to contact 
us with any queries, or to request further information. 
 
 
What is the Purpose of Our Study? 
 
We are conducting this study so that we can learn more about what maintains the 
difficulties that people with Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) experience. More 
specifically, we hope to explore a possible maintenance mechanism in Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) involving the thoughts and behaviours related to 
comparing appearance to other people. The research will therefore inform the way 
we understand BDD and the way we treat it using talk therapies such as Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy.  
 
Why Have I Been Chosen?  
 
You have been chosen/ or responded to an advert asking for people to volunteer 
because you have a diagnosis of BDD, have face and/or hair related concerns, and 
because you are interested. 
 
Do I Have to Take Part? 
 
No. It is entirely up to you if you take part. This sheet is just some information about 
the study and it does not hold you to anything. We would also like to make it clear 
that should you choose not to be involved, this decision will not influence any 




What Will Happen to Me if I Take Part? 
 
At your initial meeting with the trainee clinical psychologist conducting the research 
you will be asked to read this information sheet and sign a consent form if you wish 





The screening procedure would involve completing 5 questionnaires/interviews 
which should take around 40 minutes. 
 
Completing your Participation 
 
Straight after screening you would then complete the rest of the procedure. This 
would include a small amount of reading and looking at some pictures of faces, 
developing an impression of them, and completing some questions about them and 
your own appearance. This part of the procedure will not take long. Following this 
you would be asked to complete a final set of 7 questionnaires which should take 
around 30 minutes. We will then tell you more about the study and ask to write on a 
brief evaluation form. Information about compensation for your involvement is 
detailed below.    
 
Compensation for Participation and Expenses 
 
You will be compensated for your time by receiving £10. You are also entitled to 
claim back travel expenses if you have a receipt. 
 
What Are the Possible Disadvantages, Risks or Side-Effects of Taking Part? 
 
As outlined above, if you do wish to take part, we would be asking you to look at 
some pictures of faces and then answer some questions about them and your own 
appearance. If you started to experience feelings of discomfort or distress, you are 
free to withdraw as described above. You are also welcome to contact the Chief 
Investigator (Mr. Mark Turner) or the supervisors (Dr. David Veale and Dr. Martin 
Anson) to discuss these issues further, if you wish. 
 
What Are the Possible Benefits of Taking Part? 
 
We are not offering a form of treatment in the study although we hope that 
participants who choose to take part find the experience interesting. Participants can 
also take part knowing that they are contributing to research which aims to inform 
psychological treatment. As stated above you will also be compensated for your time 
by receiving £10.  
  
What Will Happen if I Do Not Want to Carry On With The Study? 
 
If you do choose to take part, but then change your mind during the process, you are 
free to withdraw at any point and without giving a reason. In this event, any 
information that you may already have provided will not be used, unless your 
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consent has been given. You would still be compensated for your participation with 
£10.  
 
What if there is a Problem? 
 
If at any point during your involvement in the study you experience concerns about 
aspects of our study you are welcome to contact the researchers, Mr. Mark Turner, 
Dr. Martin Anson and Dr. David Veale. If you remain dissatisfied and wish to make 
a formal complaint, this can be done through the NHS Complaints Procedure (please 
see contact details below).  
Compensation for harm arising from accidental injury as a result of your 
participation in our research will be covered by the Institute of Psychiatry, Kings 
College London.  
 
Will my Taking Part in the Study be Kept Confidential? 
 
All data collected during the course of our research will be kept strictly confidential, 
and any information you provide will have your name and other personal details 
removed so that no individual can be recognised. All questionnaires will be stored in 
a locked filing cabinet accessible only to the researchers. 
 
What Will Happen to the Data Collected For this Study? 
 
The anonymous data will be analysed at the Institute of Psychiatry, Kings College 
London. The questionnaire data will be analysed using computer software and kept 
in a database for around 10 months. 
 
What Will Happen to the Results of this Study? 
 
The research project should be completed by March/April 2012, and if possible our 
findings will be published. If you choose to take part, you are very welcome to have 
a written summary of the final report. No individual’s questionnaire responses or 
experiment findings will be published, and no individual will be identifiable.  
 
Who Has Reviewed the Study? 
 
The study protocol has been produced by the Chief Investigator along with his 
educational supervisors. This was then approved by the Chief Investigator’s 
doctorate course organising core team. This study is also in receipt of ethical 
approval from the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) Committee London- 






Mr. Mark Turner, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, Institute of Psychiatry, Kings 
College London, Addiction Sciences Building, 4 Windsor Walk, Denmark Hill, 




First and Second Educational Supervisors 
 
Dr. Martin Anson, Cognitive behavioural therapist/clinical psychologist, Centre for 
Anxiety Disorders and Trauma (CADAT), Maudsley Hospital, 99 Denmark Hill, 
London, SE5 8AZ. 
Telephone: 02032282431 
 
Dr. David Veale, Consultant Psychiatrist, Centre for Anxiety Disorders and Trauma 
(CADAT), Maudsley Hospital, 99 Denmark Hill, London, SE5 8AZ. 
Telephone: 020 3228 3286 
 
 
South London and Maudsley NHS Trust Complaints Office  
Maudsley Hospital, 111 Denmark Hill, London, SE5 8AZ. Telephone: 
02032282444/2499 
 
We wish to thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet, and if you 



































Institute of Psychiatry 
Department of Psychology 






Participant Consent Form 
for people with Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
 
Research Project: Faces and comparing your appearance to other people 
 
Chief Investigator: 
Mr. Mark Turner (Trainee Clinical Psychologist, Institute of Psychiatry) 
 
Educational Supervisors: 
Dr. Martin Anson (Cognitive Behavioural Therapist/ Clinical Psychologist) 
 
Dr. David Veale (Consultant Psychiatrist) 
 
Please read the following statements and then initial the box on the right. 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information 
sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information and ask questions. 
 
2. I also confirm that the researcher has explained the project and 
has answered my questions honestly and fully. 
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, 
without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
  
4. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes (e.g. 
information on diagnosis) and data collected during the study 
may be looked at by the named researchers from the Institute 
of Psychiatry where this is relevant to my taking part in this 
research. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my records. 
  
5. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
Name of Participant:    Date:   Signed: 
 
………………………………….  …………….. ………………….. 
 
Name of Person Taking Consent:  Date:   Signed: 
 
………………………………….  …………….. …………………... 
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Institute of Psychiatry 
Department of Psychology 






Participant Information Sheet 
For healthy control participants 
 
 
Faces and comparing your appearance to other people 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research project that 
forms part of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology qualification. 
This document is designed to give you some information about 
the study, detailing what we hope to achieve, why we believe the 
research is important, and what your involvement, should you 
wish to take part, would entail. You are welcome to take your 
time in coming to a decision, and please do not hesitate to contact 
us with any queries, or to request further information. 
 
 
What is the Purpose of Our Study? 
 
We are conducting this study so that we can learn more about what maintains the 
difficulties that people with Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) experience. More 
specifically, we hope to explore a possible maintenance mechanism in Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) involving the thoughts and behaviours related to 
comparing appearance to other people. The research will therefore inform the way 
we understand BDD and the way we treat it using talk therapies such as Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy.  
 
Why Have I Been Chosen?  
 
You have responded to an email advert asking for people to volunteer because you 
do not have a diagnosis of BDD and you are interested in helping with the research. 
We would like people without BDD to take part so that we have a point of 
comparison to our participants that do have this diagnosis. 
 
Do I Have to Take Part? 
 
No. It is entirely up to you if you take part. This sheet is just some information about 
the study and it does not hold you to anything. We would also like to make it clear 
that should you choose not to be involved, this decision will not influence any 






What Will Happen to Me if I Take Part? 
 
At your initial meeting with the trainee clinical psychologist conducting the research 
you will be asked to read this information sheet and sign a consent form if you wish 





The screening procedure would involve completing 3 questionnaires/interviews 
which should take around 30 minutes. 
 
Completing your Participation 
 
Straight after screening you would then complete the rest of the procedure. This 
would include a small amount of reading and looking at some pictures of faces, 
developing an impression of them, and completing some questions about them and 
your own appearance. This part of the procedure will not take long. Following this 
you would be asked to complete a final set of 7 questionnaires which should take 
around 30 minutes. We will then tell you more about the study and ask to write on a 
brief evaluation form. Information about compensation for your involvement is 
detailed below.    
 
Compensation for Participation and Expenses 
 
You will be compensated for your time by receiving £10. You are also entitled to 
claim back travel expenses if you have a receipt. 
 
What Are the Possible Disadvantages, Risks or Side-Effects of Taking Part? 
 
As outlined above, if you do wish to take part, we would be asking you to look at 
some pictures of faces and then answer some questions about them and your own 
appearance. If you started to experience feelings of discomfort or distress, you are 
free to withdraw as described above. You are also welcome to contact the Chief 
Investigator (Mr. Mark Turner) or the supervisors (Dr. David Veale and Dr. Martin 
Anson) to discuss these issues further, if you wish. 
 
What Are the Possible Benefits of Taking Part? 
 
We are not offering a form of treatment in the study although we hope that 
participants who choose to take part find the experience interesting. Participants can 
also take part knowing that they are contributing to research which aims to inform 
psychological treatment. As stated above you will also be compensated for your time 
by receiving £10.  
  
What Will Happen if I Do Not Want to Carry On With The Study? 
 
If you do choose to take part, but then change your mind during the process, you are 
free to withdraw at any point and without giving a reason. In this event, any 
information that you may already have provided will not be used, unless your 
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consent has been given. You would still be compensated for your participation with 
£10. 
 
What if there is a Problem? 
 
If at any point during your involvement in the study you experience concerns about 
aspects of our study you are welcome to contact the researchers, Mr. Mark Turner, 
Dr. Martin Anson and Dr. David Veale. If you remain dissatisfied and wish to make 
a formal complaint, this can be done through the NHS Complaints Procedure (please 
see contact details below). Compensation for harm arising from accidental injury as a 
result of your participation in our research will be covered by the Institute of 
Psychiatry, Kings College London.  
 
Will my Taking Part in the Study be Kept Confidential? 
 
All data collected during the course of our research will be kept strictly confidential, 
and any information you provide will have your name and other personal details 
removed so that no individual can be recognised. All questionnaires will be stored in 
a locked filing cabinet accessible only to the researchers. 
 
What Will Happen to the Data Collected For this Study? 
 
The anonymous data will be analysed at the Institute of Psychiatry, Kings College 
London. The questionnaire data will be analysed using computer software and kept 
in a database for around 10 months. 
 
What Will Happen to the Results of this Study? 
 
The research project should be completed by March/April 2012, and if possible our 
findings will be published. If you choose to take part, you are very welcome to have 
a written summary of the final report. No individual’s questionnaire responses or 
experiment findings will be published, and no individual will be identifiable.  
 
Who Has Reviewed the Study? 
 
The study protocol has been produced by the Chief Investigator along with his 
educational supervisors. This was then approved by the Chief Investigator’s 
doctorate course organising core team. This study is also in receipt of ethical 
approval from the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) Committee London- 




Mr. Mark Turner, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, Institute of Psychiatry, Kings 
College London, Addiction Sciences Building, 4 Windsor Walk, Denmark Hill, 







First and Second Educational Supervisors 
 
Dr. Martin Anson, Cognitive behavioural therapist/clinical psychologist, Centre for 
Anxiety Disorders and Trauma (CADAT), Maudsley Hospital, 99 Denmark Hill, 
London, SE5 8AZ. 
Telephone: 02032282431 
 
Dr. David Veale, Consultant Psychiatrist, Centre for Anxiety Disorders and Trauma 
(CADAT), Maudsley Hospital, 99 Denmark Hill, London, SE5 8AZ. 
Telephone: 020 3228 3286 
 
 
South London and Maudsley NHS Trust Complaints Office  
Maudsley Hospital, 111 Denmark Hill, London, SE5 8AZ. Telephone: 
02032282444/2499 
 
We wish to thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet, and if you 
have any queries please do not hesitate to contact us. 
 
 
































Institute of Psychiatry 
Department of Psychology 






Participant Consent Form 
For healthy control participants 
 
 
Research Project: Faces and comparing your appearance to other people 
 
Chief Investigator: 
Mr. Mark Turner (Trainee Clinical Psychologist, Institute of Psychiatry) 
 
Educational Supervisors: 
Dr. Martin Anson (Cognitive Behavioural Therapist/ Clinical Psychologist) 
 
Dr. David Veale (Consultant Psychiatrist) 
 
Please read the following statements and then initial the box on the right. 
 
6. I confirm that I have read and understand the information 
sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information and ask questions. 
 
7. I also confirm that the researcher has explained the project and 
has answered my questions honestly and fully. 
 
8. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, 
without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
   
9. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Name of Participant:    Date:   Signed: 
 
………………………………….  …………….. ………………….. 
 
Name of Person Taking Consent:  Date:   Signed: 
 








6.5 Appendix 5: Psychometric properties of measures 
 
Psychiatric Disorders Screening Questionnaire (PDSQ)  
In a large sample of psychiatric outpatients the thirteen subscales of the PDSQ had 
good to excellent levels of internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and 
discriminant, convergent, and concurrent validity (Zimmerman & Mattia,  2001a). 
Again in a large sample of psychiatric outpatients the PDSQ was shown to have 
indices of predictive accuracy, namely sensitivity and negative predictive values, 
allowing the accurate identification of most cases and noncases, respectively 
(Zimmerman & Mattia,  2001b).    
 
Body Dysmorphic Disorder Questionnaire (BDDQ) 
The BDDQ was shown to have a sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 89% in 66 
adults in a psychiatric outpatient setting (Phillips, Atala, & Pope, 1995). Grant et al., 
(2001) also found the BDDQ to have a sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 
92.5% in 101 adults and 21 adolescents in a psychiatric inpatient sample. In addition, 
Phillips (1996a) reported that there is excellent agreement between the BDDQ and a 
clinician’s judgement of whether BDD is present in assessments using the BDD 
DSM-IV diagnostic module. There is however a lack of reliability and validity data 
for this measure. 
 
Structured clinical interview for DSM-IV axis II personality disorders (SCID II; 
version 2.0) (Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) section only) 
Maffei et al. (1997) studied the inter-rater reliability and internal consistency of the 
SCID-II 2.0 in 231 inpatients and outpatients. The categorical assessment of BPD 
was found to have an excellent inter-rater reliability coefficient of .909 (Cohen к). 
Inter-rater reliability was not influenced by inpatient/ outpatient status or the 
presence/absence of an Axis I diagnosis. An excellent internal consistency 
coefficient was also found for the BPD section (interviewer Armor θ = .86, Armor, 






Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale for Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD-
YBOCS)  
The BDD-YBOCS has been reported to have adequate inter-rater reliability (with 
intra-class correlation coefficients ranging from .79- 1.0 for the different items, and 
.99 for the total scale, good test-retest reliability over a period of one week (r = .88), 
and good internal consistency. The scale has also been shown to correlate with a 
measure of global severity, but not with a measure of general psychopathology, 
demonstrating its convergent and discriminant validity, respectively (Phillips et al., 
1997). The internal consistency in the current sample was Cronbach’s α =.7. 
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)  
The HADS has been shown to have acceptable reliability in a large non-clinical 
sample broadly representing that of the UK general adult population (Crawford, 
Henry, Crombie & Taylor, 2001).  
 
Multidimensional Body-Self Relations Questionnaire – Appearance Scales 
(MBSRQ-AS) 
Adequate psychometric properties have been found with various samples for these 
subscales (Brown, Cash, & Mikulka, 1990). The AE subscale, for example, has been 
found to have good test re-test reliability (r= .90), internal consistency (α = .86), and 
forms of validity (Cash, 1994). The subscales have been found to have acceptable 
levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and the full scale has 
demonstrated high levels of convergent, discriminant and construct validity (Cash, 
2000; Cash, Counts, Hangen & Huffine, 1989). The reliability and validity of the 
BASS has also been shown to be no different to a revised version of the subscale 
with items differentially weighted for importance justifying the use of the original 
version (Giovannelli, Cash, Henson, & Engle (2008). 
 
Body Comparison Scale (BCS) 
The scale was found to have good internal consistency (Fisher and Thompson, 1998). 






Physical Appearance-Related Comparison Scale (PA-RCS) 
Items one, two, three and four of the PA-RCS were found to correlate significantly 
with the BCS giving an indication of adequate concurrent validity for these items (r= 
.61, p =.000, 2-sided; r= .55, p < .001, 2-sided; r= .49, p =.001, 2-sided; r= . 43, p = 
.004, 2-sided, respectively). 
 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM) 
The INCOM was validated in twenty-two samples of mainly students and adults 
from the United States and Netherlands. Confirmatory factor analysis showed that a 
single factor was viable but that two distinguishable factors with their items relating, 
approximately, to the distinction between abilities and opinions was most 
appropriate. The two factors correlated highly (.79). The scale showed good internal 
consistency across samples (Cronbach’s α = .78- .85). Correlations for stability over 
time ranged from .60 to .75 for variations durations. The scale’s construct validity 
was confirmed as was concurrent validity, with correlations with both trait and state 
measures, and discriminant validity. Several studies also confirmed the scale’s 
criterion related validity (see Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) 
There is recent evidence supporting the scale’s item convergent (r = 0.57–0.79) and 
discriminant validity (r = 0.27–0.52) and its internal consistency reliability (α = .91) 
in a large sample of US adults (Sinclair et al., 2010). The RSES has been shown to 
be sensitive to change in a BDD treatment study (Rosen et al., 1995). 
 
Using confirmatory factor analyses the assessment-acceptance division (and 
therefore the self-competence and self-liking division) of the RSES was shown to 
have discriminant validity. This interpretation was based on the better statistical fit of 
this two-dimensional model as compared to the RSES unidimensional model 
(Tafarodi & Milne, 2002). 
 
To demonstrate clinical validity, Sinclair et al. (2010) showed that the RSES was 
significantly negatively correlated with depression (r = –0.62, p < .001) and anxiety 
(r = –0.47, p < .001). These authors also showed that both self-competence and self-
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liking were negatively correlated with depression (r = -0.52, p < .001; r =-0.63, p < 
























































GENERAL DETAILS FORM 
 (for BDD participants) 
 
 
For study on Faces and comparing your appearance to other people 
 
 
Name:  ______________________________________________ 
 
 
E-mail:  ___________________ 
 
 
Telephone Number(s)  
where you would be  























(Please turn over) 
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GENERAL DETAILS (Cont’d) 
 
1. What is your sex? 
 
1.   Male  
2.   Female 
 




3. What is your marital status? (Please tick) 
   
1.    Single 
2.    Married 
3.    Cohabiting/Living together 
4.    Separated/Divorced 
5.    Other 
 
4. What is your ethnic group? (Please tick)   
 
1.   White (European / Anglo-American) 
2.   Black  - Caribbean  
3.   Black  - African  
4.    South Asian (Indian / Pakistani / Bangladeshi / Sri Lankan) 
5.    East Asian (Chinese / Japanese / Korean / Burmese / Vietnamese) 
6.    Hispanic (South American / Mexican) 
7.    Other 
 
5. What is your education? (Please tick) 
 
1.   Primary 
2.   Secondary 
3.   O-levels / GCSE’s 
4.   A-levels (or equivalents e.g. BTEC Nationals, NVQ advanced) 
5.   Tertiary (Teaching / HND / Nursing) 
6.   Tertiary (Degree level) 
7.   Postgraduate (M.A., PhD., M.D. etc.) 
 8.   Other 
 
6. What is your occupation? 
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SCREENING OF EATING BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
7. During the past two weeks have you gone through a period where you ate very 
little to an extent where family or friends were worried about you? 
 
1.   Yes  




















































GENERAL DETAILS FORM 
 (for healthy controls) 
 
 
For study on Faces and comparing your appearance to other people 
 
 
Name:  ______________________________________________ 
 
 




Telephone Number(s)  
where you would be  

























GENERAL DETAILS (Cont’d) 
 
1. What is your sex? 
 
1.   Male  
2.   Female 
 




3. What is your marital status? (Please tick) 
   
1.    Single 
2.    Married 
3.    Cohabiting/Living together 
4.    Separated/Divorced 
5.    Other 
 
4. What is your ethnic group? (Please tick)   
 
1.   White (European / Anglo-American) 
2.   Black  - Caribbean  
3.   Black  - African  
4.    South Asian (Indian / Pakistani / Bangladeshi / Sri Lankan) 
5.    East Asian (Chinese / Japanese / Korean / Burmese / Vietnamese) 
6.    Hispanic (South American / Mexican) 
7.    Other 
 
5. What is your education? (Please tick) 
 
1.   Primary 
2.   Secondary 
3.   O-levels / GCSE’s 
4.   A-levels (or equivalents e.g. BTEC Nationals, NVQ advanced) 
5.   Tertiary (Teaching / HND / Nursing) 
6.   Tertiary (Degree level) 
7.   Postgraduate (M.A., PhD., M.D. etc.) 
 8.   Other 
 
6. What is your occupation? 
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SCREENING OF MENTAL HEALTH HISTORY 
 
 
7. At any time during the past have you ever been convinced that people were 
watching, spying, or talking about you, or plotting against you? AND/OR At any 
time during the past have you thought that you had special powers or think that an 
outside force was controlling you? AND/OR At any time during the past have you 
heard voices or seen things that others were not seeing? 
 
 1.   Yes  
2.   No 
 
8. At any time during the past have you gone through a period of being significantly 
sad or depressed during which you had frequent thoughts of taking your life? AND at 
that time did you have difficulties with sleeping, appetite and concentration? 
 
1.   Yes  
2.   No 
 
9. At any time during the past have you gone through a period of eating binges where 
you could not control how much you would eat AND/OR gone through a period 
where you ate very little to an extent where family or friends were worried about 
you? 
 
1.   Yes  
2.   No 
 
10. At any time during the past have you gone through a period of worrying about 
the way you look (for at least an hour a day) to a point of significant distress 
effecting your friendships, relationships, study or work? 
 
 
1.   Yes  
2.   No 
 
11. At any time during the past have you gone through a period of drinking too much 
alcohol or taking drugs to the point where you or others (such as family, friends or 
your doctor) thought that you had an alcohol or recreational/ illicit drug problem? 
 
 
1.   Yes  











SCREENING OF EATING BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
1. During the past two weeks have you gone through a period where you ate very 
little to an extent where family or friends were worried about you? 
 
1.   Yes  























































This questionnaire starts with some questions investigating how much time you 
spend comparing your own physical appearance to the physical appearance of 
others of the same sex. 
 
These questions ask you to give your answer as a percentage: 
  
• Please indicate your answer by using the percentage rating scale below each 
    question. 
• Please put a cross on the line at the percentage point which indicates your rating 
 
This mark can be placed anywhere on the line, for example: 
 
The cross can be placed so that it directly corresponds to one of the percentage 
























The remaining questions ask you to give ratings of attractiveness or satisfaction 
on a scale of 0 to 100 
 
• Please indicate your answer by using the rating scale below each question. 
 
• Please put a cross on the line at the point which indicates your rating 
 
This mark can be placed anywhere on the line, for example: 
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PART 1: COMPARING TO THE PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF OTHERS 
OF THE SAME SEX 
 
 
SECTION 1: Overall appearance and specific features 
 
In situations when you see others of the same sex, i.e. when you are: 
• Out in public 
• In social situations/interacting with people 
• When you are reading/looking at magazines, watching television/films, looking 




1. How often do you compare your overall physical appearance to the overall 





2. How often do you compare the specific facial or body features that you are 
most concerned about in yourself to the same specific facial/body features of 
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SECTION 2: The attractiveness of people you compare to 
 
In situations when you see others of the same sex, i.e. when you are: 
• Out in public 
• In social situations/interacting with people 
• When you are reading/looking at magazines, watching television/films, looking 




3. How often do you compare your physical appearance to the physical 





4. How often do you compare your physical appearance to the physical 





5. How often do you compare your physical appearance to the physical 
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SECTION 3: How do you rate yourself compared to others and how satisfied 
are you? 
 
In situations when you see others of the same sex, i.e. when you are: 
• Out in public 
• In social situations/interacting with people 
• When you are reading/looking at magazines, watching television/films, looking 




6. How do you generally rate/judge the physical attractiveness of others of 






7.  After comparing your physical appearance to the physical appearance of 
others of the same sex (in general): How much more or less satisfied with 
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SECTION 4: How automatic is comparing for you? 
 
In situations when you see others of the same sex, i.e. when you are: 
• Out in public 
• In social situations/interacting with people 
• When you are reading/looking at magazines, watching television/films, looking 




8.  How often do you find yourself comparing your physical appearance to 





9. How often do you find yourself comparing your physical appearance to 



























END OF QUESTIONNAIRE        THANK YOU 
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This questionnaire investigates what beliefs you have about why you make 
comparisons between your own physical appearance and the physical 
appearance of others of the same sex. 
 
We understand that comparing might be a very automatic process for some 
people but one with clear uses for others. 
 
We would appreciate any thoughts you have about why you compare your 
physical appearance to that of others of the same sex. 
 
Please complete the questions that ask you to give your answer as a percentage 
of how much you agree with the statements.  
 
• Please indicate your answer by using the percentage rating scale below each 
question. 
• Please put a cross on the line at the percentage point which indicates your rating 
 
This mark can be placed anywhere on the line, for example: 
 
The cross can be placed so that it directly corresponds to one of the percentage 
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STATEMENTS ABOUT COMPARING YOUR PHYSICAL APPEARANCE 
FOR MARKING HOW MUCH YOU AGREE WITH EACH ONE 
 
 
For each of the statements below please indicate how much you agree that you 




Comparing to check/verify for self-evaluation 
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Comparing to put something right through self-enhancement 
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Comparing to put something right through self-improvement 
 
 










I compare in order to help me work out how I can be more presentable to others 
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Comparing as self-loathing 
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Comparing as threat management 
 
 



































6.9 Appendix 9: Vignette task 
 
 
Please read the paragraph on the next page carefully and circle 
all the PRONOUNS found within the paragraph (e.g. I, me, 




I go to the city often.  My anticipation fills me as I see the 
skyscrapers come into view.  I allow myself to explore every 
corner, never letting an attraction escape me.  My voice fills the 
air and street.  I see all the sights, I window shop, and 
everywhere I go I see my reflection looking back at me in the 
glass of a hundred windows.  At nightfall I linger, my time in 
the city almost over.  When finally I must leave, I do so 





















6.10 Appendix 10: Photographic portraits with physical attractiveness ratings 
 






























































Matched physical attractiveness ratings for the photographic portrait sets 
  
    
       
  FEMALES    
       
  PHOTO AGE ATTRACT DISTINCT SMILE 
  
     
 
DP-F-
A5 f029 2.7 5.8 5.0 3.3 
SET A 
DP-F-
A7 f467 2.3 5.7 4.2 5.0 
 
DP-F-
A6 f184 2.3 6.3 4.2 4.0 
    5.9   
       
       
       
 
DP-F-
A3 f262 2.7 5.7 4.0 4.8 
SET B 
DP-F-
A1 f074 2.2 6.0 5.0 4.3 
 
DP-F-
A2 f303 1.8 6.2 5.0 5.5 
    5.9   
       
    OVERALL AVERAGE = 5.9 
       
  MALES     
       
  PHOTO AGE ATTRACT DISTINCT SMILE 
  
     
 
DP-M-
A1 m004 3.7 5.8 5.0 3.5 
SET A 
DP-M-
A7 m043 3.5 5.3 3.7 3.17 
 
DP-M-
A8 m165 3.2 6.3 3.8 5 
    5.8   
       
       
       
 
DP-M-
A3 m463 2.8 5.8 4.0 5.67 
SET B 
DP-M-
A2 m143 2.7 5.5 4.3 5 
 
DP-M-
A5 m496 2.5 6.2 4.7 5.5 
    5.8   
       
    OVERALL AVERAGE = 5.8 
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MB1 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MB2 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MB3 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MB4 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MB5 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MB6 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MB7 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MB8 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MB9 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MB10 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MB11 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MB12 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MB13 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MB14 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MB15 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MB16 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MB17 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MB18 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MB19 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MB20 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
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FB1 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FB2 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FB3 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FB4 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FB5 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FB6 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FB7 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FB8 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FB9 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FB10 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FB11 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FB12 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FB13 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FB14 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FB15 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FB16 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FB17 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FB18 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FB19 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    





























































MC1 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MC2 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MC3 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MC4 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MC5 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MC6 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MC7 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MC8 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MC9 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MC10 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MC11 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MC12 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MC13 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MC14 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
MC15 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
MC16 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MC17 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
MC18 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
MC19 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    




























































FC1 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FC2 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FC3 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FC4 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FC5 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FC6 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FC7 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FC8 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FC9 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FC10 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FC11 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FC12 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FC13 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
FC14 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FC15 4. CAC Set B SFA Set A    
FC16 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FC17 1. SFA Set A CAC Set B    
FC18 3. CAC Set A SFA Set B    
FC19 2. SFA Set B CAC Set A    
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The assessment of effort has become a routine element of clinical neuropsychology 
practice. At the Lishman Brain Injury Unit outpatient service the Reliable Digit Span 
(RDS) is used for this purpose. The relevance of the extant literature to the use of the 
RDS in our service’s context however is questionable. A retrospective observation of 
n = 125 neuropsychological assessments was carried out. 108 (86.4%) patients with 
traumatic brain injury passed the RDS and 17 (13.6%) failed. For RDS failures a 
higher than expected number of false positives was found. RDS failure was 
associated with poorer neuropsychological test performance, post-concussional 
symptoms, anxiety and depression but not medicolegal status or brain injury severity. 
The project’s results are discussed with reference to limitations and suggested future 
service plans. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Definitions of effort and related terminology 
 
Effort has been defined as a higher order concept akin to motivation that has a 
magnitude and a direction. That is, the extent to which a patient applies effort can 
vary and can do so in keeping with the task at hand or deliberately in opposition to it 
(British Psychological Society; BPS, 2009). Effort can also be unintentionally poor/ 
suboptimal in some patients especially if they are depressed (Kaplan & Saddock, 
1991). The term malingering however tends to be used for and defined as the 
intentional presentation of false or exaggerated symptoms motivated by external gain 
(BPS, 2009). Such gain is often thought to be monetary from litigation proceedings, 
especially following a Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). 
 
Neuropsychologists are rarely explicit in using the term malingering (Slick, Tan, 
Strauss, & Hultsch, 2004). This rare use is perhaps due to the consideration of effort 
as on a continuum: poorer performances on measures of effort are associated with 
poorer performance over a neuropsychological test battery (Nies & Sweet, 1994; 
Green, Rohling, Lees-Hayley, & Allen, 2001). More often neuropsychologists refer 
to the invalidation of test results, their inconsistency with the severity of injury, or 
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highlight that they are indicative of a symptom exaggeration (Slick et al., 2004). 
Other used terms which are perhaps more appropriate refer to a level of effort that is 
incomplete, sub-optimal or poor (Axelrod, Fichtenberg, Millis & Wertheimer, 2006; 
BPS, 2009). From here on in the term poor effort is preferred and used as an 
umbrella term that covers both intentional and unintentional underperformance. 
“Malingering” is written only in reference to literature that specifically uses this term 
to assist with cross-referencing.   
 
2.2 Assessment of effort in clinical neuropsychology 
 
The identification of poor effort can involve the use of information from medical 
records, the patient’s self-report, behavioural observations, and also the use of results 
from neuropsychological testing (Slick, Sherman, & Iverson, 1999). However, 
neuropsychologists commonly also employ Symptom Validity Tests (SVTs) which 
assess effort independent of the core neuropsychological testing battery that they 
administer. Examples include the frequently used forced choice task called the “Test 
of Memory Malingering” (TOMM) and the more recent “Green Word Memory Test” 
(GMT) (Sharland & Gfeller, 2007; Tombaugh, 1996; Green, 2003). The application 
of SVTs by neuropsychologists however is somewhat variable. The tests that have 
become the most popular are not necessarily those that are deemed the most accurate 
by those familiar with them (Sharland & Gfeller, 2007). This variability might well 
be due to the additional clinical time required for their administration especially in 
time-pressured settings. 
 
Neuropsychologists can also gauge effort through the identification of score patterns 
on routinely administered tests deemed unusual based on knowledge of their rate of 
occurrence (Larrabee, 2003). The use of such embedded measures of effort is 
appealing because they are more disguised from those wishing to apply poor effort as 
compared to SVTs upon which litigants may be coached to pass (Rogers & Correa, 
2008; Youngjohn, 1995). They also provide a means of assessing effort 
retrospectively where stand-alone SVTs were not employed (Mittenberg, Patton, 
Canyock, & Condit, 2002). The use of embedded measures of effort is therefore a 
much more justifiable asset to routine neuropsychological assessment and 
interpretation in general clinical practice. 
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2.3 Base rates of malingering in Traumatic Brain Injury 
 
A summation across 11 studies which included data pertinent to the prevalence of 
poor effort found that around 40% (range, 15% to 64%) of participants were 
probably malingering (Larrabee, 2003; Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993; Heaton, Smith, 
Lehman, & Vogt, 1978, as cited in Larrabee, 2003). The base rate of malingering 
may depend on the population being observed (Larrabee, 2003): neuropsychologists 
have estimated the prevalence or “base rate” of probable malingering and symptom 
exaggeration to be around 30% of disability or worker’s compensation cases, 29% of 
personal injury cases, 19% among criminal cases, and 8% of medical cases 
(Mittenberg et al., 2002). 
 
More specifically to TBI, Larrabee (2003) found 38.5% of litigating or compensation 
seeking mild TBI (MTBI) cases to be in keeping with probable malingering or 
symptom exaggeration. This figure rose to 41.24% when referral source was taken 
into account. Others who have studied more heterogeneous TBI samples have found 
that malingering tends to be more prevalent in milder TBI groups (Binder & Green, 
1996; Green et al., 2001). Most research however is on mild traumatic brain injury 
(MTBI) patients involved in litigation being assessed for this purpose and so its 
applicability to more general clinical settings which see a proportion of people with 
MTBI, such as the Lishman Unit, is questionable.   
 
In addition to base rates of malingering being highly variable, they are also difficult 
to ascertain. This difficulty is due to those attempting such behaviours actively trying 
to avoid detection and diagnostic standards continuing to be refined (Slick et al. 
2004; Slick et al., 1999). Furthermore, because base-rates of malingering in general 
clinical samples may be of low frequency, this makes its prediction particularly 
challenging (Rosenfeld, Sands, & Van Gorp, 2000). Its identification is nonetheless 
very important given that effort can have a greater effect on suppressing 
neuropsychological test scores than moderate-severe brain injury (Green et al., 
2001). This effect has also been illustrated in a UK sample whereby the systematic 
relationship between TBI severity and cognitive functioning was seen only in those 




2.4 Indices of predictive accuracy 
 
There are different statistical methods for highlighting the predictive accuracy of a 
test in finding patients who are applying poor effort. The main two are sensitivity and 
specificity. Sensitivity would refer to the proportion of patients applying poor effort 
that is correctly detected taking into account the proportion of false negatives- the 
patients incorrectly predicted as not belonging to those applying poor effort. 
Specificity would refer to the proportion of patients who apply at least reasonable 
effort in testing that is correctly detected taking into account the proportion of false 
positives- the patients incorrectly predicted as belonging to those applying poor 
effort. It is therefore deemed important to have an effort test with high specificity at 
the cost of some sensitivity with the implication being that fewer patients are then 
wrongly portrayed as producing invalid test results. 
 
Despite it influencing neither sensitivity nor specificity, when the base rate of poor 
effort is particularly low in a population, the number of false positives detected by a 
test inevitably increases relative to both true and false positives combined (Rosenfeld 
et al., 2000). This ratio forms an index of predictive accuracy known as a test’s 
positive predictive validity (PPV). To utilise PPV however a gold standard of poor 
effort is required. Indeed research using the RDS test to study effort using known-
groups designs has commonly organised the population(s) they have studied 
according to criteria considered as a gold standard for the assessment of 
malingering1. Different indices of predictive accuracy are then documented for one 
or more RDS cut-off values for the identification of malingering as per the gold 
standard used. 
Nonetheless, the association between false positive rate and specificity means that, 
along with data on the rate of a variable of interest in a known sample size, a 
binomial calculation can be used to test for a greater number of individuals failing an 
                                                 
1 In some studies this has been the use of criteria set out by Slick et al. (1999) whereas in 
others it has been the use of a forced choice symptom validity test (Heinly, Greve, 
Bianchini, Love, & Brenan, 2005; Meyers & Volbrecht, 1998). Others have organised 
groups on the basis of medical variables such as Glasgow Coma Scale ratings, brain scan 
results and length of hospital stay (Greiffenstein, Baker, Gola, 1994).  
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effort test than would be predicted just on the rate of false positives alone. The 
comparative population for this calculation is therefore the sample from which 
the published specificity data was derived from. For this project this calculation 
would open up the possibility that there are factors contributing to apparently poor 
effort identified at the Lishman Unit other than measurement error and false 
positives, including those other factors thought to exert influence on effort in the TBI 
populations studied in the research literature. 
 
2.5 Professional practice guidance  
 
The American Psychological Association (APA) and British Psychological Society 
(BPS) have recommendations for the use of effort tests routinely in clinical practice. 
As many as 79% of neuropsychologists report the use of at least one specific method 
for the detection of malingering in cases involving claims for financial compensation 
or personal injury litigation (Slick et al., 2004). Much of the literature however has 
been focused on medicolegal samples that are potentially unrepresentative to their 
use in clinical populations. It is important to characterise rates of RDS failure and its 
correlates, especially in relation to awareness of base rates of poor 
effort/malingering. This data then gives an indication of the characteristics of a 
service’s clinical population that are being picked up as apparently applying poor 
effort. Indeed, it has been asserted that clinicians should be aware of base-rate 
differences which are pertinent to diagnostic decision making in their setting 
(Rosenfeld, et al., 2000).  Moreover, BPS practice guidance recommends that 
clinicians are aware of the sensitivity and specificity of the effort tests that they use, 
as well as the base-rates of sub-optimal performance in the populations that they 
have contact with. These factors should then be considered in the interpretation of 
findings. Without following such guidance the quality of test results could be taken 
for granted and placed in the context of published normative data leading to 
assumptions that a patient has tried hard or applied poor effort in testing (BPS, 
2009). Furthermore, and thinking more broadly, without such consideration the value 
of a neuropsychologist in care is reduced making their practice, and ultimately their 





2.6 Reliable Digit Span as a measure of effort 
 
The Reliable Digit Span (RDS) is one of several proposed embedded measures of 
effort based on data from the digit span subtest. The digit span subtest involves a 
patient being asked to repeat different strings of numbers that increase in length on 
every second trial. In the first half of the test (digits forward) the patient is required 
to repeat the digits verbatim, in the second half however the patient is asked to repeat 
the digits in reverse order (digits backwards). RDS is computed by adding together 
the longest number of digits attained twice in succession on the digits forward part of 
the test with that from the digits backward part (Greiffenstein et al, 1994). The RDS 
has indeed been found to have the best classification accuracy for effort of 17 
embedded measures in a sample of individuals currently seeking medicolegal 
compensation (Miele, Gunner, Lynch, & McCaffrey, 2012). It is also very commonly 
used, being identified in a survey of clinical practice as the sixth most frequently 
used out of twenty-nine measures of malingering, and second only to the California 
Verbal Learning Test as the most popular embedded measure of effort (Sharland & 
Gfeller, 2007).   
 
Using a known-groups design Greiffenstein et al. (1994) found that mild TBI 
(MTBI) probable malingerers scored significantly lower compared to both a 
moderate- mild TBI group and a MTBI persistent post-concussion syndrome group, 
which did not differ from each other, in terms of RDS score. Greiffenstein, Gola, & 
Baker (1995) similarly showed that probable malingerers scored lower compared to a 
group of severely brain injured patients, in terms of RDS score. In keeping with these 
results, Axelrod et al. (2006) found a group of MTBI patients who were probable 
malingerers to score significantly lower than both a TBI group with very low risk of 
malingering and a non-litigating MTBI group that did not differ from each other, in 
terms of RDS score. Mathias, Greve, Bianchini, Houston, Crouch (2002) also found 
that a mixed severity TBI group, without substantial evidence of malingering, scored 
significantly higher on RDS as compared to a probably malingering TBI group.  
 
Although a cut-off of ≤7 has been used in some studies, this may sacrifice specificity 
at the cost of sensitivity, inflating false positive rates to unacceptably high levels 
(Jasinski, Berry, Shandera, & Clark, 2011). An RDS cut-off value of ≤6 to identify 
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those who fail RDS has been suggested as this is associated with good specificity and 
sensitivity (Greiffenstein et al., 1994). Greiffenstein et al. (1995) reported 86% 
sensitivity and 57% specificity for this RDS cut-off value. More recently, its use in a 
TBI-only sample was associated with a sensitivity of 0.39 and a specificity of 0.91 
(Heinly et al., 2005).  
 
Some research on the RDS test has used simulator designs requiring participants to 
behave as though they were malingering or as if they were TBI patients. Strauss 
Slick, Levy-Bencheton, Hunter, MacDonald, & Hultsch, (2002) used three groups 
(healthy controls, controls with professional knowledge of TBI, and non-litigating 
TBI patients) to study malingering. The participants were randomly allocated and 
instructed to either try their best or to malinger. There was a significant effect of this 
instruction. In each of the groups instructed to try their best the mean RDS score was 
above 10, while scores for the malingerers were below 7. It is also interesting that 
those asked to malinger were more inconsistent across three testing sessions 
compared to those trying their best.   
 
The above research has been conducted on populations that are not necessarily 
representative of the TBI patients we routinely see in our outpatient clinic. Most 
research has focused on medicolegal patients with MTBI being assessed specifically 
for that purpose. At the Lishman Brain Injury Unit patients with a wide range of 
brain injury severities and accompanying post-concussional symptomatology are 
assessed to advance a clinical understanding of their needs. Research using the RDS 
has neglected the possibility that RDS failure is an indication of clinically relevant 
variables other than poor effort. It is noteworthy, for example, that the Greiffenstein 
studies and Mathias et al. (2002) show that the ability of RDS to exclude those not 
meeting criteria taken as indicative of malingering (and hence its specificity) lowers 
with increasing severity of brain injury. This implies that the RDS, in addition to 
measuring effort, may be sensitive to more severe brain injury or indeed perhaps the 
influence of other correlates. There is evidence for example that poor effort is also 
associated with greater post-concussional symptoms (Tsanadis, Montoya, Hanks, 





2.7 Aims and objectives 
 
The current service evaluation project had three main aims. Firstly, we wished to 
identify the rate of RDS failure within a general UK TBI population/ amongst 
patients attending a tertiary clinic for out-patients with TBI for future reference in 
audit. In particular we considered whether the rate of failure was higher than might 
be accounted for solely by false positives based on a published false-positive rate for 
the test. 
 
The second aim was to identify and examine a broader range of variables which we 
expected to be associated with RDS failure if the RDS is a measure of poor effort 
(e.g. lower severity of injury, medicolegal status, impaired neuropsychological 
performance and post-concussional symptoms). The third aim was to explore both 
the relationship between mood/ psychological symptomatology and the RDS test and 
the clinical information that might predict RDS failure. 
 
2.8 Project questions and hypotheses 
 
I. Based on the published specificity of RDS of 0.96 (and its false positive rate of 
0.04; Heinly et al., 2005), is there evidence of higher-than-expected rates of RDS 
failure in our general clinical TBI sample based on a binomial calculation? 
 
II. If RDS failure is a measure of effort to task associated with under-performance, 
RDS failure should be associated with being involved in a medicolegal claim, 
milder injury severity, and poorer neuropsychological test scores.  
 
III. RDS failure was also expected to be associated with higher self-reports of post-
concussional symptoms (Lange, Iverson, Brooks, Ashton Rennison, 2010).  
 
2.8.1 Supplementary/exploratory analyses 
 
What is the relationship between RDS failure and more general reports of anxiety 








This project takes the form of a retrospective observation of neuropsychological 
assessments carried out with consecutive outpatients referred to a tertiary brain injury 




Our participants were n=125 individuals who had endured a TBI and were 
consecutively referred to the outpatient unit for neuropsychological assessment. All 
participants were assessed during the past 5/6 years. 
 
3.2.1 Inclusion criteria 
 
The patients included had suffered any severity of TBI. It was therefore possible to 
look at the influence of this variable on the RDS in a sample with a homogenous 
cause of injury and heterogeneity in terms of associated relative contribution of brain 
injury to ongoing cognitive difficulties (Lishman, 1988). The minimum amount of 
data required for inclusion was an RDS score, injury severity (measured, in the large 
majority of cases, using an estimation of post-traumatic amnesia) and information 
pertaining to whether or not they were or had been involved in a medico-legal claim. 
 
3.2.2 Exclusion criteria 
 
The inpatients attending the service as well as the outpatients who were not being 
seen due to a TBI but for other reasons (e.g. stroke; hypoxic brain injury; 




Each patient attending the outpatient clinic for a neuropsychological assessment 
typically completed a brief (30-minute) clinical interview followed by a standard 
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neuropsychological battery (lasting between 90 and 120 minutes). Some were asked 
to attend on another occasion for completion of this battery or for additional testing 
depending on their initial clinical presentation.  
 
Data for use in this project was then gathered by assistant and trainee clinical 
psychologists from several sources kept on file within the Lishman Brain Injury Unit 
and added into a retrospectively updated electronic (Excel) database. The sources of 
information included clinical neuropsychology reports, the original 
neuropsychological test proformas and other relevant documentation such as 
neuropsychiatric assessments completed at the same clinical service. 
 
3.4 Ethical considerations 
 
Access to the original clinical data and that collated for the present work was only 
available to the clinical team. After data entry, information regarding scores 
remained anonymous and unidentifiable. Due to the use of these considerations, in 
the context of the retrospective design, no formal consent was sought from our 
patients. Approval for the project was instead approved through the audit committee 
of the local South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
3.5 Instruments of measurement 
 
Outlined below are the instruments routinely used in the TBI outpatient clinic. 
 
3.5.1 National Adult Reading Test (NART) 
 
Premorbid intellectual functioning was assessed using the NART (Nelson, 1982). 
The NART is formed of 50 printed words that are difficult to phonetically decode 
and pronounce based on their written presentation. The words also become 
progressively less familiar towards the list's end. The NART has been found to 
correlate with both current and childhood examinations of IQ in healthy controls 
(Crawford, Dreary, Starr, & Whalley, 2001). Reading ability as per the NART is 
relatively unaffected by various conditions affecting cognition, hence its use to 
estimate premorbid intelligence levels in these patients (Nelson & O'Connell, 1978). 
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NART errors were converted into predicted WAIS-R FSIQ equivalents (from the 
manual using the following formula (=130.6-[cell reference with errors]*1.24). No 
age corrections were applied. 
 
3.5.2 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-IIIUK) 
 
General intellectual functioning was assessed using age scaled scores from a short 
form of a comprehensive psychometric test of intelligence called the WAIS-IIIUK 
(Crawford, Allum, Kinion, 2008). This short form included four of its verbal tests 
(vocabulary, similarities, arithmetic, and digit span) and three of its performance 
tests (block design, matrix reasoning, and digit symbol). Arithmetic was not used in 
analyses however as the neuropsychology service had only been using it for the last 
2-3 years. 
 
3.5.3 Reliable Digit Span (RDS) 
 
Effort was assessed using the RDS which was calculated from the digit span subtest 
of the WAIS-IIIUK. The RDS was computed by adding together the longest number 
of digits attained twice in succession on the digits forward part of the test with that 
from the digits backward part of the test (Greiffenstein et al., 1994). The RDS was 
used as the index of effort from the digit span subtest because it was routinely 
employed in our outpatient clinic and because it is the most frequently derived digit 
span index used in clinical practice (Sharland & Gfeller, 2007). An RDS cut-off 
score of ≤6 was used to identify those who failed this proposed assessment of effort 
because its use in a TBI-only sample has been found to correspond to a sensitivity of 
0.39 and a specificity of 0.96 (Heinly et al., 2005). 
 
3.5.4 Trail Making Test (TMT) 
 
The TMT has been proposed as a test of processing speed, sequencing, mental 
flexibility and visual-motor skills (Bowie & Harvey, 2006). Part A requires patients 
to draw a pencil line to connect a set of 25 encircled numbers, in numerical order. 
Part B requires patients to alternate the line they draw between sets of encircled 
numbers and letters, while maintaining respective numerical and alphabetical orders. 
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Part B is therefore deemed to be a more difficult cognitive task with increased 
demands in motor speed and visual search (Gaudino, Geisler, & Squires, 1995). 
 
Martin, Hoffman, & Donders (2003) found that Part B but not A was sensitive to 
severity of TBI. Others have found significant main effects for both Part A and B as 
a function of injury severity (Lange, Iverson, Zakrzewski, Ethel-King, & Franzen, 
2005). Lange et al. (2005) also used regression analyses of different methods of 
scoring the TMT. Unique contributions to test interpretation beyond what were 
already available from Part A and B separately were not provided. For these reasons, 
the total completion times in seconds for each part were used as the values of 
interest.  
 
3.5.5 Adult Information Processing and Memory Battery (AMIPB) 
 
Tests from the AMIPB were used to assess memory and learning (Coughlan & 
Hollows, 1985). Verbal memory and learning were assessed with both immediate 
and delayed story and figure recall. Visual memory was assessed using trials A1-A6 
of the list and design learning trials. In both cases however a score for A1-A5 was 
calculated because these trials are administered consecutively and therefore give a 
measure of learning and memory that is more likely to be normally distributed. A6 
however is administered after a distracter list and so scores produced on this trial are 
additionally influenced by an interference effect. A6 was therefore entered as a 
separate variable. The intrusion and distracter (trial B) lists from the AMIPB were 
not used.     
 
3.5.6 Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) 
 
Verbal fluency was assessed using the COWAT (Ruff, Light, Parker, & Levin, 
1996). This test  involved patients being asked to produce as many words as possible 
beginning with the letter C, without the use of names, proper nouns or repeated 
words with different endings (e.g. cough, coughing), in a 60 second trial. The test is 
then repeated for the letter F followed by the letter L. Lesions in frontal parts of the 
brain have tended  to result in reduced scores on the COWAT (Miceli, Caltagirone, 
Gainotti, Masullo, & Silveri 1981; Perret, 1974). 
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3.5.7 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
 
The HADS (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) is a widely used 14-item self-report measure 
that was used to assess the severity of current symptoms of anxiety and depression in 
our patients. Each item uses a 4 point scale. The HADS has been shown to have 
acceptable reliability in a large non-clinical sample broadly representing that of the UK 
general adult population (Crawford, Henry, Crombie & Taylor, 2001).  
 
3.5.8 Rivermead Post Concussion Syndrome Questionnaire (RPQ)  
 
The RPQ was used to assess the severity of 16 post-concussion symptoms (PCS) 
over the past 24 hours by self-administration (King, Crawford, Wenden, Moss, & 
Wade, 1995). The patients were asked to compare each specified symptom on a scale 
from 0 to 4 (absent, mild, moderate, or severe) used to compare their severity in 
comparison to before the injury occurred. The specified symptoms cover the 
cognitive, emotional, and somatic domains which have been shown to be associated 
but at least partially distinct (Potter, Leigh, Wade, & Fleminger, 2006). The total 
score was used, as calculated using the method suggested by the original authors, 
ignoring any scores of 1. 
 
3.5.9 Other measures 
 
In addition to the above measurements being taken it was necessary for us to assess 
the medicolegal status of each patient. This variable was coded in three different 
ways. The first and primary way was to distinguish those that were from those that 
were not currently involved in medicolegal proceedings. In keeping with gold 
standard criteria for malingering the rationale for doing so was that a potential 
financial reward might form the primary incentive for applying poor effort (Slick et 
al., 1999). The second way was to distinguish those that had never been involved 
with a medicolegal claim from those who had, irrespective of if this was ongoing or 
not. The third way was to distinguish those that were currently involved with 
medicolegal proceedings from those with previous but closed medicolegal cases 
from those that had never sought compensation. A fourth level was needed here to 
highlight those who had medicolegal involvement but with an unknown status. The 
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rationale for these second and third ways of coding was that those who apply poor 
effort may be doing so through repeated rehearsal of symptoms as a process of 
attributing blame as opposed to something which is purely driven by a financial 
incentive. This is particularly relevant for our service given that people are assessed 
in a clinical context for that purpose. 
 
An estimate of each patient's Post-Traumatic Amnesia (PTA) was also used to 
ascertain an approximation of injury severity. This was assessed retrospectively at 
interview using the Rivermead PTA protocol and coded in minutes as a continuous 
variable (King, Crawford, Wenden, Moss, Wade, & Caldwell, 1997). If clinical 
information gave a banding (e.g. 5-6 weeks) the median value was taken. In cases 
where clinical information allowed less exacting estimations (e.g. a few days; or, <1 
hr; or, several days) only a categorical variable of brain injury severity was used. 
This was coded as mild (0-24hrs) (Kay et al., 1993), moderate (>24hrs-7 days) and 
severe (>7 days). For those cases where a PTA banding in days and/or minutes 
overlapped with two of these categories the category corresponding to the median 
value in minutes was used. Where it was possible to estimate PTA in the absence of 
precise durations a severity classification was still assigned. A Glasgow Coma Scale 
rating was used to estimate brain injury severity in one case. There was one case in 
which information specified 2 hours of PTA plus neurosurgery and so this was left 
uncoded due to the case’s complexity. There were also three people who had 
insufficient data to ascertain an approximation of brain injury severity and so these 
data points were left uncoded. Time since injury was used and coded as the number 
of months elapsed. 
 
3.6 Transformation into Z-scores 
 
In order to manage our neuropsychological test battery data we transformed each of 
the above instrument’s test scores into a common metric of Z-scores. The WAIS-R 
FSIQ equivalents derived from the NART were standard scores and the WAIS-IIIUK 
subtests (which were expressed in age-adjusted scaled scores) were all converted 
directly into this common metric (see appendix 1). The TMT scores were converted 
into means and standard deviations, adjusted for age, using a regression equation 
associated with norms from a meta-analysis (Mitrushina, Boone, Razani, & D’Elia, 
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2005). This data was then converted into z-scores: inspection of the data indicated 
strong positive skews for both Trail A and Trail B data2. 
 
Scores from both the AMIPB immediate and delayed story and figure recall trials 
and the list and design learning trials (A1-A5, and A6) were converted into z-scores 
from the age-adjusted means and standard deviations found in the test’s original 
normative data. (See appendix 1). 
 
The COWAT produced both gender- and education-adjusted scores with 
corresponding percentiles for the total number of words produced using normative 
data from Ruff et al. (1996). For adjusted scores that lay between those given in the 
conversion table a mean percentile was used based on the percentiles corresponding 
to the adjacent adjusted scores.  The nine adjusted scores from below the 1st 
percentile were considered to be at the 0.5th percentile. Percentiles were then 
converted directly into z-scores using an on-line conversion table. For percentiles 
that lay between those given in this conversion table mean z-scores were used based 
on the z-scores corresponding to the adjacent percentiles.  The HADS and RPQ raw 
scores were used without transformation. 
 
3.7 Composite measures 
 
Our neuropsychological test battery allowed us to compute a maximum of 17 z-
scores for each patient excluding the RDS and measures of mood and PCS. This data 
was therefore merged into a lesser number of composite measures of cognitive 
domains following some guidance from Miller and Rohling (2001). 
 
3.7.1 Overall test battery mean (OTBM) 
 
An OTBM was calculated as the mean of the means of the z-scores available for each 
patient from the maximum of 17. This calculation then allowed us to look at the 
association between neuropsychological test scores and RDS failure. It also allowed 
                                                 
2
 Median statistics are therefore reported in addition to means. 
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us to calculate an estimation of the variance in such test performance accounted for 
by poor effort as per the RDS. 
 
3.7.2 Domain test battery mean (DTBM) 
 
It has also been shown that effort influences domains of cognitive functioning 
differentially (Green et al., 2001; Curtis, Greve, Bianchini, 2009). The z-scores from 
our neuropsychological test data were therefore also clustered according to domains 
of cognitive functioning defined a priori. More specifically, z-scores from the 
vocabulary, similarities, matrix reasoning and block design subtests of the WAIS 
IIIUK in addition to the NART were merged to create an intelligence (IQ) DTBM. 
 
The z-scores produced from the AMIPB (design learning A1-A5 and A6, list 
learning A1-A5 and A6; immediate and delayed story and figure recalls) were 
merged to create a Learning and Memory (LM) DTBM. 
 
Z-scores from the digit symbol subtest of the WAIS IIIUK were not used in a DTBM. 
Indeed this subtest is more akin to a stand-alone test of processing speed possibly 
fitting under the umbrella term of executive functioning as opposed to one which 
would fit an IQ DTBM. Furthermore given that executive functioning might not be a 
unitary concept we could not justify using a small number of tests (the TMT part A 
and B and the COWAT) to create a DTBM for it (Jurado & Roselli, 2007; Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). The digit span subtest of the WAIS 
IIIUK was not added to a DTBM or to the OTBM to prevent a circularity of data in 




4.1 Treatment of Missing Values 
 
As a consequence of our data being derived from information collected for a clinical 
purpose in the context of a retrospective design there were unavoidable missing 
values. To maximise the number of cases in each analysis however cases were 
“excluded pairwise/ test by test”. The use of this SPSS command meant that cases 
20 
 
entered an analysis if they had the required data for that analysis, irrespective of if 
they had missing data from other variables. 
 
4.2 Choice of statistical tests 
 
Heinly et al. (2005) found that an RDS cut-off value of ≤6 had a specificity of 0.96 
and therefore an associated false positive rate of 0.04 in the TBI group that they 
studied. This specificity value was entered into a binomial calculation along with our 
sample size and our observed frequency of RDS failure at the same cut-off value. 
This analysis allowed us to ascertain if the rate of RDS failure in our sample was at a 
frequency significantly above chance level relative to that expected based on Heinly 
et al. (2005). 
 
For comparisons of most categorical variables (RDS pass/fail with current 
medicolegal status, medicolegal history B and TBI severity) the minimum expected 
cell frequency of >5 assumption of the Pearson chi-square (χ2) test was violated. The 
Fisher’s exact test (FET) was therefore reported for RDS pass/fail with current 
medicolegal status. For comparisons of RDS pass/fail with medicolegal history B 
and TBI severity however the χ2 test was used because this significance value was in 
keeping with the Cramer’s V exact test associated with the choice of effect size 
measurement used. For the comparison of RDS pass/fail with medicolegal history A 
the χ2 test was used. 
 
Where parametric statistical tests were possible their suitability was assessed by 
considering the distribution of data for each analysis. Observations of histograms and 
boxplots were first made to form an initial impression of the data. The data’s 
deviation from normality (using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), homogeneity of 
variance (using the Levene’s test for group comparisons) and the presence of case 
outliers were assessed to inform our decision about what tests to employ. For each 
analysis if the data for the relevant RDS pass/ fail groups appeared reasonably 
normally distributed and homogeneity of variance and/or normality was preserved 
parametric tests were used. Preservations of both homogeneity of variance and 
normality were found in the RDS pass/fail group comparisons of IQ DTBM, LM 
DTBM and PCS. Homogeneity of variance only was preserved in the RDS pass/ fail 
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group comparisons of anxiety and depression. This data was not transformed 
however as this not considered a useful approach by all (Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 
1972).   
 
Outliers have been reported as potentially misleading in data analyses (Osborne & 
Overbay, 2004). For parametric analyses where outliers were present tests were also 
trialled with their removal (Barnett & Lewis, 1994). Outliers were defined 
conservatively with the use of boxplot inspection3 (Tukey, 1977). Statistical 
significance was not altered much by this procedure. In addition, because outliers 
were not found more so in the RDS fail groups, we had little reason to believe that 
they were illegitimate. For these reasons, and to keep the overall TBI sample studied 
as similar as possible, results from untreated data has been reported. 
 
For RDS pass/fail group comparisons of IQ DTBM, LM DTBM, PCS, anxiety and 
depression the data was considered reasonably normally distributed. Independent-
samples t-tests were therefore used. For RDS pass/fail comparisons of PTA, time 
since injury and OTBM the data was considered not normally distributed. The RDS 
pass/fail groups examined were also very different in size by virtue of studying a 
variable (poor effort) of low base rate (Rosenfeld, et al., 2000). In this context the 
non-parametric analyses used were exact Mann-Whitney tests. 
 
Estimates of effect size were made throughout. Cramer’s V was used for cross-tab 
analyses. Cohen’s d effect sizes were calculated from means and standard deviations 
and were weighted by group sizes (Thalheimer & Cook, 2002; see appendix 2). 
Effect size r was calculated for each non-parametric statistical test and converted to a 
Cohen’s d where it was felt that this would assist interpretation (Rosenthal, 1991; see 






                                                 
3
 An outlier was therefore defined as 1.5*interquartile range above and below the 75th and 





5.1 Missing values summary 
 
Throughout the results section of this project data on the available sample size as a 
function of RDS pass/ fail group is given in tablature or text corresponding to each 
statistical analysis used.  
 




The demographics of the Lishman unit TBI sample are shown in table 1. The sample 
was mainly male (67.2%) and of a white ethnicity (68%). The mean number of 
year’s education (M = 12.96) was roughly equivalent to having completed studies 
through to the end of English A-levels.    
 
5.2.2 Injury characteristics 
 
The injury characteristics of the Lishman unit TBI sample are shown in table 2. 
There was a larger proportion of patients failing the RDS who were not currently 
involved in a medicolegal claim (58.8%) as compared to those who were currently 
involved in such claims (35.3%). There was however a larger proportion of patients 
failing the RDS who had current or past involvement with a medicolegal claim 
(52.9%) as compared to those who had never been involved in such claims (35.3%). 
The proportion of patients failing the RDS who were currently involved in a 
medicolegal claim (35.3%) was more than those who had previous but closed cases 
(17.6%) but equal to those who had never sought compensation (35.3%).  
 
The median (Mdn) PTA of the whole sample was 4 days, (min = 0 minutes, max = 98 
days). The PTA of those failing the RDS (Mdn = 4 days, min = 20 minutes, max = 56 
days) was very similar to that of those who passed the RDS (Mdn = 4 days, min = 0 
minutes, max = 98 days). There were however a larger proportion of patients failing 
the RDS in the Mild TBI group (41.2%) as compared to in the Moderate and Severe 
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TBI groups; 29.4% and 23.5%, respectively). In addition, the median length of time 
since injury was shorter for those who had failed the RDS (Mdn = 21months) as 
compared to those who had passed the RDS (Mdn = 22.55 months). 
 
5.2.3 Neuropsychological functioning 
 
Table 3 shows the neuropsychology data for the Lishman unit TBI sample. The mean 
of each of the 17 z-scores produced from our instruments of measurement was lower 
in those who had failed the RDS as compared to those who had passed the RDS. 
Furthermore these differences were consistently of a medium or large effect size 
(max =.55, min = 1.05). 
 
IQ DTBM and LM DTBM data was available for n = 125 (RDS: pass, n = 108; fail, 
n = 17) and n = 120 (RDS: pass, n = 103; fail, n = 17), respectively. Indeed poorer 
neuropsychological test scores in those failing the RDS were evident in the OTBM as 
well as in both the IQ DTBM and LM DTBM. Median scores for TMT part A and B 
respectively were -1.28 (RDS: pass,-1.21; fail, -4.60) and -.88 (RDS: pass, -.65; fail, 
-7.38). 
 
5.2.4 Post-concussional symptoms 
 
Table 4 shows the mood/ psychological symptomatology data for the Lishman Unit 
TBI sample. PCS data was available for n = 95 (RDS: pass, n = 83; fail, n = 12). The 
level of post-concussional symptoms in those that failed the RDS (M = 42.08) was 
higher than that in those who passed the RDS (M =32.39). 
 
5.2.5 Anxiety and depression 
 
Anxiety and depression data was available for n =115 (RDS: pass, n = 99; fail, n = 
16). The level of anxiety in those who failed the RDS (M =14.19) was higher than 
that in those who passed the test (M = 10.82). The level of depression in those who 
failed the RDS (M =11.06) was also higher than that in those who passed the RDS 




Table 1. Demographics for the Lishman Unit TBI sample. 
    n  %  Mean  S.D.   
 
Whole    125  100  -  -  
sample     
Gender Male  84  67.2  -  -  
  Female 41  32.8  -  - 
Ethnicity White  85  68.0  -  - 
  Other4  30  24.0  -  - 
  Unknown 10  8.0  -  - 
Age  Years  125  100  39.52  12.94 
Education Years  118  94.4  12.96  2.77 
  Unknown 7  5.6  -  - 
Note. TBI, Traumatic Brain Injury; N, number; S.D., standard deviation. 
 
 
5.4 Inferential statistics 
 
5.4.1 Rate of RDS failure 
 
In our general clinical TBI sample of 125 patients 108 passed the RDS and 17 failed 
using the cut-off value of ≤6. A binomial calculation demonstrated that there was 
statistically significant evidence of a higher-than-expected rate of RDS failure 
(p<.0001) based on this data and an RDS false positive rate of 4% (associated with a 
specificity of 0.96; Heinly et al., 2005). That is, there were more than expected false 
positives based on this published specificity data which could have been owing to the 
RDS test of effort picking up clinically relevant variables other than poor effort in 
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5.4.2 Associations of RDS failure 
 
There was no significant association between RDS pass or failure and whether or not 
patients were currently involved in a medicolegal claim (FET: p = .370, 2-sided, 
Cramer’s V = .09). There was no significant association between RDS pass or failure 
and whether or not patients had ever been involved in a medicolegal claim (χ2(1) = 
2.607, p = .159, exact, 2 sided, Cramer’s V= .15). The more fine grained analysis of 
medicolegal status (as defined using Medicolegal History B) was then computed. 
There was again no significant association between RDS pass or failure and 
medicolegal status (χ2(3) = 2.953, p = .380, exact, 2 sided, Cramer’s V= .16). 
 
There was no significant difference between the PTA of those who passed and failed 
the RDS (U = 419.50, p = .76, exact, 2-sided, r = -.03). There was also no significant 
association between RDS pass or failure and whether or not the patients had 
sustained a mild, moderate or severe TBI (χ2(2) =3.468, p = .204, exact, 2 sided, 
Cramer’s V= .17). There was also no significant difference between RDS pass and 
failure in terms of length of time since injury (U =808.50, p =.683, exact, 2-sided, r = 
-.04). 
 
The result showing that those who failed the RDS compared to those that passed the 
RDS scored lower on the IQ DTBM was found to be statistically significant (t(123) = 
-4.11, p <.001, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (d =1.08). The result 
showing that those who failed the RDS compared to those that passed the RDS 
scored lower on the LM DTBM was also found to be statistically significant (t(118) 
= -3.64, p < .001, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (d = .97). Furthermore 
the result showing that those who failed the RDS compared to those that passed the 
RDS scored lower on the OTBM was also found to be statistically significant (U = 









Table 2. Frequencies for the whole sample and as a function of both RDS and injury 
characteristics. 
       RDS   
      Pass  Fail  Total   
      n (%)  n (%)   n (%)  
Whole sample    108 (86.4) 17 (13.6)  125 (100) 
PTA  Ascertained   81 (75.0) 11 (64.7) 92 (73.6) 
  Unknown   27 (25.0) 6 (35.3) 33 (26.4) 
TBI  Mild    56 (51.9) 7 (41.2) 63 (50.40) 
Severity Moderate   14 (13.0) 5 (29.4) 19 (15.20) 
  Severe    36 (33.3) 4 (23.5) 40 (32.0) 
  Unknown   2 (1.9)  1 (5.9)  3 (2.4) 
Current Currently involved  27 (25.0) 6 (35.3) 33 (26.4) 
Medicolegal Not currently involved 78 (72.2) 10 (58.8) 88 (70.4) 
Status  Unknown   3 (2.8)  1 (5.9)  4 (3.2) 
Medicolegal Current or past involvement 40 (37.0) 9 (52.9) 49 (39.2) 
History A Never involved  65 (60.2) 6 (35.3) 71 (56.8) 
  Unknown   3 (2.8)  2 (11.8) 5 (4.0) 
Medicolegal Currently involved  27 (25.0) 6 (35.3) 33 (26.4) 
History B Previous but closed  12 (11.1) 3 (17.6) 15 (12.0) 
  Never sought compensation 65 (60.2) 6 (35.3) 71 (56.8) 
  Involvement but status   
  unknown   1 (0.9)  0 (0)  1 (0.8) 
Unknown   3 (2.8)  2 (11.8) 5 (4.0) 
Injury type RTA    44 (40.7) 6 (35.3) 50 (40) 
  Assault   26 (24.1) 8 (47.1) 34 (27.2) 
  Accidental   38 (35.2) 3 (17.6) 41(32.8)  
Time since Ascertained   108 (100) 16 (94.1) 124 (99.2) 
Injury  Unknown   0 (0)  1 (5.9)  1 (0.8) 
Note. RDS, Reliable Digit Span; PTA, Post-Traumatic Amnesia; n, number; RTA, 





Table 3. Means (M) and standard deviations (S.D.) for Test, DTBM, and OTBM Z-
scores for the whole sample and as a function of RDS pass/fail. ES (d) is also shown. 
       RDS  
Total  Pass  Fail  ES  
M (S.D.) M (S.D.) M (S.D.) d 
Domain      
IQ 
- Vocabulary   -.02 (1.25) .13 (1.19) -.96 (1.22) .92 
- Similarities   -.16 (1.06) -.04 (1.0) -.94 (1.09) .9 
- Block design   .05 (1.08) .13 (1.02) -.45 (1.29) .55 
- Matrix reasoning  .03 (1.13) .18 (1.02) -.92 (1.30) 1.05 
- NART   .05 (.95) .16 (.90) -.70 (.96) .96 
DTBM   -.03 (.91) .10 (.84) -.82 (.98) 1.08 
LM 
- List learning A1-A5  -.98 (1.47) -.82 (1.41) -1.97 (1.48) .82 
- List learning A6  -.96 (1.40) -.83 (1.36) -1.75 (1.42) .68 
- Design learning A1-A5 -.28 (1.28) -.15 (1.19) -1.13 (1.56) .8 
- Design learning A6  -.03 (1.17) .06 (1.09) -.67 (1.47) .64 
- Immediate story recall -.49 (1.12) -.41 (1.06) -.97 (1.37) .51 
- Delayed story recall  -.58 (1.16) -.48 (1.11) -1.22 (1.27) .66 
- Immediate figure recall -.27 (1.07) -.18 (1.03) -.88 (1.16) .67 
- Delayed figure recall -.32 (1.08) -.22 (1.05) -.94 (1.08) .69 
DTBM   -.52 (1.01) -.39 (.92) -1.31 (1.18) .97 
Additional  
- Digit Symbol  -.92 (1.06) -.81 (1.02) -1.61 (1.11) .78 
- COWAT   -.47 (1.12) -.35 (1.05) -1.28 (1.32) .86 
- TMT A   -2.45 (3.96) -2.20 (3.87) -4.20 (4.29) .51 
- TMT B   -2.57 (4.90) -2.01 (4.67) -6.74 (4.68) 1.02 
    Mdn  Mdn  Mdn  d 
OTBM:   -.40  -.29  -1.81  -.72  
Note. DTBM, Domain Test Battery Mean; OTBM, Overall Test Battery Mean; RDS, 
Reliable Digit Span; IQ, intelligence; LM, learning and memory; COWAT, 





Table 4. Means (M) and standard deviations (S.D.) for RPQ and HADS total scores 
for the whole sample and as a function of RDS pass/fail. ES (d) is also shown. 
       RDS  
Total  Pass  Fail  ES  
    M (S.D.) M (S.D.) M (S.D.) d 
- RPQ    33.62 (12.97) 32.39 (13.03) 42.08 (9.06) .8 
- HADS anxiety  11.29 (4.63) 10.82 (4.62) 14.19 (3.66) .75 
- HADS depression  8.65 (4.36) 8.26 (4.36) 11.06 (3.62) .66 
Note. RDS, Reliable Digit Span; RPQ, Rivermead Post-concussional Questionnaire; 
HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; ES, Effect Size. 
 
 
5.4.3 Post-concussional symptoms and RDS failure 
 
The result showing that post-concussional symptoms was higher in those that failed 
the RDS compared to those that passed the RDS was found to be statistically 
significant (t(93) = 2.49, p = .015, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (d = 
.8). 
 
5.4.4 Anxiety, depression and RDS failure 
 
The result showing that anxiety was higher in those that failed the RDS compared to 
those that passed the RDS was found to be statistically significant (t(113) = 2.78, p = 
.006, 2-sided). This result had a large effect size (d = .75). The result showing that 
depression was higher in those that failed the RDS compared to those that passed the 
RDS was also found to be statistically significant (t(113) = 2.44, p = .016, 2-sided). 










This service evaluation project examined the use of the RDS as a routine indicator of 
effort in a tertiary outpatient clinic for patients with TBI. The findings were to inform 
the clinical neuropsychology service and its future audit in keeping with professional 
practice guidance (BPS, 2009). There were three main aims addressed with several 
project questions and hypotheses for which partial support was found. 
 
6.1 Rate of RDS failure 
 
There were 17 (13.6%) TBI patients who failed the RDS (≤6; Heinly et al., 2005) 
and 108 (86.4%) who passed in the whole sample of 125 patients. This rate of poor 
effort is lower than both the average (40%) and minimum (15%) prevalence of 
probable malingering found in a summation across eleven studies by U.S.A based 
neuropsychologists with data pertinent to prevalence rates (Larrabee, 2003; 
Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993 as cited in Larrabee, 2003). However, American 
neuropsychologists may be more commonly assessing effort in the context of 
medicolegal claims for that purpose. Conversely our U.K.-based clinic patients are 
assessed for clinical reasons, especially for prospective cognitive behavioural therapy 
or cognitive rehabilitation, albeit with a proportion (49 out of 120 with recorded 
litigation status) of individuals either previously or currently involved in ongoing 
medicolegal claims. Involvement in a medicolegal claim is a known predictor of poor 
effort and malingering (Slick et al., 1999). If the primary reason for applying poor 
effort is indeed monetary then it would therefore make sense that the rate of poor 
effort at the Lishman Unit appears comparatively lower. 
 
Nonetheless, based on the published specificity of RDS of 0.96 (and its false positive 
rate of 4%; Heinly et al., 2005) a binomial calculation showed that there was 
evidence of a statistically significant higher-than-expected rate of RDS failure in our 
general clinical TBI sample than might be expected if all the instances of RDS 
failure represented false positives. This result suggests that RDS failure may reflect 





6.2 Associations of RDS failure 
 
In contrast to our expectations, RDS failure was not associated with severity of TBI. 
Numerous studies have shown that poor effort and malingering is more common in 
people with milder brain injuries (Binder, & Rohling, 1996). It might be that milder 
TBI patients are more likely to apply poor effort because, in the context of litigation, 
their proceedings are often perceived as somewhat less clear-cut compared to more 
severe cases. At the Lishman Unit however, given that it offers a tertiary service, 
only more complex clinical cases are seen with the presence of PCS. There might 
therefore be less of a perceived need by patients with milder TBI to apply poor 
effort.  
 
Similarly, and in contrast with more general findings from meta-analyses that show 
an association between increasing injury severity and more severe cognitive 
impairments, RDS failure was not associated with increased injury severity 
(Schretlen & Shapiro, 2003). The absence of this association is also not in keeping 
with the systematic reduction in specificity of the RDS with increasing severity of 
brain injury observed in some existing studies (Greiffenstein et al., 1994, 1995; 
Mathias et al., 2002). The RDS therefore did not seem to be effected by more 
“organic” effects of TBI in the current project in keeping with the digit span’s 
reported relative insensitivity to organic amnesia (Iverson & Franzen, 1991). 
 
It is noteworthy that others have not found associations between injury severity and 
proposed measures of effort (Bowden, Shores, & Mathias 2006; Rohling and 
Demakis, 2010): the interpretation of these null findings continues to be discussed, 
with some arguing that this threatens their validity as effort tests (Bowden et al, 
2006) and others suggesting otherwise (Rohling & Demakis, 2010). Nevertheless, 
associations between the RDS and other variables that appear important for the 
interpretation of this proposed index of effort were found in the present project. 
 
RDS failure was also not associated with being involved in a medicolegal claim in 
the current project. This null effect held for all three methods of coding this variable. 
These findings are in contrast to the gold standard criteria for the identification of 
malingering in which current medicolegal involvement with a monetary incentive is 
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viewed as a primary criterion (Slick et al., 1999). It is however only one criterion 
amongst the cluster that Slick et al (1999) highlight. It has also been reported that 
such an association is more apparent for individuals with MTBI (Binder & Rohling, 
1996). The present project’s sample might have been lacking in power to replicate an 
association between MTBI specifically and medicolegal status however.  
 
In keeping with other predictions, significantly poorer neuropsychological test scores 
were found in those who failed the RDS. This association was consistently the case 
throughout our neuropsychological data and was therefore apparent in the OTBM 
and both the IQ DTBM and LM DTBM, in keeping with Green et al. (2001), and 
consistent with the proposed role of RDS as a measure of effort. However, the 
proportion of variance in neuropsychological test performance that was explained by 
RDS failure (11%) was low relative to that in a larger litigating sample (53%, Green 
et al., 2001). This large discrepancy could be due to the RDS being a poor index of 
effort as compared to the composite measure of effort used by Green et al. (2001). 
Nonetheless, this difference might also be owing to the greater number of factors 
affecting OTBM in a clinical sample.  
 
It is possible that a third variable influenced both the RDS and neuropsychological 
performance. For example, TBI patients pre-occupied with an apparent link between 
their history of a brain injury and a likelihood of cognitive impairments might 
underperform during neuropsychological testing due to the effects of rumination, or 
similar stimulus independent thoughts (SITs), using some working memory capacity 
(Teasdale et al., 1995). A similar phenomenon in a group of individuals with a 
history of MTBI but not seeking clinical or medicolegal help, described as “diagnosis 
threat”, was found to be independent of effort as measured by both self-report and a 
SVT (Suhr & Gunstad 2002; Suhr & Gunstad, 2005). It was however related to 
poorer performances in attention/ working memory including on the WAIS-IIIUK 
digit span (Suhr & Gunstad, 2005). The concept of diagnosis threat might be 
inclusive of a process of SITs implicated in unintentional poor effort that the RDS is 
also sensitive to.  
 
PCS were significantly higher in those failing the RDS. The difference in such 
symptoms between the RDS pass/fail groups amounted to a large effect size. This 
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result is supported by higher rates of PCS in people with MTBI who failed as 
compared to passed the TOMM (Lange et al., 2010). Others have found that PCS 
vary as a function of medicolegal status in a group of moderate-severe TBI patients 
(Tsanadis, et al., 2008). It is possible that there is shared variance between the effects 
of effort and litigation in terms of the extent of PCS reported by TBI patients. 
 
In addition our supplementary analyses found that general reports of depression and 
anxiety symptoms were significantly higher in those who failed the RDS. Indeed the 
RDS is derived from an intelligence subtest of verbal working memory and the 
detrimental effect of depression on cognitive ability is a well established one (Elliott, 
1998). It has also been suggested however that people who are depressed tend not to 
apply maximum effort (Kaplan & Saddock, 1991). It is worth noting that this is a 
process independent of medicolegal status or of other tangible secondary gains and 
can therefore be referred to as unintentional poor effort. A third variable might also 
be significant in mediating this relationship: for example blaming others more for a 
brain injury predicts depression (Hart, Hanks, Bogner, Millis, & Esselman, 2007). It 
is possible that such attributions around blame and responsibility feed into a process 
of poor effort and reinforces depressive symptomatology. Indeed, and building on a 
previous point, the deleterious effects of SITs on concurrent executive processing in 
depressed patients has gained experimental evidence (Watkins & Brown, 2002). 
 
Major depression however, in both inpatients and disability-seeking outpatients, has 
been found not to influence the outcome of performance on the TOMM - a SVT 
measuring effort using a visual recognition memory format (Rees, Tombaugh, & 
Boulay, 2001; Yanez, Fremouw, Tennant, Strunk & Coker, 2006). If depression was 
contributing to the higher than expected rate of false positives for poor effort in our 
sample this rate should reduce with the use of the TOMM as compared to the RDS at 
the Lishman Unit. Given that our data is only correlational however it is also possible 
that those who apply poor effort on the RDS also over-report symptoms of 
depression. 
 
It is interesting that those who failed the RDS also had significantly higher anxiety 
compared to those who passed. There is some correlational evidence that test anxiety 
negatively influences cognitive performance (Gass, 2002). Whilst the measure used 
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to assess anxiety in the present project focussed on more general symptoms, rather 
than test anxiety, those who have higher symptoms of clinical anxiety might be more 
likely to experience test anxiety. However, it is also possible that people who apply 
poor effort over-report anxiety symptomatology. 
 
6.3 Limitations and future service plans 
 
The method used in this project was a retrospective observation of 
neuropsychological assessments carried out for a clinical purpose. There was 
therefore an inevitable amount of missing data which contributed to some reduction 
in statistical power in the context of examining poor effort, a variable of low base 
rate (Rosenfeld, et al., 2000). Statistical measures were nonetheless taken to 
compensate for the difference in group sizes between those passing and failing the 
RDS. It is interesting to consider that significant associations with injury severity 
and/or medicolegal status might have emerged with a larger RDS fail sample. A 
larger sample size might have been found with a more liberal RDS cut-off of ≤7 
(Jazinski et al., 2011). According to Heinly et al. (2005) however such change in 
criteria would lead to unsatisfactory false positive rates and indeed the present 
project has found this to be especially problematic in clinical samples when using ≤6.   
 
The design was also cross-sectional meaning that cause and effect could not be 
established. For example, our design cannot ascertain if PCS, anxiety, and depression 
cause TBI patients to apply poor effort or if people over-report such psychological 
symptomatology in their attempts to deliberately feign adverse consequences. 
Furthermore, our design cannot show that the higher rates of PCS, anxiety, and 
depression in patients failing the RDS are mutually exclusive psychological 
phenomena. Indeed postconcussion-like symptoms are frequently found in 
outpatients being seen for psychological treatment and, patients with depression 
often meet diagnostic criteria for this syndrome (Fox, Lees-Haley, Ernest, & 
Dolezal-Wood, 1995; Iverson, 2006). In addition, the design cannot rule out the 
possibility of extraneous third factors which cause both RDS failure and higher 




Furthermore, this project did not have an independent gold standard of effort 
measurement, unlike research using known-groups designs, meaning that a base rate 
(excluding false positives) could not be ascertained. In future projects it might be 
useful to organise a Lishman Unit TBI sample (or subsample) according to criteria 
set out by Slick et al. (1999) or according to a purpose-built SVT like the TOMM or 
Green’s Word Memory Test (Tombaugh, 1996; Green, 2003). Different indices of 
predictive accuracy could then be documented for one or more RDS cut-off values 
for the identification of malingering as per the gold standard used. 
 
The presence of a gold standard measure of poor effort would also allow the base 
rate of poor effort in the TBI outpatients attending the Lishman Unit to be used to 
assess the utility of the RDS in terms of PPV (Heinly et al., 2005).  Published 
standards of PPV denoting what can be considered a useful rate of poor effort 
detection exist (e.g. ≥0.5, Kagehiro, 1990; Heinly et al., 2005; Greve & Bianchini, 
2006; ≥0.8, Valabhajosula & Van Gorp, 2001). If a non-satisfactory PPV is found 
then it might be appropriate for the Lishman Unit to consider applying a more 
conservative RDS cut-off value to improve its specificity by reducing the likelihood 
of a high false positive rate. The addition of a stand-alone SVT as a routine measure 
would also be in keeping with results that do not support the use of the RDS as a sole 
measure of effort (Miele et al., 2011). The clinical time that this proposed additional 
routine measure would take however might not be justifiable in a population with 
such a small base rate of poor effort. An alternative might be to cross-validate and 
then add a second embedded measure of effort in an attempt to improve the services 




In conclusion, in a retrospective review of n = 125 neuropsychological assessments 
following TBI we found that 108 (86.4%) passed and 17 (13.6%) failed a proposed 
embedded measure of effort, the RDS. This rate of RDS failure included a higher 
than expected number based on predicted numbers of false positives using existing 
data on the measure. RDS failure was associated with poorer neuropsychological test 
performance as would be expected of a measure of effort. RDS failure was also 
associated with PCS, anxiety and depression. However, it was not associated with 
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medicolegal status or brain injury severity. Although the data showed partial support 
for the use of RDS as a measure of effort clinicians should be aware of these other 
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8.0 Appendices  
 
8.1 Appendix 1: conversion equation 
 
The following equation was used to convert age adjusted data for the NART, WAIS-
IIIUK subtests and the AMIPB immediate and delayed story and figure recall trials 
and the list and design learning trials (A1-A5, and A6)  into a common metric:   
 
 
Z-score = (Patient score – population mean)/ population standard deviation 
 
For example, for WAIS-III subtests scores, defined as having a population mean of 
























8.2 Appendix 2: Cohen’s d effect size equation 
 
 












































8.3 Appendix 3: effect size r  equation 
 


































8.4 Appendix 4: ethnic diversity in the sample 
 
For a proportion of those coded as “other” in the Excel spreadsheet compiled in the 







1 Pakistan/ Kenya 
1 Belgian 
1 Indian 
1 Black British 
1 Spanish 
2 Caribbean 
1 Black Nigerian 
1 Iranian 
1 Any other group- Asian 
1 Cypriot 
1 Any other group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
